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Introduction
In the three independent chapters of this thesis I study microeconomic interactions on
different markets, thereby addressing questions of market design and industrial organiza-
tion. Although distinct in their nature, all markets I consider allow for the interplay and
competition of participants, whose decisions impact the allocation of limited resources.
In this work market design refers to the design of allocation rules affecting the out-
come in two-sided matching markets, as considered in chapter one. Here, participants
on either side have preferences over a matching with the other side. While there is
competition among participants for these matchings, there is no price to balance supply
and demand. Therefore matching algorithms are employed to find an allocation. When
there are prices to clear a market in the traditional microeconomic sense, as in chapters
two and three, tools from game theory and industrial organization help to analyze the
strategic behavior of market participants and to understand what makes these markets
work better. However, in online markets as in chapter two, prices may not be monetary
but rather consist of private data "payments", which has important implications for pri-
vacy and competition policies. Moreover, on many other markets as in chapter three,
prices can be dynamic because goods are sold during longer sales periods, such that
inter-temporal optimizations of firms and consumers need to be considered. Summing
up, as the notions of market and price can differ, also analyses and policy results in the
three considered markets are distinct.
In the first chapter of this thesis I consider the market for lawyer trainee-ship posi-
tions, which exhibits a many-to-one matching problem. Based on lawyers’ preferences
and their priorities at courts, many lawyers are matched each year to a regional court in
Germany. Because of excess demand in some regions lawyers often have to wait before
being allocated. I show that the currently used “Berlin” mechanism is not weakly Pareto
efficient, does not eliminate justified envy and does not respect improvements. Therefore,
I introduce a mechanism based on the matching with contracts literature, using waiting
time as the contractual term. The resulting mechanism is strategy-proof, weakly Pareto
efficient, eliminates justified envy and respects improvements. Furthermore, I extend the
proposed mechanism to allow for a more flexible allocation of positions over time.
2 Introduction
In chapter two I analyze online platform competition. Here, two-sided platforms,
such as search engines or social networks, charge on the one side a monetary price from
advertisers for the placement of ads, while on the other side users “pay” with their private
data in order to gain access to the platform. This user data improves ad-targeting,
hence is a valuable resource for platforms and advertisers. Considering that users incur
privacy costs, I show that the equilibrium level of data provision is distorted and can be
inefficiently high or low: if overall competition is weak or if targeting benefits are low, too
much private data is collected, and vice-versa. Further, I find that softer competition on
either market side leads to more data collection, which implies substitutability between
competition policy measures on both market sides. Moreover, if platforms engage in two-
sided pricing, i.e. use monetary payments on both market sides, data provision would be
efficient.
The third chapter of this thesis is on dynamic pricing, such as in markets for airline
tickets or travel bookings. Competition in these markets does not only take place in
a static environment but rather throughout a finite selling horizon with a deadline, for
example the departure or event day. Capacity-constrained firms compete to sell their
goods, whereby they can dynamically adjust their prices at all times until this dead-
line. Therefore, firms face an inter-temporal pricing problem, trading off current-period
payoffs and continuation values. Forward-looking consumers, too, face an inter-temporal
problem of buying at current prices or waiting to buy later at possibly better prices, how-
ever at the risk of being rationed. In the pure-strategy equilibrium firms set dispersed
prices, which depend on the number of unsold capacities relative to remaining selling
time. The resulting price paths provide an explanation for empirically observed price
volatility. A policy allowing consumers to become forward-looking increases consumer
surplus yet reduces efficiency and industry profits. Further, I find that competition pol-
icy is especially relevant if market capacities are excessive. Last, my results show that
ex-ante capacity production can be inefficiently low.
3
Chapter I
Matching with Waiting Times:
The German Entry-Level Labor
Market for Lawyers
Based on Dimakopoulos and Heller (2017).
1 Introduction
Many real world matching markets fail to match all participants. Those who are un-
matched may either leave the market altogether or wait and participate in a later match-
ing procedure. The example that we study here is the allocation of graduating lawyers
to their legal trainee-ship at regional courts in Germany. In this market congestion arises
because of excess demand for positions in some parts of the country. This congestion is
managed by requiring unmatched applicants to enter a wait list for their trainee-ship. To
ensure that lawyers will eventually obtain a position at a court, the priority of a lawyer
increases with the acquired waiting time. We assume that lawyers have preferences over
where and when they complete their legal trainee-ship. The preferences over time are
however ignored by the currently used procedure, which leads to a lack of efficiency,
justified envy and a lack of respect of improvements. We propose a new procedure that
does not suffer from those shortcomings.
The focus of this work is the trainee-ship allocation problem between graduated
lawyers on the one side and courts on the other side. This is an important market as
each year there are approximately 8,000 positions for legal trainee-ship in Germany.1
These numbers are comparable to the (roughly) 20,000 US hospital residency program
1Based on authors’ calculations using data from http://www.juristenkoffer.de/
rechtsreferendariat/ (Accessed 8. October 2015).
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matches per year studied by Roth and others, e.g. in Roth (1984). In this lawyer market
the wage is regulated so it cannot be used to reduce congestion by balancing excess
demand.
Unlike in the United States, in Germany lawyers typically begin their legal education
as an undergraduate, studying law at a university for around four years. Afterward
students take a first state exam, set by the 16 federal states. Following this, students
may apply for a legal trainee-ship. Completion of the trainee-ship is necessary to practice
law in Germany and a requirement for many jobs in the bureaucracy. It is thus important
to ensure access to trainee-ships for all lawyers who wish to complete it.
There is no cooperation across the federal states in terms of having a single national
market for positions. This means that each lawyer can in principle apply for a position
in each of the federal states.2 This leads to sizable congestion, since in the extreme the
total number of registered applicants in the system will be several times the number of
positions actually demanded by the lawyers. We suspect that multiple applications by
some lawyers for positions in several federal states is at least partially responsible for
long waiting times as some lawyers apply for positions as a safety option which they are
unlikely to take. The authorities seem to be aware of this possibility. Several application
forms contain declarations that there are no pending applications to other regional courts
of appeals or require applicants to withdraw other applications.3 If they do not accept
a position after they have been offered one, then the application system requires the
lawyers to inform the respective authorities in the federal state.4 The authorities may
then decide to allow additional lawyers to begin their trainee-ship at that period. This
process of refusing and making new offers takes up time and may leave some positions
unused if no other lawyers can be found to take up these positions.5 Note that this
process of formally accepting and rejecting offers could also be addressed by allowing
2The allocation of lawyers to courts is organized by regional courts of appeals in each state. Some
federal states, notably Bavaria and North Rhine-Westfalia, contain several regional courts of appeals so
even within a state there is scope for greater coordination.
3See for example the application web page of the regional court of appeals in Munich, https://www.
justiz.bayern.de/gericht/olg/m/studiosi/01441/index.php (accessed 8. October 2015).
4For example, Art. 4 of the “Verordnung über die Aufnahme in den juristischen Vorbereitungsdienst”
of Hamburg states that applicants who have not accepted a position that was offered to them within 10
days, will not be allocated. Furthermore it says that if an applicant does not accept a position twice,
the applicant will be excluded from the application procedure and will have to reapply. Last, it says
positions which have not been accepted are allocated to applicants next in line.
5For example on 6. October 2015 in North Rhine-Westfalia there were 12 positions still to
be filled to begin on 1. November 2015. See http://www.olg-duesseldorf.nrw.de/aufgaben/
referendarabteilung/09_weiter_info/index.php (accessed 8. October 2015). Congestion problems
arising from the need to sequentially inquire about agents acceptance and rejection of offers have been
found for example in the market for clinical psychology, Roth and Xing (1997).
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lawyers to formally declare some courts as unacceptable and committing applicants to
accepting any position that they were offered. However if the value of the outside option
is unknown at the time preferences are submitted, then this will not alleviate the problem
of offers being refused.6
While the organization of the allocation procedure by federal state, rather than having
a national procedure, seems to us to be a major cause of congestion in the market
for lawyers, addressing this problem would require coordinated action of the federal
states. Given the difficulty of establishing such cooperation, we here take the approach
to consider only an isolated federal state and analyze how the allocation procedure in
that federal state should be designed to better handle the congestion resulting from the
lack of national coordination. We thus treat the federalized nature of this labor market
as an additional constraint to be respected by the market designer, akin to the constraint
that monetary flexibility cannot be used to clear some matching markets (e.g. for kidneys
or schools7).
The number of available positions for the trainee-ship varies by court and usually
depends on its size and the budget that has been made available for legal trainees in
the budget of the federal state and/or the capacity of the court. This budget is usually
set for several starting dates in advance. For example, the relevant administrative order
in Berlin states that the capacity needs to be determined for one year in advance while
positions may be started in February, May, August and December.8 In Hamburg, the
relevant administrative order states that the number of positions is determined by the
number of positions fixed in the budget, which is valid for at least one year. Trainee-ships
can start every even-numbered month.9 In Hessen capacities are set every half a year,
while new positions are available in all odd-numbered months.10
Due to large numbers of applications in some federal states, not all lawyers applying
for a position at a court can be allocated at their desired starting time.11 The excess
6This is the case when several federal states run their allocation procedures in parallel.
7See Roth et al. (2004) and Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003)
8See Art. 2 (2) in the “Verordnung über die Ausbildungskapazität und das Vergabeverfahren für den
juristischen Vorbereitungsdienst” (Stadt Berlin (2004)) for setting capacities. Dates for entry into the
trainee-ship are taken from http://www.berlin.de/sen/justiz/gerichte/kg/ausbildung/jur-vorb/
bew-verf/ (accessed 6. October 2015).
9See Art. 2 and Art. 3 (1) in the “Verordnung über die Aufnahme in den juristischen Vorbereitungs-
dienst” (Hansestadt Hamburg (2012)) for how capacities are set and the dates when trainee-ships start,
respectively.
10See the guidelines on the legal trainee-ship for Hesse.
11Most application forms ask for the desired entry date of an applicant. Even if applicants could only
apply for the next starting date, delaying applications until that date ensures that students can affect
the time period for which they are considered.
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demand is managed via a system based on waiting times accumulated by the applicants.12
Most federal states have a system whereby a lawyer’s priority in being allocated a place
at a court increases in the number of times that lawyer was not matched. For example
in Hamburg, grades, waiting time and other concerns are weighted and expressed as a
single score for each lawyer.13 In North Rhine-Westfalia by contrast only the time since
the application was received by the regional court of appeals determines the ranking of
a candidate.14 In Hessen 35% of positions are reserved for applicants with the highest
waiting time.15 In Brandenburg 70% of positions are reserved for applicants with the
highest waiting time.16 Thereby it is in principle possible for each lawyer to gain some
place in a federal state eventually. Currently, average waiting times can be up to 24
months, depending on the federal state, although it should be noted that in many states
waiting time is zero or only a couple of months.17
When applying for a position lawyers can typically indicate a preference for a par-
ticular regional court.18 While lawyers can submit rankings over the courts, there is no
legal guarantee of being assigned the first choice court.19 While in general the allocation
of lawyers to courts should take into account reported preferences, capacities and pri-
orities, we could not find a clear description of the methods used to allocate lawyers to
12For example, in Berlin for entry on August 3rd 2015 applicants with a grade of 10 or higher were
admitted if they applied 5 months earlier. Those who did their state exam in Berlin were admitted if
they applied 10 months earlier, while those who did their state exam elsewhere with a grade below 10
were admitted if they applied 11 months earlier.
13Art. 5 of the Aufnahmeverordnung (AVO,Hansestadt Hamburg (2012)) sets rules on how to calculate
this score. The base score is the minimum of 6.49 and the grade achieved by the lawyer in the first state
exam (Art. 5 (1) AVO). Further points can be added for example for having completed military service,
disabilities, having done the state exam in Hamburg and for every 6 months of accumulated waiting time
(Art. 5 (2) AVO). In case of ties in the weighted score, Art. 6 (1) AVO instructs to use the grade in the
state exam to break ties. Remaining ties are to be broken via lottery according to Art. 6 (2) AVO.
14See https://www.justiz.nrw.de/WebPortal/JM/landesjustizpruefungsamt/juristischer_
vorbereitungsdienst/2Einstellung/index.php (accessed 7. October 2015).
15See the Justizprüfungsamt Hessen (2011). Another 50% are reserved for lawyers based on merit and
the remaining 15% are reserved for applicants satisfying social criteria.
16See Art. 11 (3) of the “Juristenausbildungsgesetz” of Brandenburg (Land Brandenburg (2014)). 20%
of positions are given based on waiting time, with the remaining 10% given based on social criteria.
17Based on data from http://www.juristenkoffer.de/rechtsreferendariat/ (Accessed 8. October
2015).
18For example lawyers applying to do their trainee-ship in the district of the Dusseldorf (North Rhine-
Westfalia) regional court of appeals can apply to the regional courts in Dusseldorf, Duisburg, Kleve,
Krefeld, Mönchengladbach or Wuppertal.
19For example, Art. 30 (3) of the Lawyer Education Law of North Rhine-Westfalia (Juristenaus-
bildungsgesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen, JAG NRW) states that there is no legal right to a position in a
particular district of a regional court of appeals and at a particular time.
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courts.20 Some regional courts of appeal give some additional insights into how lawyers
are allocated to particular courts. For example, applicants to Munich are ranked accord-
ing to a number of criteria.21 The highest priority is given to applicants having to care
for their children, followed by married couples having lived for at least one year in the
desired location. Next come those suffering from serious illnesses and then those working
as teaching assistants at universities in the desired location. Finally, the length of time
that applicants have lived in the desired location is used. There is however no indication
in what way those priorities are used.
To analyze the market while accounting for waiting time, we propose a lawyer-court
matching problem based on Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).22 On the one side of the market
there are lawyers, who have preferences over assignments to courts over time. Courts on
the other side have priorities over lawyers, possibly based on their grade, social criteria
and accumulated waiting time, which together with the current time period determines
a lawyer’s waiting time.23 A matching mechanism in this context produces an allocation
consisting of a subset of contracts, which specify a lawyer, a court and the time period
the trainee-ship begins. Capacities of a court in future periods are already known, as we
discussed above.
Based on the features of the currently used procedure we introduce the “Berlin”
mechanism. This mechanism is not weakly Pareto efficient. We show that this mecha-
nism may lead to allocations where one lawyer justifiably envies another. Furthermore
improvements of the ranking achieved by a lawyer may yield an allocation that is worse
for that lawyer. However, by construction, the Berlin mechanism achieves an allocation,
such that no currently available positions remain unfilled while allocating some lawyers
to later positions.
We propose the time-specific choice function, which is a special case of choice functions
based on slot-specific priorities of Kominers and Sönmez (2016). Here time-specific means
that each court can only accept a fixed number of students to begin their trainee-ship in
a given period. Using the time-specific choice functions, the cumulative offer process of
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) is used to find stable allocations. Extending beyond current
20For example, in the guidelines on the application in the Dusseldorf district, it simply says that lawyers
are allocated to courts following a “comprehensive view” of all applications. This may result in lawyers
not getting their first choice so that they are asked to indicate further preferences, (Oberlandesgericht
Düsseldorf (2015b)).
21See the criteria for the allocation of trainee-ships, Oberlandesgericht München, (2015).
22 Other related papers are Hatfield and Kojima (2010), Kominers and Sönmez (2016), Sönmez (2013)
and Sönmez and Switzer (2013).
23In the district of the regional court of appeals in Dusseldorf, it is explicitly stated that a higher
waiting time does not affect the allocation to a desired court (Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (2015b)).
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results, we can show the existence of a lawyer-optimal stable allocation, when lawyers
prefer earlier assignments. In cases where lawyers’ preferences are unrestricted, no such
lawyer-optimal stable allocation need exist.
The time-specific choice function does not satisfy some properties used in the previous
literature. Notably it fails to satisfy the unilateral substitutes condition and the law of
aggregate demand. Hence we cannot use the results of Hatfield and Kojima (2009) and
Hatfield and Kojima (2010). We instead apply the results of Kominers and Sönmez (2016)
to show that the time-specific lawyer proposing mechanism is (group) strategy-proof for
the lawyers. Moreover, this mechanism is weakly Pareto efficient, eliminates justified
envy and respects improvements. Furthermore, our mechanism creates incentives for all
lawyers to report verifiable information increasing their priority at a court. However,
it may allocate some lawyers to later positions while leaving some currently available
positions unfilled. It thus allows current lawyers to obtain better positions at the expense
of future lawyers.
We consider another modified version of the matching with contracts model, in which
we no longer have time-specific constraints for each court. Instead, courts face only ag-
gregate capacity constraints and are able to shift their positions flexibly over time. This
would be applicable if courts had control over their own budgets over a period of some
years. We construct the flexible choice function for courts, based on the time-specific
choice function. The resulting flexible lawyer-optimal stable mechanism (FLOSM) is
(group) strategy-proof, weakly Pareto efficient, while eliminating justified envy and re-
specting improvements. Furthermore it Pareto dominates the allocation obtained when
time-specific capacity constraints need to be respected. It may however violate the time-
specific capacity constraints of the courts.
While our model has been developed with the entry-level labor market for lawyers in
Germany in mind, there are potentially many more applications of the basic framework.
For example, university admissions in Germany for some very competitive courses, such
as medicine, often ration places by putting unsuccessful applicants on waiting lists. A
certain fraction of all seats is then reserved for those applicants who have waited a
sufficient number of periods. Another potential application concerns the allocation of
aspiring teachers to teaching trainee-ship positions at schools, in a system very similar
to that of lawyers. The main difference to the market for lawyers is that teachers differ
based on their chosen subjects, so that schools’ preferences over teachers will be more
complex than courts’ priorities over lawyers. In addition schools are likely to be strategic
players, unlike the courts. A position for math and physics teacher could for example
2. Literature 9
be filled either by one teacher for both subjects or by two teachers each responsible for
one of the subjects. Further interesting applications of matching with waiting times are
(social or student) house allocation problems. For example, if there are a number of
different projects to construct social housing that finished at different, known points in
time then our model could be directly applied.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the
relevant literature. The model and some definitions are introduced in Section 3. Using
our model, in Section 4 we analyze the currently applied Berlin mechanism and its
properties. In Section 5 we propose mechanisms based on matching with contracts.
Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs that are not in the main text.
2 Literature
This paper fits into the research agenda started by Gale and Shapley (1962) on two-sided
matching. For a summary of research in this vein until 1990, see Roth and Sotomayor
(1990). Two-sided matching has found important applications in the design of labor
markets. For examples of the application of two-sided matching to medical entry-level
labor markets see Roth (1984), Roth (1991) or Roth and Peranson (1999). More re-
cently a number of papers have applied the original two-sided matching problem to the
allocation of seats at universities, for instance Balinski and Sönmez (1999) and, more
prominently, to the design of school choice mechanisms (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez,
2003; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005b,a).
The canonical model of matching with contracts is due to Hatfield and Milgrom
(2005),24 which was later extended by Hatfield and Kojima (2008), Hatfield and Kojima
(2009), Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Hatfield et al. (2015a). Some early precursors of
this type of model are Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982).
In two recent contributions by Sönmez and Switzer (2013) and Sönmez (2013) new
applications of the matching with contracts model to the allocation of cadets to branches
of the US Army are introduced. Their treatment relies heavily on the recent result of
the literature on matching with contracts and shows their practical relevance. In their
case the number of years a cadet commits to serve in the army is the contract term.
In our model the time at which a lawyer starts her trainee-ship is the contract term.
Our work is closely related to and makes use of results in Kominers and Sönmez (2016)
who study a more general slot-specific matching with contracts model. We use their
24Fleiner (2003) uses a similar fixed-point approach to find stable matchings.
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results to show (group) strategy-proofness and respect of improvements for our preferred
mechanism, the time-specific lawyer offering stable mechanism. We additionally show
the existence of a lawyer-optimal stable mechanism by assuming weak impatience for the
lawyers.25 In recent work, Aygun and Turhan (2016) study dynamic reserves in Indian
engineering school admission, where some seats might remain unfilled due to affirmative
action reserves. Also using the matching with contracts framework and a new choice
function for schools, the authors employ privilege types as contractual terms. In our
paper we consider the time dimension, giving rise to additional dynamic properties.
There are several papers considering dynamic matching models. Leshno (2015) con-
siders a queuing model in which agents are of two (privately known) types and can be
assigned to one of two objects. There is overload in the sense that there are many agents
waiting to be assigned an object. This model differs from ours in that the arrival of
objects is random, whereas in our model it is known. Furthermore Leshno (2015) as-
sumes that waiting is equally costly for agents, whereas in our model agents differ in
time preferences.
Thakral (2015) studies a model similar to Leshno (2015) and ours, where agents are
assigned to public housing. In his model houses arrive stochastically over time due to
existing tenants moving out of public housing at their discretion. He assumes that agents
are weakly impatient in the sense that being assigned public housing earlier is preferred
to it being assigned later. Assuming that there is a common ordering of the houses over
the agents, he introduces a strategy-proof mechanism that eliminates justified envy and
is efficient evaluated at a particular point in time. If the realization of the house arrival
process in the model of Thakral (2015) were known, it would correspond to our model
in which the available positions in the future are known.
Kadam and Kotowski (2015) consider a two-sided matching model in which agents
may have different partners over time. Their model set-up could be formulated in terms
of a matching with waiting time model as we propose. The difference to our model is
that both sides of the market would be allowed to sign multiple contracts even if all
agents can only be matched to one other agent in a given period of time. In addition,
they focus on different notions of stability.
Another related literature is the one on dynamic matching markets. Papers in that
literature have, to our knowledge, not yet made use of the matching with contracts
framework. Damiano and Lam (2005) consider one-to-one matching markets which are
repeated over time. Here the outcome is a matching associating one man to a woman for
25An alternative route towards our results can be found in Hatfield et al. (2015b) who provide conditions
for cumulative offer processes to yield stable and strategy-proof mechanisms.
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each period. Similarly, Kurino (2009) considers one-to-one repeated matching markets.
The focus in the latter paper is on a new notion of credible group-stable dynamic match-
ings. The paper by Bloch and Houy (2012) considers the allocation of a set of durable
objects to agents who successively arrive and live for two periods. Related, Kurino (2014)
considers a dynamic house allocation problem in which agents arrive successively and live
for two periods. Abdulkadiroğlu and Loertscher (2007) also consider a dynamic house
allocation problem. That paper compares static and dynamic mechanisms, finding that
the latter can improve welfare upon the former. Another market design application of
dynamic matching problems is Kennes et al. (2014) who consider the allocation of small
children to daycare facilities in Denmark. Our paper differs from these papers insofar as
in our paper the outcome is a set of contracts in which each lawyer appears only once,
so no lawyer is matched repeatedly. Also, unlike the previous papers we make explicit
use of the matching with contracts literature, which might also be fruitfully applied in
the papers just mentioned. To apply the matching with contracts framework one would
simply need to allow lawyers to hold multiple contracts.
This paper is also related to some papers within the theory of matching which analyze
different legal entry-level labor markets. Avery et al. (2001) provide empirical data and
discuss possible reconstructions of the market for legal clerkships at US federal courts for
graduating law students, primarily addressing the unraveling problem. In Avery et al.
(2007), the authors describe the unraveling in this market and relate to the problem of
exploding offers. Haruvy et al. (2006) also study dynamics and unraveling inefficiencies
of law clerk matching, using experimental and computational investigations to evaluate
proposed reforms to the US system. Notably, this market is a decentralized one with no
central authority designing an allocation procedure. Additionally, there is some conflict
among the judges which prevents an effective coordination to improve the system. In
contrast, the market for legal trainee-ships in Germany is centralized within districts of
regional courts of appeals. While unraveling does not appear to happen in the allocation
of lawyers in Germany, congestion is an important issue. Our paper is thus also related
to common themes of the literature on markets suffering various defects (Roth and Xing,
1994; Niederle and Roth, 2003, 2009) and on how to improve the design of markets to
overcome these defects (Roth and Peranson, 1999).
Two further related papers are Schummer and Vohra (2013) and Schummer and
Abizada (2015). The former paper considers the assignment of landing slots to planes
in the event of adverse weather. It shows the lack of incentives to report truthfully
the estimated arrival times for flights under the currently used mechanism and proposes
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a strategy-proof alternative. That paper also highlights the restrictions that notions of
incentive compatibility impose on the efficiency of the resulting mechanisms. The landing
slot allocation problem as studied in those papers also differs from the lawyer allocation
problem studied here. First, the paper assumes that all future arrival times are known
by the airlines at the time an allocation is made. Second, the airlines have homogeneous
preferences for early arrival at a single airport. So unlike in the present paper, there is
only one good to be allocated in any time period.
Last, this paper is also related to other papers analyzing allocation systems in which
some participants need to wait before being allocated. Braun et al. (2010) and Westkamp
(2013) both study the mechanism used to allocate medical students to universities, where
waiting times can be several years. However their models of the allocation procedure are
static in the sense that they consider allocations for only one time period.
3 Model
This section introduces the lawyer-court many-to-one matching with waiting time prob-
lem. We abstract from complications arising from the fact that lawyers arrive sequen-
tially over time and focus on the case in which a given set of lawyers is to be allocated to
courts over several time periods. Each court can only accept a fixed number of lawyers
per period.
The lawyer assignment problem consists of the following components:
1. a finite set of periods T = {1, ..., tmax}
2. a finite set of lawyers I = {i1, ..., in}
3. a finite set of courts C = {c1, ..., cm}
4. a matrix of court capacities q = (qc,t)c∈C,t∈T
5. lawyers’ (strict, rational) preferences P = (Pi)i∈I over C×T∪{∅}, with Ri denoting
weak preferences of lawyer i.26 The domain of preference profiles is denoted P.
6. a list of courts’ priority rankings, = (c)c∈C over I.27
26This means that (c, t)Ri(c′, t′) if and only if either (c, t)Pi(c′, t′) or (c, t) = (c′, t′).
27These can be thought of as a single score as a function of a lawyer’s grade, waiting time and social
factors, such as place of birth, current residence or place of study. Since we consider a static setting, we
will not consider how these priority rankings might change.
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We call (T, I, C, q, P,) an instance of a lawyer-court matching with waiting time prob-
lem. A contract is a triplet x = (i, c, t) ∈ I×C×T , specifying a lawyer, a court and the
time at which the lawyer begins her trainee-ship at the court. Let X ⊆ I ×C ×T be the
set of all feasible contracts. For contract x = (i, c, t) we denote by xI the lawyer appear-
ing in x, i.e. xI = i. Similarly we denote by xC and xT the court and the time period of
assignment appearing in contract x, i.e. xC = c and xT = t. Further, let YI be the set of
lawyers appearing in some set of contracts Y ⊆ X, that is YI = {i ∈ I | ∃y ∈ Y s.t. yI = i}.
A subset of contracts Y ⊆ X is an allocation if for all i ∈ I, |{y ∈ Y : yI =
i}| ∈ {0, 1} and for all c ∈ C and t ∈ T , |{y ∈ Y : yC = c}| ≤
∑
t qc,t. In words, an
allocation is a set of contracts such that no lawyer appears more than once and there
are not more contracts of a court for some period than number of positions available
at that court overall. An allocation Y ⊆ X is feasible if for all c ∈ C and t ∈ T ,
|{y ∈ Y : yC = c, yT = t| ≤ qc,t. Hence an allocation is feasible if each court respects
its time-specific capacity constraint for each period.28 Let X̃ be the set of feasible
allocations. For a subset of contracts Y denote by Y (j) the subset of contracts in Y
involving agent j ∈ I ∪C alternatively, if j has no contract in Y then Y (j) is the empty
set. Furthermore if Y is an allocation and j ∈ I, let YT (j) be the time of start of
trainee-ship according to j’s contract in Y . We define YC(j) accordingly.
A contract x is acceptable to lawyer i if xPi∅. We suppose that within the set of
courts C there is a court cG such that qcG,t = 0 for all t ∈ T and where cG=G is the
(weak) ranking induced by the lawyers’ grades. Similarly we denote by cW the empty
court with a ranking induced by waiting times, W , and by cS the empty court inducing
a ranking by social hardship, S . Note that this modeling choice is not appropriate for
all federal states. For example, Hamburg uses a single score to determine which lawyers
are allocated.
There are two possible interpretations of our model, the myopic and the fully dynamic
interpretation. Under the fully dynamic interpretation, akin to models with overlapping
generations of agents, we suppose that in the initial period t = 1 it is already determined
how many future agents there are, when they “arrive”,29 what their preferences are and
how they are ranked. Over short horizons this may be a realistic possibility. However
as the horizon that one considers grows, this becomes increasingly unrealistic, especially
since lawyers typically only take their state exams in the period before they start applying
for positions.
28Note that capacity used in one period does not affect capacity in future periods.
29A lawyer arrives in period t if all contracts involving an earlier period of allocation are unacceptable
to the lawyer.
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Under the myopic interpretation one only considers the problem of allocating lawyers
from a single generation to courts. In that interpretation we abstract away from future
generations of lawyers arriving.30 In the myopic view the capacities of the courts beyond
the current period should then not be interpreted as actual physical capacity, but as
capacity which has not been reserved for future generations of lawyers. The myopic
interpretation ignores the uncertainty involved in deciding how to allocate lawyers when
the number and preferences of future lawyers are not yet known.
We denote by Pi not only preferences over i’s assignment of a court and a time
period, but also i’s preferences over allocations. These preferences over allocations reflect
i’s preferences over assignments, so there should be no loss of clarity in this abuse of
notation.
A direct mechanism ψ is a function ψ : P → X̃.31 Hence ψ associates to each
(reported) preference profile an allocation. Note that we treat courts as objects and
hence they do not behave strategically, i.e. their priorities over lawyers are assumed to
be given. We also take waiting time as given and do not consider changes in priorities
arising from accumulated waiting time.
We now describe a few properties that lawyer preferences over the courts and the
time of allocation can satisfy.
Definition. Preferences of lawyer i ∈ I are weakly impatient if for all c ∈ C, t, t′ ∈ T
such that t < t′, then (c, t)Ri(c, t′).
A lawyer’s preferences are weakly impatient if a lawyer prefers to be allocated an
early position at some court to a later position at the same court.
Definition. Preferences of lawyer i ∈ I are strictly impatient if for all c, c̃ ∈ C
t, t′ ∈ T such that t < t′, then (c, t)Ri(c̃, t′).
Strict impatience is a strengthening of weak impatience. A lawyer having strictly
impatient preferences prefers an early position at any court to a later position at any
court. In practice we do not expect all lawyers’ preferences to be strictly impatient. The
reason is that there are some regions, e.g. Saxony-Anhalt, in which the average waiting
time is zero, while in other regions the average waiting time is strictly positive. This
would not be observed if lawyers’ preferences were strictly impatient, since in that case
30We do however incorporate some concern for future generations by considering a basic notion of
limiting harm to future generations - early filling, which we define in Subsection 3.1.
31In full generality the mechanism should also depend on (T, I, C, q,). We suppress this dependence
for simplicity but will highlight whenever it becomes relevant, for example when comparing the outcome
of some mechanism when a court’s ranking of the lawyers has changed.
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those waiting for a position in a desirable region could just switch to a less desirable region
without a waiting time and thereby be better off. In addition many of the forms filled in
by lawyers when applying for a position allow them to indicate a preferred entry date,
which may differ from the next possible starting date.32 It appears that many lawyers
make use of the ability to postpone their starting date.33 While delay of applicants may
be for strategic reasons, delays may be rational if the lawyer plans to obtain an additional
qualification, such as a one-year law degree, in the time up to the entry date. Hence it
is not clear that lawyers’ preferences are either weakly or strictly impatient.
3.1 Properties of Allocations and Mechanisms
To analyze the outcome of different mechanisms it is necessary to be able to talk about
properties of allocations. A basic requirement of an allocation is that no lawyer should
prefer the outside option to the court that she has been assigned:
Definition. An allocation Y ⊆ X is individually rational if for all i ∈ I, Y (i)Ri∅. A
mechanism ψ is individually rational if ψ(P ) is an individually rational allocation.
Another basic requirement that any mechanism should satisfy is that it only outputs
feasible allocations.
Definition. A mechanism ψ is feasible if ψ(P ) is a feasible allocation for all P ∈ P.
We next introduce a common notion of fairness:
Definition. An allocation Y ⊆ X has no justified envy, if for any pair of contracts
x, y ∈ Y with xI 6= yI and (xC , xT )PyI (yC , yT ), one of the following conditions holds:
xI xC yI , xI G yI , xI W yI or xI S yI . A mechanism ψ eliminates justified
envy if its outcome ψ (P ) has no justified envy for all P ∈ P.
An allocation thus is envy-free if, whenever a lawyer prefers some other lawyers’
assignment, then that lawyer must have a higher priority at the court she is being assigned
to than the former lawyer, a better grade, more waiting time or a higher priority based on
social hardship criteria. In standard notions of fairness, usually only the court’s priorities
are considered. Since the policy maker in our case explicitly uses these other rankings
to determine allocations, it appears natural to modify the standard notion of lack of
justified envy to incorporate these additional concerns.
32See the application form for trainee-ships in the district of the Dusseldorf regional court of appeals,
Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (2015a)
33See the weighted list of applicants for positions in Hamburg, Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht (2015).
It can be seen that many lawyers have asked their entry date to be postponed for several months.
16 Chapter I. Matching with Waiting Times: The German Labor Market for Lawyers
The following definition of Pareto dominance is standard.34
Definition. An allocation Y ⊆ X Pareto dominates another allocation Ỹ ⊆ X if
for all i ∈ I Y (i)RiỸ (i) and there exists at least one i ∈ I such that Y (i)PiỸ (i). A
mechanism ψ Pareto dominates another mechanism ψ̃ if for all P ∈ P ψ(P ) Pareto
dominates ψ̃(P ).
It is standard to define Pareto efficiency of an allocation by the absence of another
allocation that Pareto dominates it. None of the mechanisms that we study in this paper
satisfy this requirement. We thus consider a weaker notion of efficiency:
Definition. An allocation Y ⊆ X is weakly Pareto efficient if there does not exist an
individually rational allocation Ỹ ⊆ X such that for all i ∈ I Ỹ (i)PiY (i). A mechanism
ψ is weakly Pareto efficient if for all P ∈ P ψ(P ) is weakly Pareto efficient.
As usual, a mechanism is strategy-proof if it is a dominant strategy for each agent to
truthfully report her preferences to the mechanism:
Definition. Mechanism ψ is strategy-proof if for all i ∈ I, for all P ∈ P and for all
P̃i ∈ Pi we have ψ(P )Riψ(P̃i, P−i). Mechanism ψ is group strategy-proof if, for any
preference profile P ∈ P, there is no Ĩ ⊆ I and P̃Ĩ = (P̃i)i∈Ĩ such that for all i ∈ Ĩ we
have ψ(P̃Ĩ , P−Ĩ)Piψ(P ).
We next define respect of improvements, first used in the matching literature by
Balinski and Sönmez (1999).35 What that property means is that a lawyer should not
receive a worse assignment when her priority has increased at the courts. First we need
to define what we mean by an improvement in the priority of a lawyer. In doing so, we
will follow closely the presentation in Sönmez (2013).
Definition. A priority profile  is an unambiguous improvement over another pri-
ority profile ′ for lawyer i if:
- the ranking of i is at least as good under  as under ′ for any court c,
- the ranking of i is strictly better under  than under ′ for some court c,
34Pareto efficiency is only defined with respect to the lawyers’ preferences. This is justified by the
fact that the courts’ priorities are set administratively and therefore do not constitute real preferences.
Instead they reflect a desire on by policy-makers to take into consideration grades, waiting time and
social criteria. The literature on school choice similarly considers only the preferences of students for
Pareto efficiency and treats schools as objects to be allocated (see Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003)).
35An alternative name for respect of improvements could be priority monotonicity, since it requires
that the rank of the outcome achieved by a lawyer is monotone in priority profile improvements.
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- the relative ranking of other lawyers is the same under  and ′ for any court
Intuitively, a priority profile improvement of some lawyer means that while all other
lawyers’ relative rankings among the courts are unchanged, the particular lawyer’s rank-
ing is not worse at any court (i.e. there are at most as many lawyers ranked higher than
the lawyer as before) and the lawyer’s ranking has improved at least at one court. Note
that priority profile improvements include improvements in grades, waiting time and
social hardship criteria.
Definition. A mechanism ψ respects improvements if a lawyer never receives a
strictly worse assignment as a result of an unambiguous improvement in her court pri-
orities.
Respect of improvements is a natural property to ask for. Suppose that a better
grade for a lawyer leads to an unambiguous improvement in that lawyer’s ranking. If
respect of improvements did not hold, the lawyer would have received a less preferred
position than with the worse grade. This would run counter to the view that law students
should be rewarded for good performance in the exams. In addition, some may consider
it to be unjust that lawyers obtain a better outcome for themselves despite having a
worse grade, compared to another lawyer. Similar arguments can be made for why a
mechanism should respect improvements in waiting time and social criteria.
More important, perhaps, is the implicit reliance of existing procedures on waiting
time in ranking lawyers. Suppose that under some specified mechanism a lawyer improves
her ranking by arriving earlier, then, if the mechanism tries to aid lawyers who arrive
early by improving their ranking, this attempt to increase the welfare will hurt those
lawyers if the overall mechanism does not respect improvements.
We next formalize the notion that whenever a position is not filled in some period,
then no agent who would have been available that period should be assigned later. It
seems reasonable to suppose that policy-makers would not be willing to allow some place
at a court to go unfilled just to allow a current applicant to obtain a better allocation.
This is first because lawyers provide essential work to the court at the time of their
trainee-ship and second because in this way more future slots are left open which makes
future lawyers (weakly) better off.36
36The notion of early filling requires that if positions are not taken in an early period, then no agent
should be allocated in a later period. It thus makes sense to require early filling only if one interprets our
model as involving a single cohort of students, rather than overlapping cohorts. In an extended dynamic
setting one should amend the definition of early filling to allow positions to be empty even if a lawyer
from a later generation takes a position at a later time. Early filling would then only rule out lawyers
from the cohort appearing at a time t to take positions after that period if there are empty slots in t.
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Definition. An allocation Y ⊆ X satisfies early filling if there is no t ∈ T such that
there exists some c ∈ C such that |{y ∈ Y : yT = t, yC = c}| < qc,t and there exists some
i ∈ I such that YT (i) > t. A mechanism ψ satisfies early filling if for all P ∈ P, ψ(P )
satisfies early filling.
Early filling appears similar in flavor to the notion of no wastefulness, which is defined
as:
Definition. An allocation Y ⊆ X is wasteful if there exists a time t, a court c and a
lawyer i such that |{y ∈ Y : yT = t, yC = c}| < qc,t, Y (i) = ∅ and (c, t)Pi∅.
Note that a Pareto efficient allocation is automatically non-wasteful. The following
example show that non-wasteful and early filling are logically independent properties:
Example 1. There are three lawyers i1, i2, i3, two courts c1, c2 and two time periods
t = 1, 2. Each court has a unit of capacity in each period. All contracts are acceptable to
all lawyers. The allocation {(i1, c1, 2), (i2, c2, 2), (i3, c1, 1)} satisfies non-wastefulness but
violates early filling. The allocation {(i1, ∅), (i2, c1, 1), (i3, c2, 1)} satisfies early filling but
is wasteful.
In fact there is a fundamental conflict between early filling and non-wastefulness if it
is additionally required that allocations are acceptable to the lawyers.
Lemma 1. There is no mechanism that is individually rational, non-wasteful and satis-
fies early filling.
Proof. Suppose ψ is an individually rational, non-wasteful mechanism. We show that
there is an instance of a lawyer-court matching with waiting times problem in which this
mechanism necessarily violates early filling. Consider the following example. There are
three lawyers i1, i2, i3, two courts c1, c2 and two time periods t = 1, 2. Each court has a
unit of capacity in each period. The only acceptable contracts are: {(i1, c1, 2), (i2, c2, 2),
(i3, c1, 1)}. Then Y ′ = {(i1, c1, 2), (i2, c2, 2), (i3, c1, 1)} is the unique individually rational
and non-wasteful allocation, which does not satisfy early-filling.
In the proof above, both individual rationality and non-wastefulness are required.
Without individual rationality, one of the lawyers assigned in period t = 2 could have
been assigned to an (unacceptable) earlier position. Non-wastefulness is required, since
otherwise both lawyers allocated in period t = 2 could have been left unassigned.
Usually non-wastefulness is one of the most basic desirable properties that a matching
mechanism has to possess. In our application, not being assigned in a particular federal
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state however likely is the result of having been accepted elsewhere. Therefore, not being
assigned appears to us not to harm lawyers to an excessive extent since with a high
probability they were accepted elsewhere. Failing to satisfy early-filling can however
have a detrimental effect on future generations of lawyers.
4 Berlin Mechanism
We now study the procedure that is currently used in Germany to allocate lawyers to
courts, mostly adopting the myopic interpretation of our model. Some aspects of that
procedure are reasonably well documented, however the part describing how lawyers are
allocated to courts within a period is not. While reported preferences, capacities and
priorities are to be taken into account, there is no description of how these are used to find
the allocation within a period. Another complication is that lawyers have many strategic
options, in addition to reporting preferences over courts. For example they can decide
for what entry date they wish to apply. They can refuse to accept an offer that has been
made. They can report verifiable information about social status and other information
that affects the priorities they will have. Because of this complexity we decide to model
the procedure in a stylized manner that captures the most important features shared by
the different allocation procedures as discussed and referenced in the Introduction.
The Berlin mechanism is a two-stage procedure. Lawyers are only able to report
a ranking over the courts and fix a particular entry date to which we suppose the lawyers
have applied.37 In each given time period, the first stage of the procedure determines
the set of lawyers to be considered in this time period, while in the second stage these
considered lawyers are matched to open court positions.
The first-stage lawyer selection procedure in a given period is often detailed
in the relevant regulations, as discussed earlier. This lawyer selection procedure can
vary across federal states (see observations in the Introduction), nevertheless in terms of
our results, these details do not matter. The important point that the lawyer selection
procedure satisfies, is that it selects lawyers based solely on observable characteristics
such as grades, waiting time and social criteria while ignoring preferences of the lawyers.
We describe here a stylized lawyer selection procedure, which takes as input λG, λW and
λS , which are respectively the share of positions to be assigned to lawyers based on grade,
waiting time and social hardship criteria. Let Qt =
∑|C|
c=1 qc,t be the total capacity of the
courts in period t. For period t select the bλSQtc lawyers ranked highest according to
37In Subsection 4.3 we study the question whether lawyers can strategically delay their application.
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S .38 Next, select the bλGQtc lawyers ranked highest according to G. Finally, select
the Qt − bλSQtc − bλGQtc lawyers ranked highest according to W .39
For the second-stage allocation of lawyers to courts within a given period we
make the assumption that the lawyer-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm of Gale
and Shapley (1962) is used.40 The DA algorithm works as follows, taking as input
lawyers’ reported preferences and courts’ priority rankings over lawyers:
• Step 1: Each lawyer applies to her preferred court. Each court considers all
applicants and tentatively accepts the ones it ranks highest up to its capacity. All
others are rejected.
• Step k: Any lawyer who was rejected by a court in the previous step applies to
her next most preferred acceptable court or, if all acceptable courts have already
rejected her, she is assigned the outside option. Each court considers applicants it
tentatively holds from the last step and those who applied in step k and tentatively
accepts the ones it ranks highest up to its capacity. All others are rejected.
The DA algorithm eventually stops with all lawyers either assigned to a court or the
outside option. We summarize below a number of properties of the DA mechanism that
we will use throughout the paper.41
Theorem. (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982) The Lawyer-Proposing Deferred-
Acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof.
Theorem. (Balinski and Sönmez, 1999) The Lawyer-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance
mechanism lacks justified envy and respects improvements.
Given the lawyer selection procedure and the DA algorithm, the Berlin mechanism
proceeds as follows, for ascending integers t = 1, ..., tmax:42
38We define bxc to be the largest integer below x.
39Note that Qt − bλSQtc − bλGQtc equals bλWQtc, thereby ensuring that a total of Qt lawyers gets
selected.
40If an unstable mechanism were used instead of the lawyer-proposing DA, then we would immediately
have the result that the Berlin mechanism cannot simultaneously satisfy individual rationality, respect
of improvements, non-wastefulness and lack of justified envy (see Balinski and Sönmez (1999)). Making
this assumption allows us to conclude that any deficiencies we find are likely the result of the way the
Berlin mechanism determines the time at which a lawyer is allocated to a court. Consequently, this can
be considered as the “most conservative” assumption.
41Note that when discussing the elimination of justified envy under the DA mechanism we refer to the
standard definition of justified envy, which does depend on the rankings over grade, waiting time and
social criteria.
42We consider a stylized version of the Berlin mechanism. It does not allow lawyers who could not
be assigned at some period to later be allocated. Instead such lawyers are assigned the outside option.
We make this assumption here for simplicity. In practice, such lawyers may be considered again by the
mechanism in later rounds, with the caveat that they will not gain waiting time following a rejection.
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First stage
• Step t.a: Select up to Qt lawyers from the set of lawyers that so far have not been
selected, according to the lawyer selection procedure.
Second stage
• Step t.b: Selected lawyers submit preferences over courts.43 Apply the DA al-
gorithm using submitted preferences of the lawyers who have so far been selected
in period t and on the courts’ priorities. Assign each lawyer to the court assigned
under this algorithm. If there are lawyers that were assigned the outside option,
go to step t.c. If there are no lawyers that were assigned the outside option in this
step, go to step (t+ 1).a or if t = tmax, end the procedure with all those who were
not yet assigned a court being assigned the outside option.
• Step t.c: Select as many additional lawyers from those not yet selected as there
are unassigned lawyers resulting in Step t.b. Repeat Step t.b with those lawyers
additionally selected and those that were assigned to a court before.
Intuitively the Berlin mechanism tries to allocate lawyers to the earliest possible period
using the DA algorithm. If there are more lawyers than seats at courts for the earliest
period there is a first step that determines the set of lawyers to be allocated to courts
at the earliest date based on grades, waiting time and social criteria. If at some point
a lawyer is allocated to the outside option the mechanism selects an additional lawyer
to be allocated in the earliest possible period. Once all positions in the earliest possible
period have been filled, the same process is repeated for the subsequent period. From the
description of the Berlin mechanism it follows that the allocation it produces is feasible
and that no lawyer receives an allocation that is worse than the outside option.
Lemma 2. The Berlin mechanism is individually rational and feasible.
In addition to the previous description of the allocation procedure, there are some
peculiarities that may affect its performance, which for now we abstract from in the
43In practice lawyers submit their ranking over courts the first time they apply for a position. However
it is conceivable that lawyers might contact the regional court of appeal to change those submitted
preferences. However if such behavior is infrequent it is sensible to assume that preferences over courts
are submitted only once by the lawyers. Some federal states explicitly allow lawyers to change their
ranking over courts until a position has been offered to them. Allowing lawyers to submit their ranking
over courts after the time at which they are allocated has been determined simplifies the strategic analysis
of the Berlin mechanism. Given that DA is strategy-proof for lawyers, they will have an incentive to
report their ranking over courts in a way that is consistent with their preferences over courts and time,
by reporting possibly different rankings over courts for different periods.
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following theoretical discussion. First, truncated court preferences: In some federal states
only two more courts in addition to the most-preferred one can be reported (sometimes
with no ordering possible) and if the lawyer is not allocated to any of these three, then
her preference list is randomly filled with non-listed courts.44 Second, endogenous court
priorities: lawyers can report a verifiable special social connection to some courts, e.g.
a spouse or other relatives living in that region etc., leading to higher priority at that
court. Third, refusals to accept positions: lawyers are informed of their allocated court,
but they can refuse to accept that position. Refusing lawyers are replaced by those still
on the waiting list. Usually, refusals lead to non-accrual of waiting time.
4.1 Deficiencies of the Berlin Mechanism
The algorithm as currently used has a number of flaws, mainly associated to the fact that
t-preferences are not considered when determining which lawyers are to be allocated in
a given time period. While lawyers are able to report different rankings over courts for
different periods, any information concerning the trade-off between waiting and obtaining
a better court is not used by the mechanism. This has important implications for the
efficiency of the mechanism.
Proposition 1. The Berlin mechanism is not weakly Pareto efficient.
Proof. Consider the following example.
Example 2. C = {c1}, I = {i1, i2}, T = {1, 2}, qc1,1 = qc1,2 = 1 and i1 c1
i2. But lawyers arrive in the first period and their preferences are (c1, 2)Pi1(c1, 1) and
(c1, 1)Pi2(c1, 2). Due to the two-stage procedure the higher ranked lawyer i1 is considered
for the first period, reports c1 as acceptable and is allocated. In period two i2 is selected
and allocated. Then, the outcome of the Berlin mechanism is {(i1, c1, 1), (i2, c1, 2)}, which
is strictly worse for both lawyers than {(i1, c1, 2), (i2, c1, 1)}.
Lack of weak Pareto efficiency means that under the Berlin mechanism there could be
situations under which every single lawyer could be made better off. In the above example
the inefficiency stems from the fact that the exogenous lawyer selection procedure in effect
determines the final allocation of lawyers to courts. Since this allocation does not depend
on lawyers’ preferences at all, it is not surprising that there are many lawyers that could
be made better off. We have the following result.
44It is well known that the DA mechanism is more manipulable if lawyers report a ranking over only
k courts than if lawyers report a ranking over k′ > k courts, see Pathak and Sönmez (2013).
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Proposition 2. The Berlin mechanism does not eliminate justified envy and does not
respect improvements.
Proof. Consider the following lawyer assignment problem.
Example 3.
[Berlin mechanism does not eliminate justified envy] There are two periods, t = 1, 2. We
have three lawyers I = {i1, i2, i3} and two courts C = {c1, c2}. qc1,1 = qc1,2 = qc2,1 = 1
and qc2,2 = 0. Court priorities are i1 c i2 c i3 for all c ∈ C. Lawyer preferences are
i1 : (c1, 1)Pi1(c1, 2)Pi1(c2, 1)
i2 : (c1, 1)Pi2(c1, 2)Pi2(c2, 1)
i3 : (c1, 1)Pi3(c2, 1)Pi3(c1, 2).
In period 1, in the first stage the two lawyers with highest priority (i1 and i2), regard-
less of their preferences, are selected to be allocated to the two open spots in the first
period. Lawyer i3 is put on hold, increases her waiting time, and will be reconsidered
in the next period. In the second stage of period 1 lawyers can report their preferences
considering only contracts for this time period t = 1. Based on these preferences, i1 and
i2 are matched to their favorite courts, respecting their priority, and using the deferred
acceptance mechanism. In period 2, there is only i3 who is then allocated.
Therefore the Berlin mechanism produces the following (unique) outcome XBerlin =
{(i1, c1, 1), (i2, c2, 1), (i3, c1, 2)} for all c ∈ C. This outcome is not fair since there exists
justified envy of i2, i.e. (c1, 2)Pi2(c2, 1), although i2 c i3.45
[Berlin mechanism does not respect improvements] Consider the previous set-up. If
courts’ priority orders are changed to ′, s.t. i1 ′c i3 ′c i2, then the resulting allocation
under the Berlin mechanism is X∗ = {(i1, c1, 1), (i2, c1, 2), (i3, c2, 1)}. If i2 improves, e.g.
with a better grade, such that the old priority ranking, , is recovered, then XBerlin would
result and i2 would be worse off. Hence the algorithm does not respect improvements.
Finally, we show that the Berlin mechanism may be wasteful.
Proposition 3. The Berlin mechanism is wasteful.
Proof. Consider the following lawyer assignment problem.
45Note that the allocation X∗ = {(i1, c1, 1), (i2, c1, 2), (i3, c2, 1)} is preferred by i2 and i3 and weakly
preferred by i1 to XBerlin and hence Pareto dominates it, despite equal courts’ rankings of lawyers.
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Example 4. Suppose there are three lawyers i1, i2 and i3, two courts c1, c2 and two
time periods t = 1, 2. Each court has one unit of capacity in each time period. All
courts rank lawyers the same: i1 c i2 c i3. Lawyers i1 and i3 are strictly impatient
and prefer c1 over c2 in both periods. Lawyer i2 is (strictly) impatient and finds only
c1 acceptable. Then the outcome of the Berlin mechanism under truth-telling is: Y ′ =
{(i1, c1, 1), (i2, ∅), (i3, c2, 1)}. Note that because i2 does not find (c1, 1) acceptable, he is
assigned the outside option in t = 1. This is wasteful since court c1 has an empty position
in period t = 2 which lawyer i2 prefers to being unassigned.
Note that Proposition 3 is a corollary of Lemma 1 which shows that no individually
rational mechanism is both non-wasteful and fills positions early and Proposition 6, which
shows that the Berlin mechanism fills positions early.
4.2 Desirable Properties of the Berlin Mechanism
We have seen that the Berlin mechanism is not weakly Pareto efficient, does not eliminate
justified envy, does not respect improvements and further is wasteful for general prefer-
ences. One question that could be considered is whether there exists a class of preferences
for which the Berlin mechanism eliminates justified envy and respects improvements. As
it turns out for preferences which are strictly impatient the currently used allocation pro-
cedure always delivers an allocation without justified envy and respects improvements.
This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose the preferences of each lawyer are strictly impatient and all
contracts are acceptable to all lawyers and courts. Then the Berlin mechanism eliminates
justified envy.
Proof. Suppose first lawyers are strictly impatient, all contracts are acceptable to all
lawyers and courts and that the Berlin mechanism does not eliminate justified envy. Then
there exist lawyers i1, i2, contracts x, y resulting in the Berlin mechanism with xI = i1
and yI = i2 such that yPix and i1 xC i2, i1 G i2, i1 W i2, and i1 S i2. Since all
contracts are acceptable we have that x 6= ∅. Since i1 is higher ranked than i2 in terms of
grade, waiting time and social criteria, the Berlin mechanism must yield contracts such
that yT ≥ xT . Strict impatience rules out that yT > xT , as otherwise i1 would not prefer
y to x. Thus we have yT = xT . But in period xT the deferred-acceptance algorithm is
used, which is known to eliminate justified envy. This contradicts i1 xC i2.
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Note that we need that all lawyer find every court acceptable. If this were not the
case, it could happen that lawyer i is selected for a period earlier than lawyer j, but left
unassigned. This can happen if there are some courts that lawyer i finds unacceptable
and if j later obtains a position at a court that is acceptable. While this result is
somewhat encouraging, one should note that in practice it is not obvious that lawyers
have preferences that are strictly impatient and find all courts acceptable, which we have
already argued does not appear likely.
Unfortunately the above logic cannot be used to show that under strict impatience
and acceptability of all contracts, the Berlin mechanism respects improvements. To see
this, consider the following example:
Example 5. I = {i1, i2, i3, i4}, C = {c1, c2}, t = 1, 2 and qc1,1 = qc2,1 = qc1,2 = qc2,2 =
1. Preferences of the lawyers are given by (c1, 1)Pi(c2, 1)Pi(c1, 2)Pi(c2, 2) for all i ∈ I.
There are two priority profiles,  and ̃, given by:
c1 : i3, i2, i1, i4
c2 : i1, i2, i3, i4
G: i1, i2, i3, i4
W : i2, i3, i4, i1
and
̃c1 : i3, i2, i1, i4
̃c2 : i1, i2, i3, i4
̃G : i2, i1, i3, i4
̃W : i2, i3, i4, i1
Note that the priorities only differ in that i2 has a better grade under ̃. We consider a
lawyer selection procedure with λG = 0.5 and λW = 0.5. As λS = 0 by implication, the
lawyer selection procedure first selects the lawyer ranked highest according to grade and
the highest ranked remaining lawyer according to waiting time. Hence under  lawyers
i1 and i2 are selected and lawyer i2 gets (c1, 1). Under ̃ lawyers i2 and i3 are selected.
So i2 gets (c2, 1) under ̃, meaning that the improvement in the ranking of lawyer i2 has
made her worse off, despite the fact that all agents have strictly impatient preferences.
For the Berlin mechanism to respect improvements we need a further assumption:
namely that a single ranking determines which lawyers are allocated for each period.
Proposition 5. Suppose the preferences of each lawyer are strictly impatient, all con-
tracts are acceptable to all lawyers and courts and λG = 1. Then the Berlin mechanism
respects improvements.
Proof. Let ̃ be an unambiguous improvement over  for lawyer i and let x, x̃ be the re-
spective assignments obtained under the Berlin mechanism. For a contradiction suppose
xPix̃. There are three cases. First, suppose xT > x̃T . By the Berlin mechanism and all
contracts being acceptable there is a constant number Qt =
∑
c qc,t of agents allocated
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in period t, which are the
∑t−1
s=1Qs + 1 to
∑t
s=1Qs highest ranked agents according to
either G or ̃G. Since ̃ is an unambiguous improvement, we must have x̃T ≥ xT , a
contradiction. Second, suppose x̃ = ∅. From xPix̃ it follows that x 6= ∅. But since all
contracts are acceptable, i under ̃G cannot be ranked higher than
∑tmax
s=1 Qs. But then
it must be ranked even lower under G implying that x = ∅, a contradiction. Third, sup-
pose xT = x̃T . But the deferred-acceptance algorithm satisfies respect of improvements,
which contradicts xPix̃.
The Berlin mechanism in Step 1a selects Q1 lawyers to be allocated via the deferred
acceptance algorithm to positions in period t = 1. For each unfilled position, another
lawyer is selected. Hence either the position will be filled and the algorithm moves to the
next period or all remaining lawyers consider the unfilled position to be unacceptable. In
the former case the algorithm fills all position for period t = 1. In the latter case it does
not fill all positions in period t = 1 but all lawyers have been assigned to either a position
or the outside option. Hence in that case no lawyer will be allocated to a later period.
This argument can be extended to any subsequent period, so that either all positions for
that period are filled or no positions in subsequent periods are filled. As a result, the
final assignment obtained by the Berlin mechanism fills positions early. We summarize
this finding in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. The Berlin mechanism fills positions early.
One of the deficiencies of the Berlin mechanism was that it sometimes wasted posi-
tions. If we require all lawyers to find all positions acceptable, then this is no longer the
case.
Proposition 7. If all agents find all contracts acceptable, then the Berlin mechanisms
is non-wasteful.
Proof. Let Y ′ be the outcome of the Berlin mechanism for some lawyer-court matching
with waiting time problem. Suppose that some lawyer i is not assigned under the Berlin
mechanism, but that there exists c, t such that |{y ∈ Y ′|yC = c, yT = t}| < qc,t. By
assumption we have that (c, t)Pi∅. Note that i cannot have been selected at a step t′ ≥ t,
since the fact that there was an empty position at court c for time t implies that more
lawyers would have been selected until all positions in period t were filled. In particular, i
would have been selected eventually. But then, since i finds (c, t) acceptable, i would have
been assigned to it in that step. Hence i must have been selected earlier. Furthermore,
i cannot have been selected in step t′ < t. If i had been selected, i would have been
assigned since i finds all courts acceptable. Hence we have a contradiction.
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4.3 Strategic Delay under the Berlin Mechanism
So far we have mainly adopted the myopic interpretation: there is a single cohort of
lawyers who simultaneously apply for positions for their legal trainee-ship. This effec-
tively assumes that all lawyers need to apply at the same time. However the Berlin
mechanism may lead to incentives for strategically delaying an application. For sim-
plicity, we again abstract away from future generations of lawyers, but allow lawyers to
choose the time at which they submit their application. Note that the Berlin mecha-
nism, by its nature, can accommodate agents submitting preferences at various points in
time. We adapt the Berlin mechanism by inserting at the very beginning of the Berlin
mechanism a step 0, in which each lawyer reports a desired starting time τi ∈ T .
The difference to before is that in each period only those lawyers who wished to be
allocated before or in that period are considered in the lawyer selection procedure. Under
the Berlin mechanism with reports of starting time, the strategy of each lawyer is now a
starting time τi as well as her preferences over courts for each period.
The following example shows that agents may have an incentive to delay submitting
their preferences:
Proposition 8. Under the Berlin mechanism, agents have incentives for delaying their
application.
Proof. Consider the following example.
Example 6. There are two periods, t = 1, 2. We have lawyers I = {i1, i2, i3}. There
are two courts, i.e. C = {c1, c2}. qc1,1 = qc1,2 = qc2,1 = 1 and qc2,2 = 0. Court (as well
as grade, waiting time and social) priorities are i1 c i2 c i3 for all c ∈ C. Lawyer
preferences are
i1 : (c1, 1)Pi1(c1, 2)Pi1(c2, 1)
i2 : (c1, 1)Pi2(c1, 2)Pi2(c2, 1)
i3 : (c1, 1)Pi3(c2, 1)Pi3(c1, 2)
If all lawyers submit their desired starting time τi = 1, the resulting allocation is {(i1, c1, 1),
(i2, c2, 1), (i3, c1, 2)}. However if lawyer i2 instead reports τ2 = 2, the outcome of the
Berlin mechanism is {(i1, c1, 1), (i2, c1, 2), (i3, c2, 1)}, which is preferred by lawyer i2 to
the outcome from applying in period t = 1. Therefore, lawyer i2 has an incentive to delay
her application.
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In practice, incentives for strategic delay may be muted by the (uncertain) arrival
of future generations of lawyers. If there are sufficiently many highly ranked future
generations of lawyers arriving in period t = 2, then by delaying her application, agent i2
might not be assigned at all or later. The motivation of delaying the application in this
example is for strategic reasons: it allows lawyer i2 to obtain a more preferred allocation.
In practice students might also wish to delay their entry date for non-strategic reasons.
This could happen when they wish to do a PhD or a masters degree before starting their
trainee-ship. In such cases the lawyers would have a preference of starting late.
Allowing lawyers to choose the time period in which they apply may alleviate some
concerns regarding the negative properties of the Berlin mechanism. However the fol-
lowing example shows that there are equilibria under the Berlin mechanism that are not
weakly Pareto efficient.
Proposition 9. There are Nash equilibrium outcomes under the Berlin mechanism with
strategic delay that are weakly Pareto inefficient.
Proof. Consider the following example.
Example 7. C = {c1, c2}, I = {i1, i2}, qc1,1 = qc2,2 = 1, qc1,2 = qc2,1 = 0 and i1 c1 i2,
i2 c2 i1 and i1 G i2 and λG = 1. Preferences are: (c2, 2)Pi1(c1, 1) and (c1, 1)Pi2(c2, 2).
Let τ1, τ2 ∈ {1, 2} be the desired starting dates of the two lawyers, respectively. Note
that reported preferences over courts are not relevant in this example. Then {(τ1 =
1), (τ2 = 2)} is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile. The outcome associated with this
strategy profile is {(i1, c1, 1), (i2, c2, 2)}. To see that this strategy profile is indeed a Nash
equilibrium, suppose i1 deviated to report τ1 = 2. Then no lawyer would be allocated
in the first period. In the second period, lawyer i2 would still be allocated to c2 due to
her higher priority at the court. Lawyer i1 would be left unallocated. Hence i1 does not
gain from this deviation. Next suppose i2 deviates to report τ2 = 1. Then only i1 is
selected to be allocated in the first period, while i2 is still allocated in the second period.
Hence i2 is indifferent. Thus {(t1 = 1), (t2 = 2)} constitutes a Nash equilibrium. To
see that this is not Pareto efficient, note that if i1 and i2 switched allocations such that
{(i1, c2, 2), (i2, c1, 1)}, both would be better off.
Note however that there are multiple equilibria in the example we considered. For
example the profile {(τ1 = 2), (τ2 = 1)} would result in a Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium
outcome in the example used above.
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5 Stable Mechanisms
5.1 Choice Functions and their Properties
In the previous section we have seen that the currently employed procedure of allocating
lawyers to their trainee-ships has some serious deficiencies. In this section we propose
a procedure which overcomes these problems. Our approach is to first take the court
(or grade, waiting time and social) priorities as used in the current procedure and then
to construct choice functions, as in the matching with contracts literature. Having con-
structed the choice functions we can then use the cumulative offer process of Hatfield
and Milgrom (2005) to find a stable allocation. Specifying appropriate choice functions
for the lawyers does not present a difficulty since a lawyer will simply choose her most
preferred contract from the set of available contracts. The choice functions for the courts
are somewhat harder to define.
We will denote general choice functions of some agent j ∈ I∪C as Chj which associates
for each offer set Y ⊆ X some contracts involving j. When we write Chi(Y ) then the
choice function of an agent i ∈ I from the offer set Y is meant, whereas Chc(Y ) denotes
the choice function of a court c ∈ C from the offer set. A lawyer i’s choice function
Chi(Y ) specifies for each set of contracts Y ⊆ X which contract the lawyer chooses and
is given by
Chi(Y ) ≡ max
Pi
Y.
The above formulation says that lawyer i will choose from set Y the contract naming
lawyer i that is maximal according to the lawyer’s preferences Pi. If Y does not contain
a contract with i then Chi(Y ) = ∅.
While there are many possible choice functions that are conceivable for the courts,
we restrict attention to slot-specific choice functions as in Kominers and Sönmez (2016).
Each court c has a set Sc of slots where |Sc| =
∑
t∈T qc,t. Each slot s ∈ Sc has an
associated priority ordering Πsc over the set of contracts involving court c, where we
denote the profile of slot-specific priority orderings of court c by Πc = ∪s∈ScΠsc. In our
setting it is natural to suppose that each court has qc,t slots of type t. We let Stc be the
set of slots of type t and thus we have Sc = ∪t∈TStc. Furthermore for each court c there is
a precedence order Bc over slots in Sc. The interpretation of Bc is that for slots s, s′ ∈ Sc
if s Bc s′ then slot s is filled before slot s′, where we make precise what filling a slot
before another one means below. Given the slot-specific priorities and the precedence
order over slots, a court’s slot-specific choice function Chc(Y ;Bc,Πc) is constructed as
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follows. Consider slots in order of their precedence Bc. Each slot s chooses its most
preferred contract according to Πsc from those contracts that have been offered and are
not yet associated to any lawyer chosen by any slot with higher precedence.
For court c the model set-up does not prescribe a unique slot-specific choice function
that is consistent with the priority c and the time-specific capacity constraints. While
we know a court’s priority ordering over lawyers and its capacity constraints qc,t, this does
not imply a single slot-specific choice function. There are potentially many different slot-
specific choice functions, differing both in the precedence order Bc as well as in the slot
priority orders Πs. We introduce below the time-specific choice function Chtsc (·) =
Chc(·;Bts,Π(c)), for which each slot of type t finds only contracts involving period
t acceptable and ranks acceptable contracts according to the court’s priority ordering
c.46 The precedence order Bts is such that any slot of type t has precedence over any
slot of type t′ if t < t′, i.e. for all s ∈ Stc and s′ ∈ St
′
c such that t < t′ we have s Bts s′.
Slots of the same type can be ordered arbitrarily without loss of generality since their
priority orderings are identical. The reason for referring to this as the time-specific choice
function is that it makes choices of contracts based on constraints, which specify for each
time period the number of contracts that can be held. For any set of available contracts
Y the choice of court c from Y , Chtsc (Y ), is thus given by the following procedure:
• Step 0: Reject all contracts y ∈ Y with yC 6= c.
• Step t ∈ {1, ..., tmax} : Consider contracts y ∈ Y with yT = t. Accept one by
one contracts of the highest priority lawyers according to c until qc,t contracts
have been accepted. If a contract of lawyer yI has been accepted, reject all other
contracts y′ with y′I = yI . Once qc,t contracts have been accepted, reject all other
contracts y with yT = t. If there are no contracts which have not yet been consid-
ered, end the algorithm. Unless t = tmax move to the next step t + 1. If t = tmax
end the algorithm.
We will make use of the following definitions of unilateral and bilateral substitutes from
Hatfield and Kojima (2010):
Definition. Contracts are unilateral substitutes for court c if there do not exist con-
tracts x, z ∈ X and a set of contracts Y ⊆ X such that zI /∈ YI , z /∈ Chc (Y ∪ {z}) and
z ∈ Chc (Y ∪ {x, z}).
46Since each lawyer has only one contract available for each period, this completely determines the
slot’s priority ordering.
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Consider a situation in which for some lawyer i there is only one contract, say z, in
the available set of a court that is not chosen by the court. Then the choice function
of the court satisfies unilateral substitutes if and only if that contract is also not chosen
when some other contract, say x, is added to the available set.
Definition. Contracts are bilateral substitutes for court c if there do not exist con-
tracts x, z ∈ X and a set of contracts Y ⊆ X such that zI , xI /∈ YI , z /∈ Chc (Y ∪ {z})
and z ∈ Chc (Y ∪ {x, z}).
Bilateral substitutes is a less strict requirement on choice functions. Consider a
situation in which for some lawyer i there is only one contract, z, in the available set,
that is not chosen by the court. Then consider adding another contract, x, to the available
set, such that the lawyer of that new contract did not previously have a contract in the
available set. The court’s choice function satisfies bilateral substitutes if and only if the
contract z of lawyer i is still rejected out of the larger set of available contracts.
The following irrelevance of rejected contracts property as defined by Aygün and
Sönmez (2012) will be needed:
Definition. Choice functions satisfy irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) for
court c if for all Y ⊂ X and for all z ∈ X \ Y , we have z /∈ Chc (Y ∪ {z}) implies
Chc (Y ) = Chc (Y ∪ {z}).
Irrelevance of rejected contracts simply means that the availability of contracts which
are not chosen does not matter for choices.
Although we will rely on the results of Kominers and Sönmez (2016) to establish
strategy-proofness of the cumulative offer process for a particular choice function, other
choice functions that we introduce in this paper satisfy the law of aggregate demand,
first introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005):
Definition. The choice function of court c ∈ C satisfies the law of aggregate demand
if for all X ′ ⊆ X ′′ ⊆ X, |Chc (X ′)| ≤ |Chc (X ′′)|.
The law of aggregate demand intuitively says that when more contracts are available
to a court, then the court does not choose to accept fewer contracts. We can now state
Lemma 3:
Lemma 3. (Kominers and Sönmez, 2016) The time-specific choice functions satisfy
bilateral substitutes and IRC.
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In general, Kominers and Sönmez (2016) have shown that slot-specific choice functions
satisfy neither unilateral substitutes nor the law of aggregate demand. However since
we consider a particular slot-specific choice function it could potentially satisfy these
conditions. However the next two examples show that this is not the case.
Example 8. Let T = {1, 2}, Y = {(i2, c, 2)} and x = (i2, c, 1), z = (i1, c, 2). Fur-
thermore let i2 c i1 and qc,1 = qc,2 = 1. Then we have under a time-specific choice
function z /∈ Chtsc (Y ∪ {z}) = {(i2, c, 2)}. However we have z ∈ Chtsc (Y ∪ {x, z}) =
{(i2, c, 1), (i1, c, 2)}, which contradicts unilateral substitutes.
Example 9. Let Y = {(i1, c, 1), (i2, c, 2)}, i2 c i1 and qc,1 = qc,2 = 1. Then we
have Chtsc (Y ) = {(i1, c, 1), (i2, c, 2)}) but we also have Chtsc (Y ∪{(i2, c, 1)}) = {(i2, c, 1)}.
Hence adding the contract (i2, c, 1) to the set of contracts Y reduces the total number of
contracts chosen.47
The unilateral substitutes as well as the law of aggregate demand condition is used
by Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Aygün and Sönmez (2012) to prove (group) strategy-
proofness and the rural hospitals theorem for the cumulative offer process. The unilat-
eral substitutes condition is also used to show the existence of a doctor-optimal stable
matching. Nevertheless we are able to show that despite of the failure of the unilateral
substitutes condition, this result continues to hold in our model. The key to this result
is to assume that the preferences of lawyers satisfy the weak impatience property. With
that property a situation such as the one in the example above cannot arise. There we
had that a contract of lawyer i2 for a late period was available without contracts of the
same lawyer for all earlier time periods being available. Adding one of these earlier time
periods then caused lawyer i1 to be accepted when i1 was previously rejected. If lawyers
however propose early contracts before later ones, such a situation cannot arise in the
cumulative offer process.
To discuss elimination of justified envy, we follow Sönmez (2013) in defining fairness
of a choice function.48
Definition. For any court c, choice function Chc is fair if for any set of contracts
Y ⊆ X, and any pair of contracts x, y ∈ Y with xC = yC = c, yI c xI , yT = xT and
x ∈ Chc(Y ), then there exists z ∈ Chc(Y ) such that zI = yI .
In words, a choice functions of a court is fair if it chooses one lawyer’s contract but
not another lawyer’s contract, although the latter enjoys a higher priority at that court,
47We thank Christian Basteck for this example and for correcting a previously incorrect lemma.
48Note that this is a different concept from fairness of an allocation.
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this can only be if the latter lawyer has another contract which is chosen by that court.
We then have the following Lemma 4:
Lemma 4. The time-specific choice function Chtsc is fair.
We now define stability, the central concept of the two-sided matching literature since
Gale and Shapley (1962).
Definition. An allocation Y ⊆ X̃ is stable with respect to choice functions (Chc)|C|c=1 if
we have:
1. individual rationality: Chi(Y ) = Y (i) for all i ∈ I and Chc = Y (c) for all c ∈ C;
and
2. there is no court c ∈ C and a blocking set Y ′ 6= Chc(Y ) such that Y ′ = Chc(Y ∪Y ′)
and Y ′RiY for all i ∈ Y ′I .
Hence an allocation is stable if each lawyer prefers the assignment to being allocated
no contract, each court chooses its assignment over some subset of that assignment and
there is no set of contracts such that a court would rather choose that set of contract,
the blocking set, when this and the allocation are available, such that the lawyers having
contracts in the blocking set weakly prefer those contracts over their assignment. Under
the assumption that courts use the time-specific choice function Chtsc (·) stable allocations
are feasible. Stability is not a desiderata per se in our model. In the original literature
on two-sided matchings stability was seen as important in explaining whether matching
procedures would systematically lead to unraveling (Roth, 1984, 1991). In our case the
regional courts are not strategic players and the priorities according to which they eval-
uate lawyers are determined by the mechanism designer. This precludes the possibility
of courts contracting with lawyers around the centralized mechanism. However, stabil-
ity matters in our context as stability implies other desirable properties of mechanisms.
An allocation Y ⊆ X̃ is the lawyer-optimal stable allocation if every lawyer weakly
prefers it to any other stable allocation.
5.2 Cumulative Offer Process
We now introduce the cumulative offer process (COP) as defined in Hatfield and
Kojima (2010), which is a generalization of the deferred-acceptance algorithm of Gale
and Shapley (1962).
The cumulative offer process takes as input the (reported) preferences of the lawyers
as well as the choice function of each court.
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• Step 1: One (arbitrarily chosen) lawyer offers her first choice contract x1. The
court that is offered the contract, c1 = (x1)C , holds the contract if it is acceptable
and rejects it otherwise. Let Ac1(1) = {x1}, and Ac(1) = ∅ for all c 6= c1.
In general,
• Step k ≥2: One of the lawyers for whom no contract is currently held by any court
offers her most preferred contract, say xk, that has not been rejected in previous
steps. Let ck = (xk)C , hold Chc (Ack(k − 1) ∪ {xk}) and reject all other contracts.
Let Ack(k) = Ack(k − 1) ∪ {xk} and Ac(k) = Ac(k − 1) for all c 6= ck.
Now we apply Theorem 1 of Hatfield and Kojima (2010) to show that the cumulative offer
process, as just described, in conjunction with the time-specific choice function produces
a stable allocation.
Theorem. [Hatfield and Kojima (2010)] Suppose the choice functions of the court used
in the cumulative offer process satisfy bilateral substitutes. Then the cumulative offer
process produces a stable allocation.
The existence of a stable matching is the minimum requirement that we ask of an
algorithm. By the above result and the fact that the time-specific choice functions satisfy
bilateral substitutes, using the time-specific choice functions when running the COP
yields a stable allocation. Hatfield and Kojima (2010) further show that if one strengthens
the assumptions to unilateral substitutes for the choice functions used, then one can show
that the cumulative offer process produces the lawyer-optimal stable allocation. In our
case however the time-specific choice functions do not satisfy unilateral substitutes.
Nevertheless one can adapt Theorem 4 of Hatfield and Kojima (2010), as modified
by Aygün and Sönmez (2012), which is used in Theorem 5 of Hatfield and Kojima (2010)
to show the existence of a lawyer-optimal stable allocation (doctor-optimal in their ter-
minology). To do so, it is sufficient to make an assumption on the preferences of the
lawyers, rather than on the choice functions used by the courts. Namely we will as-
sume that lawyers are weakly impatient. Previous results in the matching with contracts
literature usually proceeded by restricting the choice functions used by the side of the
market which could accept multiple contracts to obtain results, while placing essentially
no restrictions on the other side of the market. Here we depart from this approach and
relax the restrictions placed on the choice functions used by the side of the market which
can accept several contracts (the courts) and instead put some restrictions on the single-
contract side (lawyers) of the market. Both approaches, as we will see, lead to similar
results.
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Lemma 5. A contract z that is rejected by a court c at any step of the cumulative offer
process using the time-specific choice function Chtsc , cannot be held by court c in any
subsequent step.
The key to our proof of this result lies in the specific choice function that we use.
This causes lawyers, when a contract of theirs is rejected, to either propose to a new
court or to propose to some court at which the lawyer was previously rejected. So if
some court c has multiple offers, say z and z′ of some lawyer i and holds z, then it
will, when receiving a new contract offer from some other lawyer j, never reject z while
simultaneously accepting z′. In the proof we heavily rely on Aygün and Sönmez (2012).
With this result in hand, we can now state the following lemma:
Lemma 6. Suppose lawyer preferences are weakly impatient. The outcome of the cumula-
tive offer process using the time-specific choice function Chtsc produces the lawyer-optimal
stable allocation.
The proof is essentially the same proof as the one of the corresponding Theorem 5 in
Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Aygün and Sönmez (2012). Assuming weak impatience
again allows us to relax the unilateral substitutes assumption and instead use the time-
specific choice functions which only satisfy the bilateral substitutes assumption. The
reason that this works is that because of weak impatience, any sets of available contracts
that the courts will have to make choices from are sets such that if a contract x of some
lawyer i is available for period t, then contracts for any earlier and feasible period for that
lawyer i will also be available. On this restricted domain of sets of available contracts
unilateral substitutes essentially holds for the time-specific choice function, allowing the
proofs by Hatfield and Kojima (2010) to go through, with some modifications. Note that
we only needed to make use of the assumption of weak impatience for proving Lemma 6.
The result in Lemma 6 is a new result, which is not implied by any of the results
in Kominers and Sönmez (2016), since they consider more general slot-specific choice
functions than we do here. For general slot-specific choice functions a lawyer-optimal
stable allocation is not guaranteed to exist and even when such an allocation exists, the
COP is not guaranteed to find it. Lemma 6 above shows that under weak impatience,
a lawyer-optimal stable allocation is guaranteed to exist and that it is found by the
COP. The following example shows that without weak impatience, the existence of a
lawyer-optimal stable allocation is no longer guaranteed.
Example 10. Let i1 and i2 prefer (c, 2) to (c, 1) and assume i1  i2 with qc,1 = qc,2 = 1.
Then the allocation Y = {(i1, c, 1), (i2, c, 2)} is stable, while the COP produced the also
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stable allocation Y ′ = {(i1, c, 2), (i2, c, 1)}. Notice that i2 prefers Y , while i1 prefers Y ′,
i.e. neither allocation is weakly Pareto efficient.
5.3 Properties of the Time-specific Lawyer Offering Stable Mechanism
The time-specific lawyer offering stable mechanism (TSLOSM), ψts, is defined to be that
mechanism which associates with each preference profile the outcome of the COP using
the time-specific choice functions. We will refer to this mechanism as the time-specific
stable mechanism. We have the following result:
Proposition 10. The time-specific lawyer offering stable mechanism is stable and (group)
strategy-proof. If in addition lawyers’ preferences are weakly impatient, then the time-
specific stable mechanism is lawyer-optimal stable.
Stability and (group) strategy-proofness follow directly from Theorem 3 in Kominers
and Sönmez (2016). The second part follows from applying our Lemma 6. Instead of
applying Theorem 3 in Kominers and Sönmez (2016), an alternative way of obtaining the
first part of the above results when lawyers’ preferences are weakly impatient is to adapt
results in Hatfield and Kojima (2009) making use of the fact that under weak impatience,
a lawyer-optimal stable allocation is guaranteed to exist. An important corollary of the
time-specific stable mechanism being group strategy-proof is that it leads to weak Pareto
efficiency as in Hatfield and Kojima (2009).
Corollary 1. The time-specific lawyer offering stable mechanism is weakly Pareto effi-
cient.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Hence there exists an allocation Y ⊆ X such that for all i ∈ I
we have Y (i)PIψts(P ). Let P̃i be the preference profile for each lawyer i ∈ I that lists
Y (i) as the only acceptable contract. Then we have that ψts(P̃ ) = Y . This implies that
we have found a coalition of lawyers, namely all lawyers, that can jointly deviate to make
all its member strictly better off. This contradicts ψts being group strategy-proof.
One of the problems in the current procedure, the Berlin mechanism, is that lawyers
may be worse off by improving their ranking, for example by obtaining a better grade
or having waited longer. The next proposition shows that this is not the case for the
cumulative offer process using the time-specific choice function.
Proposition 11. The time-specific lawyer offering stable mechanism respects improve-
ments.
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The intuition behind the proof of this result, which is simply an application of The-
orem 4 in Kominers and Sönmez (2016), is as follows. Let 1 be an unambiguous
improvement over 2 for lawyer i and let ψ1 be the associated mechanism. Similarly for
2. Suppose the COP were run initially excluding lawyer i under 1, which will lead
to some allocation X1. After this, lawyer i proposes contracts in order of preference.
This process will terminate for some contract offer xk, which is i’s assignment under the
mechanism ψ1. Running the algorithm under 2 without lawyer i will lead to the same
initial allocation X1 since only the ranking of lawyer i has changed. Letting i propose
contracts however will lead to the same rejections occurring since 1 is an unambiguous
improvement over 2 until xk is offered by i, which by assumption is the final allocation
under 1 but which may nevertheless be rejected under 2. From this it follows that i
cannot do worse under 1 than under 2. Note that the priorities based on grades, ac-
cumulated waiting time and social criteria do not directly enter the time-specific lawyer
offering stable mechanism. Hence changes in those rankings will leave the outcome of
the mechanism unchanged, which is consistent with respect of improvements.
This is an important result since it implies that targeted efforts to improve the allo-
cation obtained by specific lawyers through an improvement of their ranking can never
hurt these lawyers who those efforts are intended to help. One implication is that when
the ranking depends positively on grades, then lawyers are rewarded for better grades
by an improvement in their assignment.
The fact that the time-specific stable mechanism respects improvements has a further
implication in our application. Lawyers, in the current system, may report to have
a special social relationship to a court. For example, having children grants higher
priority for regional courts in Bavaria, as discussed above. Consider now a game which
first asks lawyers to report any such information. In a second stage, the priorities of
each court would be adjusted to reflect those reports, in case the information lawyers
have reported has been verified. In case lawyers do have special social relationship to
a court, but do not report it, the choice function remains unaffected. Then we have
the following result, which follows by noting that reporting this information leads to
an unambiguous improvement in the priority of a lawyer at a court. Since the time-
specific stable mechanism respects improvements, reporting this information, holding
the strategies of everyone else fixed, cannot make a lawyer worse off, but may lead to an
improvement. Hence the following corollary is obtained:
Corollary 2. Each lawyer has an incentive to report verifiable information increasing
her priority at a court under the time-specific stable mechanism.
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The above corollary shows that respect of improvements is closely linked to the in-
centive compatibility of revealing hard information.49 Another desirable property that
the time-specific stable mechanism satisfies is elimination of justified envy.
Proposition 12. The time-specific stable mechanism eliminates justified envy.
Proof. To see that the time-specific stable mechanism eliminates justified envy, let x, y ∈
Y ⊆ X̃ be two contracts obtained by the time-specific stable mechanism such that xI 6= yI
and (xC , xT )PyI (yC , yT ). Then since by the cumulative offer process yI must have offered
(yI , xC , xT ) at some step during the process, it must have been rejected. But the only
way that (yI , xC , xT ) had been rejected while x was accepted is when xI xC yI , which
implies that the time-specific stable mechanism eliminates justified envy.
The time-specific mechanism proposed in this section however does not fill positions
early. The reason is an inherent conflict between stability and early filling. To see this
consider the following example.
Example 11. There are two periods t = 1, 2 and two courts c =c1, c2, each with one
position in each period. In the first period, there are two lawyers I = {i1, i2}, with
common preferences for each i ∈ I: (c1, 1)Pi(c1, 2)Pi(c2, 1)Pi(c2, 2). Both courts have
priorities such that lawyer i1 c i2. The outcome of the cumulative offer process using
the time-specific choice function results in the allocation {(i1, c1, 1) , (i2, c1, 2)}, which
leaves the position in period 1 at court c2 unoccupied even though lawyer i2 is given a
position in period 2, thereby violating early filling.
The example shows that (lawyer-optimal) stable outcomes might not satisfy the early
filling properties. There is a trade-off between preferences of lawyers from different time
periods: On the one hand, a mechanism finding a stable outcome over lawyers from all
periods might not fill positions early and by this make future lawyers worse off. On the
other hand, guaranteeing early filling could benefit future lawyers at the costs of earlier
lawyers, but would not be stable and might violate other desirable properties, such as
strategy-proofness.
49Aygün and Bo (2013) in their analysis of college admissions with affirmative action in Brazil study
the incentives of different disadvantaged groups to disclose their status to the mechanism. For example,
it is desired by the policy-makers in Brazil that students from ethnic minorities who went to a public
high school are given higher priority. However such students may decide not to reveal their status as an
ethnic minority. In the currently used procedure in Brazil they sometimes do not have an incentive to
do so. The mechanism proposed by Aygün and Bo (2013) makes it optimal for students to reveal this
information truthfully.
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5.4 Flexible Choice Functions
The discussion in the previous sections assumed that each court c could only accept qc,t
lawyers in time period t. This assumption was made because the number of positions
at each court is determined by the budget of the federal state several periods into the
future so that the courts cannot flexibly set their own capacity for each period. In this
subsection we consider the possibility of allowing each court to flexibly determine how to
allocate total capacity, which is assumed to be fixed over several periods. Hence, we no
longer have a time-specific capacity constraint but instead have for each court a global
constraint on the total number of lawyers that can be accepted. In other words, we relax
the requirement that a mechanism produces a feasible allocation.
We continue to consider slot-specific choice functions and build on the time-specific
choice function Chtsc to develop the flexible choice function Chflexc . As before there are
qc,t copies of a slot of type t and the slots with a lower t have higher precedence. Under
the time-specific choice function Chtsc each slot’s priority ordering was such that only
periods of the associated time period were deemed acceptable and acceptable contracts
were ranked according to c. Under Chflexc each slot’s priority ordering Πs ranks highest
the contracts of the associated time period. Next highest are ranked the contracts of
period 1 (or period 2 in case we are considering slots of the period 1 type), followed by
those contracts of the next highest period and so on.50 Contracts of the same period are
ranked according to c. As a consequence each slot, irrespective of its types, considers
all contracts acceptable. Note that this allows for choices that violate the time-specific
capacity constraints of the courts.
Since the flexible choice function is also a slot-specific choice function and since con-
tracts, given a fixed period, are ranked according to c by slots, the cumulative offer
process using these choice functions is a strategy-proof, weakly Pareto efficient mecha-
nism that eliminates justified envy and respects improvements. The proofs are similar to
those for the TSLOSM and are omitted. We call this new mechanism the flexible lawyer
offering stable mechanism (FLOSM) and denote it by ψflex.
FLOSM does not necessarily satisfy the time-specific capacity constraints of the
courts, while the TSLOSM satisfies these constraints. Hence there may be allocations
that can be reached by FLOSM that violate feasibility under TSLOSM but are preferred
over allocations feasible under TSLOSM.
50The ranking of contracts not involving period t by slots of type t does not matter for our results, so
long as all contracts involving period t are ranked highest.
40 Chapter I. Matching with Waiting Times: The German Labor Market for Lawyers
Proposition 13. Fix a lawyer matching problem (T, I, C, q, P,). Then we have for all
i that ψflex(P )(i)Riψts(P )(i).
Proposition 13 says that all lawyers weakly prefer the outcome of the flexible lawyer
offering stable mechanism over the outcome of the time-specific lawyer offering stable
mechanism. The intuition behind this result is that the time-specific choice function
can be obtained from the flexible choice function via truncation strategies. Truncation
strategies by one side of the market make the other side of the market weakly worse off.
Hence we conclude that relaxing time-specific capacity constraints and suitably adapting
the choice functions used by the courts has the potential of making lawyers better off.51
We interpret the flexible choice function as corresponding to cases in which a court
is given greater budgetary freedom with respect to when to open trainee-ship positions.
In practice there may be other reasons for having time-specific constraints that make ad-
justments to capacities over time difficult. For example, class room sizes could constraint
how many lawyers may begin their trainee-ship in any given period of time.
6 Conclusion
While the above description of the Time-Specific Lawyer Offering Mechanism is rather
theoretical, from a practical point of view it could be interpreted in two ways.
First, as a mechanism of perfect foresight, the matching for all lawyers at all courts in
all time periods is finalized already in period 0. This requires grades, preferences etc. of
arriving lawyers to be known already at time 0. If courts before time t are unacceptable
to some lawyer i, then we can think of i arriving at time t. This interpretation could be
realistic for short time horizons, however less so for longer horizons.
The second interpretation is that the mechanism is run every single period, whereby
lawyers are allocated to positions now and in the future, ignoring future arrivals. Then,
once a lawyer is allocated to a future position, this seat remains "reserved" for the current
lawyer. In that case one needs to additionally analyze how many future positions one
allows to be assigned today.
An interesting extension of our model would be to consider how our proposed mech-
anism behaves when it needs to be applied for each period over a number of periods.
Dur and Kesten (2014) consider a problem in which a set of students is to be matched to
colleges, but in which the set of colleges is partitioned. They show that when the assign-
ment happens sequentially, it is inherently difficult to have a mechanism be non-wasteful,
51This could happen for example by allowing courts to transfer funding for trainee-ship positions over
time in response to demand, rather than sticking to an exogenously given budget for each time period.
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and strategy-proof while eliminating justified envy and respecting improvements. Such
results would also apply in a dynamic version of our model in which the time-specific
lawyer-optimal mechanism were applied repeatedly. A related problem, that we have
ignored so far, is how to manage capacity. While we assumed that capacities were given
exogenously, in a dynamic procedure with excess demand one may want to reserve some
capacity at some courts to ensure that future agents are not unduly disadvantaged by
earlier agents taking these positions. Future research should address this question.
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Appendix
A Omitted Proofs
Proof. [Lemma 4] Suppose to the contrary that for court c and a set of contracts Y
with elements y, x ∈ Y such that yC = xC = c, yI c xI , yT = xT and x ∈ Chtsc (Y )
but that there does not exist z ∈ Chtsc (Y ) with zI = yI . Note that in particular this
implies that y /∈ Chtsc (Y ). Then since such a z does not exist, it must be that in step
yT = t of the procedure to construct Chtsc , y has not yet been rejected. So in step t
both x and y are still available. Now x is accepted in step t since x ∈ Chtsc (Y ) while y is
rejected, since y /∈ Chtsc (Y ). This contradicts yI c xI , since the procedure to construct
the time-specific choice function would have selected the contract of the agent with the
better ranking.
Proof. [Lemma 5] Towards a contradiction let k′ be the first step a court c holds a
contract z that was previously rejected at step k < k′. As z is rejected at step k, it
was on hold by court c at step (k − 1) or it was offered to court c at step k. In either
case no other contract of lawyer zI could be on hold by court c at step (k − 1). But
then, since z is the first contract to be held after an earlier rejection, court c cannot have
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rejected at step k, this means that for all x ∈ Chtsc (Ac(k)) with xT = zT , we must have
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can no longer have been under consideration in step t of the procedure to find the court’s
choice. But for that to have happened, it must be that some contract y with yI = xI
and yT < xT has been accepted in step k′. But this cannot be since by assumption z
is the first contract that was rejected and subsequently accepted and because xI cannot
have offered a contract in step k′ since a contract of xI was held by the court in period
k′ − 1. Hence a contradiction.
Proof. [Lemma 6] To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show that for any stable
allocation X ′ ⊆ X̃ and any contract z ∈ X ′, contract z is not rejected by the cumulative
offer algorithm when the time-specific choice function is used. To obtain a contradiction,
suppose not. Let k be the first step where court c = zC rejects contract z, and let
Y = Chtsc (Ac(k)). Then by IRC, z /∈ Chtsc (Y ∪ {z}). Then by lemma 5, zI /∈ YI . As k
is the first step a contract in any stable allocation is rejected, every lawyer in YI weakly
prefers their contract in Y to their contract in X ′ which is stable by assumption. We
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then consider two cases:
Case 1: z /∈ Chtsc (Y ∪X ′). In this case, court c blocks allocation X ′ together with lawyers
in YI , contradicting stability of X ′.
Case 2: z ∈ Chtsc (Y ∪X ′). But this cannot be, since for any x ∈ Chtsc (Y ) with xT = zT ,
we have for all s < t, (xI , c, s) ∈ Y by weak impatience.
Therefore the addition of contracts cannot result in z being chosen when both Y and
X ′ are available due to the way the time-specific choice function is constructed. A
contradiction.
For the proof of Proposition 13 we make use of an associated lawyer-slot matching
market as in Kominers and Sönmez (2016). A lawyer-slot matching market is constructed
from a lawyer-court allocation problem in which the courts have slot-specific choice func-
tions Chc(·;Bc,Πc) as follows. The contract set X is extended to the set Z defined by
Z ≡ {(x, s) : x ∈ X and s ∈ SxC}. Slot priorities Π̃sover contracts in Z are derived from
priorities Πsc over contracts in X. This means that (x, s)Π̃s(x′, s) if and only if xΠscx′.
A lawyer’s preferences P̃i over contracts in Z remain the same as preferences Pi over
contracts in X with ties between the same contract at different slots broken according
to the precedence order. This means that (x, s)P̃i(x′, s′) if and only if either xPix′ or
[x = x′ and s BxC s′].
Proof. [Proposition 13] For any instance of a lawyer-court allocation problem we con-
struct the lawyer-slot matching problem as follows. By Theorem A.1 of Kominers and
Sönmez (2016) the outcome of the lawyer offering stable mechanism in a lawyer-court
matching with waiting time problem in which courts use slot-specific choice functions,
corresponds to the outcome of the lawyer offering stable mechanism in the associated
lawyer-slot matching market.
Suppose now that one slot s ∈ Sc in the lawyer-slot market truncates from its priority
ordering its lowest ranked contract, say x. If that contract was not part of the allocation
under the lawyer offering stable mechanism without the truncation, then this truncation
has no effect on the final allocation. If that contract was part of the allocation under the
lawyer offering stable mechanism without the truncation, then the lawyer xI applies to
her next highest ranked slot, s′. The slot s′ will either accept lawyer xI ’s contract (in the
process possibly rejecting another contract of another lawyer) or reject it. In either case
there will be a finite chain of rejections of contracts. All lawyers involved in this rejection
chain will receive a worse allocation than without the truncation of slot s according to
their preferences over slots. There are now two possibilities. Either all lawyers find the
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new allocation worse only because of the tie-breaking induced by the precedence order
Bc. In that case the lawyers in the original lawyer-court matching with waiting time
problem are unaffected by the truncation. If the new allocation is worse because of a
change in the court and time period allocated to a lawyer, then lawyers in the original
lawyer-court matching will be worse off.
A similar logic applies to any further truncation by any slot. Each truncation makes
the lawyers weakly worse off. Consider now the case in which each slot’s priorities have
been truncated to only find contracts involving a time period corresponding to the slot’s
type acceptable. In that case the outcome of the lawyer-optimal stable mechanism in
the lawyer-slot matching problem corresponds to the outcome of the lawyer-proposing
stable mechanism under the time-specific choice functions. By the previous arguments,





Based on Dimakopoulos and Sudaric (2018), International Journal of Industrial Organi-
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1 Introduction
Online platforms often do not charge monetary prices from users but monetize through
an advertisement-based business model building on the collection and processing of user
data. Typical examples include social networks (e.g. Facebook, LinkedIn), search engines
(e.g. Bing, Google) or video platforms (e.g. Youtube, Vimeo). The role of user data in
this context is ambiguous. From the platform perspective user data is an input factor
which can be used to gain insights about users and improve the targeting of advertise-
ment, resulting in a superior product for potential advertisers. This commodity attribute
of data is mirrored to a lesser extent on the user side. Users typically accept some con-
ditions to what extent personal data is collected and processed when using a platform
service. In some cases the provision of personal data is necessary to make meaningful use
of a platform service (e.g. social networks) while in other cases services do not require
the collection of user data per se (e.g. search engines, mail providers, video platforms).
In both cases the provision of data from a user perspective can be interpreted as a price
the user is willing to accept in exchange for the use of the platform including the display
of ads.1 To put it in terms of platform economics, user data requirements exhibit price
1A study by the Pew Research Center (2014) shows that 91 percent of respondents agree that they
lost control over how companies collect personal data while 55 percent state that they are willing to
share some information in exchange for using a free service. The European Commission (2015), however,
reports that 72 percent of internet users worry they provide too much data online. This indicates that
users are aware and willing to exchange personal data for services, but the actual extent worries them.
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characteristics on the one hand, and affect indirect network effects (e.g. targeting) at the
same time.
This ambiguity makes it especially hard for policy makers as standard economic argu-
ments might not be applicable. Indeed, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)
argues that competition authorities should take privacy and data related aspects more
into account (EDPS, 2014).2 And indeed, recent cases demonstrate that competition
authorities acknowledge the peculiarities of data-driven industries. Germany’s Federal
Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt, BKartA) initiated investigations against Facebook in
2016 based on alleged abuse of market power. In particular, the BKartA investigates
whether Facebook uses its dominant position in the market for social networks to expand
the terms of service outlining how much data is collected and processed by the platform.3
Therefore, we want to shed some light on the role of competition intensity in a two-sided
market framework when users provide data and this data is monetized on the opposing
market side.4
We analyze a setting of two competing ad-financed platforms in a two-sided market
framework. On the user market side, platforms strategically set the required level of
data provision, to which users have to agree to obtain access to the platform service.
Platforms process this user data to sell improved ad targeting on the advertiser market
side. While users incur disutility from providing data (privacy concerns, opportunity
costs), they benefit from seeing more relevant ads. Users and advertisers are assumed to
single-home.
Our model predicts that platforms will extract a distorted amount of data compared
to the efficient benchmark. The distortion is induced through the one-sided monetization
in a way that platforms do not perfectly balance the costs of data provision, i.e. privacy
costs incurred by users, against the targeting benefits on both market sides, but put too
much or too little weight on the benefit captured by the monetized market side. This
distortion depends on the net effect of cross-group externalities as well as the degree of
2Whether competition authorities should incorporate aspects of privacy and data protection is, how-
ever, controversial. For arguments in favor we refer to Stucke and Grunes (2016), arguments against can
be found e.g. in Cooper (2013).
3Bundeskartellamt, ‘Bundeskartellamt initiates proceeding against Facebook on suspicion of
having abused its market power by infringing data protection rules’, Press Release, 2 March
2016, http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/02_03_
2016_Facebook.html.
4Classical examples include ad-based business models where data is used to improve ad targeting or
matching / recommendation platforms, where users are presented offers which become more relevant the
more the platform knows about its users. For illustration purposes we stick to the example of targeted
advertising and refer to the extension part of this paper for a more general consideration of cross-group
externalities, i.e. also the possibility of users enjoying the presence of firm’s offers.
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competition intensity on both market sides. If targeting benefits are small or competition
is weak, an inefficiently high level of data is collected. On the other hand, if competition
is strong or targeting benefits sufficiently outweigh nuisance costs, too little data is
collected. From the point of view of consumers the competitive level of data provision is
always too high, suggesting that applying a consumer standard to online platforms leads
to underprovision of personal data. The competitive equilibrium level of data provision,
however, is monotone in the degree of competition intensity: the weaker the competition
on either side of the market, the higher the equilibrium amount of data provision. This
result is interesting because it does not follow the common two-sided platform logic that
less elasticity on one side typically decreases the other side’s price.
Our findings indicate that the inefficiency of data provision can be reduced by careful
privacy regulation or competition policies on either market side. One interpretation of
this result is that (competition) policy measures in these data-driven industries should
take into account the effects they have on the extent of private data collection.
We also consider a variety of extensions to this setup. In the first one we depart from
the assumption that platforms are restricted in their price setting on the user side, and
allow for non-zero user prices. In fact, lifting the restriction leads to an efficient level of
collected data, while user prices can be positive, negative (or zero). This gives rise to
two interpretations. The first is a Coasian one, where establishing the missing market
on the user side leads to an efficient outcome. This reflects the idea of Laudon (1996)
that users should be adequately compensated for the provision of their data, while the
problem of the ‘data economy’ lies precisely in the absence of such a market. The second
interpretation is of counterfactual nature. In particular we argue that whenever the un-
restricted model would yield positive (negative) user prices, the restricted model exhibits
overprovision (underprovision) of user data as platforms can no longer adequately charge
or compensate users for collecting data. The second extension considers different degrees
of platform collusion and we conclude that the amount of collected data is excessively
high under full collusion, while this is not necessarily the case under partial collusion. In
the third extension we discuss the robustness of our results with respect to multi-homing
and elastic total demand. Lastly, we demonstrate that our results naturally extend to
settings with positive cross-group externalities (matching platforms).
The remaining paper is structured as follows. Section 2 relates our analysis to the
existing literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 characterizes the efficient
benchmark and competitive equilibrium outcomes, for which we present comparative
statics in Section 5. Section 6 compares these outcomes and outlines policy implications.
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In Section 7 we extend and discuss the baseline model. Section 8 concludes. Omit-
ted proofs can be found in Appendix A, while supplementary analyses are delegated to
(online) Appendix B.
2 Related Literature
Methodologically, our research is related to the literature on platform competition in
general and on applications in media markets in particular. We consider a competitive
setting with two-sided single-homing which has been analyzed by Armstrong (2006) in
a more general framework and later extended in Armstrong and Wright (2007). How-
ever, both papers consider the case where platforms engage in two-sided pricing while
non-monetary aspects (as e.g. user data) are not modelled. We also share a common
component with the literature on media platforms in the sense that we, at least in our
baseline model, consider the case of opposing indirect network effects, where advertisers
like to reach many users but users dislike the presence of advertisers. This reflects the
idea of ‘peace and quiet’ privacy in Posner (1981) and is a common assumption in the
media literature (see Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006) for a review). This setup is used
e.g. to study competition in TV markets (see e.g. Anderson and Coate (2005) or Peitz
and Valletti (2008)) where platforms do not engage in targeted advertising and therefore
the expected revenue per user as well as perceived nuisance are constant. Our research
differs in the sense that we endogenize those indirect network effects as we let them to
be affected by the level of data collected. The concept of endogenous network effects is
captured in Reisinger (2012) where users spend time using platform services and plat-
forms translate this activity into better targeting and reduced nuisance. A similar setup
is presented in Bourreau et al. (2017), however the research question differs substantially.
The key difference is that in our model the level of data provision is a strategic decision
of the competing platforms, while in the two previously mentioned papers consumers
voluntarily spend time/provide data on the platforms, which changes the competitive
dynamics significantly.
We also contribute to the broader literature on efficient provision of personal data
and the role of privacy as a competition instrument. The aspect of data provision being
a strategic choice made by platforms is captured to some extent by Spiegel (2013) who
compares commercial software (full privacy) to adware (positive privacy costs) and shows
that adware is welfare superior. De Corniere and De Nijs (2016) consider a setting where
a monopolistic platform auctions off advertising slots and decides whether to disclose
consumer information (no privacy) or not (privacy). They show that platforms might
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prefer information disclosure, which comes at the cost of some consumers leaving the
market such that from a welfare point of view it is not clear which regime is preferable.
Bloch and Demange (2017) present a setting where consumers are heterogeneous with
respect to their privacy cost and a monopolistic platform decides how much data to
extract. They show that depending on parameter values the amount of data collection
can be excessively high. A similar setting is presented in Lefouili and Toh (2017) where a
monopolistic platform monetizes on disclosing personal information to third parties. The
authors conclude that one of the inefficiencies arising is excessive information disclosure.
The mentioned papers consider the case of monopolistic platforms, while we consider
the case of competing platforms, allowing for varying degrees of competition intensity on
both market sides.
The role of privacy in a competitive environment is considered in Casadesus-Masanell
and Hervas-Drane (2015) where firms not only compete in a price dimension but also in
a quality dimension which the authors motivate as privacy. They show that compared
to a monopolistic firm, competition leads to a higher degree of privacy while increasing
competition intensity does not necessarily imply that privacy improves even further. A
key assumption in their model is that prices for disclosing consumer information are
exogenous, while in our model platforms have market power vis-à-vis advertisers and
hence face a tradeoff. They also show that low privacy firms tend to subsidize consumers,
while high privacy firms charge positive consumer prices. Similarly, Kummer and Schulte
(2016) show empirically that there is a trade-off between money and privacy for users.
They analyze mobile application data and find that apps are cheaper when more personal
data can be collected. These results reoccur in our two-sided pricing extension as we
show that user prices can be positive or negative as well, while the degree of privacy
provision is excessively high or low once firms can no longer compensate users for their
data provision. To our knowledge there are very few empirical studies examining the
interaction between market power and privacy. In fact, the only study we are aware of is
Bonneau and Preibusch (2010) who relate the extent of data collection policies of various
online services to the competitiveness of the market they are operating in. They show
that the more market power a firm has, the more personal information is asked to be
provided which is in line with our model.
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3 Model
We analyze a setting where two symmetric platforms, i, j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i, compete
for advertisers and users. Advertisers and users are distributed uniformly on different
Hotelling lines of unit length and are assumed to both single-home. This assumption
allows us to focus on the role of competition intensity more clearly.5 Platforms are
located at the ends of the respective Hotelling lines such that platform i is located at
location li = 0 and platform j at lj = 1. Note that on the advertiser and the user side we
have distinct Hotelling lines and therefore distinct parameters of transportation costs,
which we will later interpret as different degrees of competition intensity. The idea is that
the degree of competition faced by platforms does not have to be the same for all market
sides. For example, online platforms from different segments, such as search engines,
social networks, video streaming platforms or mail providers, may all compete for the
same advertisers, however competition for users may occur separately and independently
of the other segments.
3.1 Users
A user located at x on the Hotelling line obtains utility ui(x) from joining platform i,
ui(x) = u− κ(di)− ν(di)Ai − tu|li − x|. (1)
The first term of the utility function is a fixed utility component u from using platform
services, which is the same for both platforms. Second, κ(di) ≥ 0 denotes the privacy
(opportunity) costs of providing user data di to the platform, whereby we assume that
costs are strictly convex and twice differentiable, and specifically that κ′(0) = 0, while
κ′(d) > 0 for all d > 0 and κ′′(d) > 0 for all d. Third, users incur nuisance cost ν(d) ≥ 0
per advertisements Ai on the platform. We assume that users (weakly) prefer personal-
ized to non-personalized ads, i.e. ν(d) is a convex and twice differentiable function s.t.
ν ′(d) ≤ 0 and ν ′′(d) ≥ 0. This setup reflects the idea that the more relevant an ad,
the higher the chance of value creation through a possible follow-up purchase.6 Finally,
users face transportation costs due to horizontal platform differentiation, whereby we
5In Section 7 we discuss multi-homing.
6Note that our set-up allows for positive utility of seeing advertisement as well, as long as this positive
utility is again concave in the amount of provided data. However, for sake of clarity we stay with the
notion of negative utility of nuisance in the subsequent text and consider the case of positive cross-group
externalities as an extension in Section 7.
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assume uniform user distribution on the Hotelling line, i.e. x u∼ [0, 1], while tu > 0 is the
associated transportation cost parameter.
Consumers in our baseline model are not charged a monetary price explicitly, which
makes our model comparable to e.g. Reisinger (2012). We follow the same line of rea-
soning as e.g. in Peitz and Reisinger (2016) and Waehrer (2015) that there are some ex-
ogenous constraints preventing platforms from charging non-zero consumer prices. This
restriction is, however, relaxed in Section 7.1. In order to join a platform users have to
provide some personal data di in our model. This is different to the setup in Reisinger
(2012) or Bourreau et al. (2017) as in our model platforms can set the level of data which
has to be provided by the users, whereas in their models consumers voluntarily provide
a certain amount of time. The idea behind our setup is that consumers accept terms
and conditions when using a platform which requires them to accept a certain level of
data provision or alternatively cases where users have to register for an account by pro-
viding personal information before they can use the platform service. This specification
on the consumer side allows us to focus on user data di as a primary strategic aspect of
competition.
3.2 Advertisers
An advertiser located at a on the Hotelling line obtains an expected profit of πi(a) from
posting a single ad on platform i,
πi(a) = τ(di)(1− pi)Xi − ta|li − a|. (2)
The interaction with Xi users on platform i generates a normalized expected revenue of
1, if users decide to ‘click on the ad’, which happens with probability τ(di). The strictly
concave and twice differentiable function τ(d) ≥ 0 can be interpreted as the targeting
ability of platforms: the more data d can be collected from users, the more effective
the targeting and hence the higher the probability that a user clicks on this ad, i.e.
we have that τ ′(d) > 0 and τ ′′(d) < 0. At the same time we assume that advertisers
only pay the platform a price pi if the ad has been clicked (cost-per-click) such that the
expected revenue per user is given by τ(di)(1 − pi), which is consistent with real-world
pricing practices. The second term reflects advertisers transportation costs when joining
platform i. Again we assume uniform advertiser distribution on the Hotelling line, i.e.
a
u∼ [0, 1], and ta > 0 as the transportation cost parameter on the advertiser side.
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3.3 Platforms
The business model of platforms in our model is purely ad-based. While they offer
(exogenous) platform services (u) to users, revenue is only generated through presenting
ads to users.7 Platform profits are then given by
Πi (di, pi) = AiXiτ(di)pi (3)
i.e. Ai advertisers at platform i pay pi whenever the platform’s users Xi click on an
ad with probability τ(di).8 The crucial novelty in our model is that we assume that
besides charging prices to advertisers, platforms extract data di from their users. While
di shares some price characteristics from the point of view of users, data is an essential
input factor for the click-probability the advertisers are facing. At the same time we
assume that not only the click probability increases through better targeting possibilities
but also the nuisance decreases.
3.4 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions to ensure full advertiser and user market coverage,
allowing us to study environments of full platform competition.9
Assumption 1. Competition for advertisers is sufficiently strong, i.e. ta ≤ t̄a.
This implies that competition for users is sufficiently weak and that there are gains of
trade for all advertisers, even without data collection, i.e.
(a) tu > ν(0),
(b) ta < τ(0).
The upper bound on ta is given by t̄a := tuτ(0)−ν(0)τ(0)3tu+ν(0) . This assumption on the upper
bound of ta allows us to isolate effects in a competitive environment. Intuitively, this
constitutes a sufficient condition, such that for any level of (symmetric) data provision d ≥
0, it is assured that all advertisers obtain non-negative profits. Consequently, competition
for advertisers is sufficiently strong.
7In Section 7 we discuss two-sided pricing.
8Note that platforms and advertisers share the profit created by each targeted user on the platform.
However, this does not mean that their incentives are perfectly aligned, since platforms additionally care
about the number of advertisers joining.
9In Section 7 we discuss relaxing the full-market coverage assumptions.
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The condition on the consumer nuisance function, i.e. the necessary condition (a)
of Assumption 1, can be motivated as follows: no platform will obtain the entire user
market, even if all ads were placed on the rival platform. Technically, this is established
by tu > ν(0).10 The condition on the targeting technology, i.e. the necessary condition
(b) of Assumption 1, states that even without collecting any data advertisers can still
profitably join a platform. In particular we assume that there are gains of trade for
all advertisers. Intuitively, this assumption states that there is a positive probability
for users to click an ad even if the ad is not targeted at all. And this probability, τ(0),
exceeds the transportation cost incurred by any advertiser ta, so that we need not exclude
any advertisers, even if too little data is collected.
Assumption 2. The fixed utility component u is large enough to ensure full participation
on the user side.
Intuitively, the platform service provides sufficient utility such that users are not
deterred through the provision of personal data and seeing ads.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage platforms simultaneously set
prices pi and the required level of data di to join their platform. In the second stage
advertisers and users observe the platforms’ choices and simultaneously decide which
platform to join, hence determining Ai and Xi.11 The equilibrium concept is sub-game
perfection and we solve the game by backward induction.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we will first present the results for the second-stage sub-game of user and
advertiser allocation. Then we will show the efficient and the user-optimal outcome as
well as the market outcome in the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
4.1 Second Stage Market Shares
In the second stage the market shares on the consumer and advertiser side are given
by the standard Hotelling procedure. Utilizing the unit length of the Hotelling line,
10Note that tu > ν(0)⇒ tu > ν(d) ∀d because ν′(d) ≤ 0. Given any (symmetric) amount of data d ≥ 0
collected by both platforms, even if all advertisers used platform j such that Ai = 0 and Ai = 1, at least
the user most loyal to platform j, i.e. located directly at lj , would rather stay at this platform j, even
though it is full of ads. In other words, competition for users is sufficiently weak.
11We could also consider an alternative timing where advertisers choose first and users last. The
outcome is equivalent in our model.
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and given full user market coverage due to Assumption 2, the number of users joining a
platform is then determined by the indifferent consumer x̂ : ui(x̂) = uj(x̂) such that





[κ(dj)− κ(di) + ν(dj)Aj − ν(di)Ai] , Xj = 1− x̂. (4)
Similarly, market shares on the advertiser side are given by the indifferent advertiser
â : πi(â) = πj(â). Note that Assumption 1 assures market coverage gross of advertising
prices. For now we therefore assume that prices permit full market coverage and check
later that in equilibrium this is indeed the case. Market shares are then given by





[τ(di)(1− pi)Xi − τ(dj)(1− pj)Xj ] , Aj = 1− â. (5)
Solving the system of equations given in (4) - (5) yields unique market shares Xi, Xj , Ai
and Aj as functions of data requirements di, dj and prices pi, pj . Explicit solutions are
provided in the Appendix.
4.2 Efficiency Benchmark
For the derivation of the welfare-efficient benchmark, we define welfare as the sum of all
indirect utilities and profits, anticipating second stage market shares as in 4.1, i.e.












πj(a)da+ Πi + Πj .
(6)
Proposition 1. Welfare is maximized by the unique symmetric solution (do, po) =






resulting in equal advertiser and user market shares, i.e. Aoi = 1/2 and Xoi = 1/2. The
price po can be freely chosen to split the rent between advertisers and platforms.
The welfare-optimal level of data do is chosen in a way such that users’ marginal
cost of data provision κ′(do) equals the sum of marginal benefits across both market
sides, i.e. the marginal benefit of enhanced targeting τ ′(do)/2 and the marginal benefit of
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reduced nuisance −ν ′(do)/2, while the factor 1/2 is due to the symmetric market shares.12
Furthermore, the optimal level of data provision is independent of transportation cost
parameters ta and tu. Since prices are just transfers from advertisers to platforms they
do not affect welfare.13
4.3 User-optimal Outcome
Let us now turn to the user-optimal level of data provision. If users are free to decide on
the amount of data provided, the user-optimal level du is derived from consumer surplus,
which is identical to the first two terms in equation (6), anticipating second stage market
shares as in 4.1.14
Proposition 2. User utility is maximized by the unique symmetric solution (du, pu) =
(dui , pui ) for i ∈ {1, 2}, where du is characterized by
κ′(du) = −12 ν
′(du), (8)
while the price pu can be freely chosen to split the rent between advertisers and platforms,
resulting in equal advertiser and user market shares, i.e. Aui = 1/2 and Xui = 1/2.
Intuitively, the user-optimal data level balances privacy costs and reduced nuisance
benefits for users, at the margin. Note that for constant nuisance costs we get the
corner-solution where users would not provide any private data, i.e. du = 0. For general
decreasing nuisance costs, users would be willing to provide a positive level of data du > 0.
4.4 Market Outcome
For the market outcome, in the first stage platforms maximize their profits, anticipating
second stage market shares as in Section 4.1.
max
pi,di
Πi (di, pi) = Ai τ(di) piXi ∀i ∈ {1, 2} (9)
12For very low transportation cost parameters and sufficiently high net benefits τ(·) − ν(·) on the
platform it might be efficient from a welfare perspective to shut one platform down and let the entire
market be served by the other platform due to high network effects. In this case the very fact of having
a competing platform is an inefficiency. While this corner solution exhibits an interesting property of
platform markets, it is not the focus of this paper and we therefore stick to the case where we have an
interior, i.e. duopoly solution as the efficient benchmark.
13The same data level do would result if we only choose di to maximize welfare, while anticipating firms
setting ad prices pi subsequently. These prices would be identical to the prices in the market outcome,
given by equation (13). The same argument applies for the user optimal level du.
14See footnote 13.
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Xi + ∂Xi∂pi Ai
. (11)
Intuitively, equation (10) says that targeting benefits of data collection must equal the
effects on user and advertiser shares, at the margin. Similarly, also prices (11) must reflect
their impact on user and advertiser shares. Regarding the curvature of the maximization
problem we note that the solution to the first-order conditions represents a maximum
as long as the targeting technology τ(·) is sufficiently concave, the nuisance cost ν(·) is
sufficiently convex, or both. The details of this condition are given in Appendix A.
Solving the set of first-order conditions we obtain the following symmetric solutions
for prices and data levels.
Proposition 3. There exists a (symmetric) Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium with











and prices per advertisement are
p∗ = 2 tatu + ν(d
∗)τ(d∗)
τ(d∗) [tu + ν(d∗)]
, (13)
resulting in equal advertiser and user market shares, i.e. A∗i = 1/2 and X∗i = 1/2.
Comparing the market level of data provision d∗ in (12) to the efficient level do in
(7) we see that the marginal targeting benefit τ
′(d∗)
2 is additionally weighted by
ν(d∗)+tu
τ(d∗)−ta .
This distortion is analyzed in detail in Section 6. Note that the equilibrium price p∗ does
not exceed one and that profits are positive for all advertisers due to Assumption 1.15
Before we continue we state a corollary concerning the equilibrium effect of data
provision on user utility.
Corollary 1. In equilibrium, κ′(d∗) > −ν ′(d∗)/2.
15 In Appendix A we provide the details for this result.
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Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Intuitively, Corollary 1 implies that in equilibrium users’ data provision is such that
the (negative) privacy costs effect on user utility is larger than the (positive) effect
of reduced nuisance. Consequently, in the market outcome too much personal data
is provided compared to the user-optimal level.16
5 Comparative Statics
In this section we want to provide economic intuition for the equilibrium results of our
model. For this we will provide comparative statics, given changes in advertiser-side
competition intensity ta and user-side competition intensity tu as well as nuisance ν(d)
and targeting τ(d) on equilibrium values of personal data provision d∗, ad-per-click price
p∗, as well as platform profits Π∗i , advertiser profits π∗i and user utility u∗i .
As most of the comparative statics effects are in line with standard intuition from
two-sided platforms, we delegate these analyses to the Online Appendix B and refer to
the table in Figure 1 for an overview of all derived comparative statics results. In this
section we focus on the important and seemingly counter-intuitive effects of competition
intensities of both market side.
Figure 1: Overview of Comparative Statics
z dd∗/dz dp∗/dz dΠ∗i /dz dπ∗i /dz du∗i /dz
ta + + + − −
tu + − − + −
ν(d) + + + − −
τ(d) − ? + ? +
Note that we distinguish between the platform competition intensity on the user
side and on the advertiser side. As platforms are horizontally differentiated vis-à-vis
both market sides, competition intensity on each side can be measured through the
corresponding transportation cost parameter: higher transportation costs mean higher
platform differentiation and thus higher switching costs on this market side, which can
be interpreted as more platform market power and hence lower competition intensity.
16 In Section 6 we provide a detailed comparison of the market outcome and the user-optimal outcome.
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5.1 Advertiser-side Competition
First, we consider the effects of advertiser-side competition on data collection. For this
consider the platform’s first-order condition in equation (10) and note that the data
level choice depends on the effects of di on advertiser and user market shares Ai and Xi.
Regarding market share reactions we obtain ∂Xi/∂di < 0 and ∂Ai/∂di < 0 at equilibrium
values.17 Intuitively, additional data provision di would shy away users Xi because
marginal privacy costs are higher than marginal benefits of reduced nuisance (compare
Corollary 1). Although more data provision increases targeting, overall, advertisers would
still be repelled by additional data provision because of the detrimental effect on user
market share at that platform.
In equilibrium, if competition for advertisers softens, i.e. transportation costs ta in-
crease, advertisers become ‘more sticky’, i.e. less sensitive to changes in data provision
(and hence user demand) such that ∂2Ai/(∂di∂ta) > 0. Contrary, users become more
sensitive to data provision such that ∂2Xi/(∂di∂ta) < 0. Overall, the former effect dom-
inates the latter effect in magnitude. Consequently, and recalling X∗i = A∗i = 1/2, the
right-hand-side of equation (10) decreases in ta such that the equilibrium level of data




This effect might seem counter-intuitive initially. However note that in equilibrium plat-
forms balance the following trade-off for the data level. On the one hand, more data
collection yields higher targeting rates, higher advertiser demand and in sum higher
profits. On the other hand, collecting more data decreases user demand, which in turn
repels advertisers and thus decreases platform profits. If competition for advertisers soft-
ens, the latter effect is dampened more than the former effect is strengthened. This yields
a new balance of the trade-off, where more user data is collected.
While advertiser prices p∗ rise in ta (compare Online Appendix B), the effect on
user data collection d∗ does not follow ‘standard’ two-sided platform logic as here less
competition for advertisers, i.e. less sensitive advertiser demand, increases users’ data
‘payment’. Therefore, users actually benefit from increased competition on the advertiser
side, such that also du∗i /dta < 0, as discussed in the Online Appendix B. Also, since
dd∗/dta > 0 and dp∗/dta > 0 we naturally have dΠ∗i /dta > 0.
17Note that derivations can be found in Appendix A.5.
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5.2 User-side Competition
Second, we evaluate the effects of user-side competition intensity on data collection. Sim-
ilar to the analysis above, we know that ∂Xi/∂di < 0 and ∂Ai/∂di < 0 in equilibrium. If
competition for users softens, i.e. transportation costs tu increase, on the one side users
become less sensitive to changes in data provision such that ∂2Xi/(∂di∂tu) > 0. There-
fore, advertisers also become less sensitive to data provision such that ∂2Ai/(∂di∂tu) > 0
because they care about the share of users on that platforms. Therefore the right-hand-





Two effects are intuitively relevant here. On the one hand, platforms care about the share
of users on their platform because it increases their profits directly, but also indirectly
through more attracted advertisers. On the other hand, platforms want to increase
the level of user data collected as it enhances targeting, attracts advertisers and hence
increases profits. In equilibrium, stronger competition for users impacts the former effect
of attracting users more than the latter of increasing targeting, therefore, platforms
will collect less user data. Following the same intuition, platforms would be willing
to lose some advertisers in order to not repel valuable users. Hence, also equilibrium
advertiser prices increase in tu (compare Online Appendix B.1). Contrary to the effects of
advertiser-side competition, these results reflect the ‘standard’ two-sided platform logic:
stronger competition for users reduces the ‘price’ on the user side, while it increases the
price on the advertiser side.
Furthermore, we discuss the effect of user-side competition intensity on platform
profits. One could expect that platforms’ profit increases if competition for users becomes
less intense, however the opposite is true. Note that their profit function in equilibrium,












On the one hand, advertiser prices decrease if competition for users becomes less
intense (tu increases), which reduces platform profits. Hence the first term on the right-
hand side of (16) is negative. On the other hand, the second term is positive, because
when competition for users becomes less intense (tu increases), more data can be collected
60 Chapter II. Privacy and Platform Competition
from users, which leads to more effective ad targeting and therefore increased platform
profits. As can be seen from the derivation in Appendix A, overall, the negative first-term
effect is stronger in equilibrium, such that platforms suffer from weaker competition for
users, i.e. dΠ∗i /dtu < 0.
6 Policy Implications
In this section we draw comparisons between the different outcomes outlined in Section
4 and present policy implications.
6.1 Comparison of Outcomes
First, we want to compare the outcome of the efficiency benchmark with the market
equilibrium outcome. If we compare the right-hand-side of the competitive level d∗ in
(12) and the efficient level do in (7) we can see that the difference will crucially depend





which gives more or less weight to the marginal benefit on the advertiser market side
τ ′(d∗)/2. Note that by Assumption 1 the denominator of δ(d∗) is positive, so that we
have δ(d∗) > 0. As the efficient level do does not depend on parameter values, we can see
that there can be underprovision (d∗u < do) as well as overprovision (d∗o > do) of personal
data in the competitive equilibrium. Depending on the structure of the market too much
or too little weight is put on the advertiser side of the market. In particular we can
infer from equations (12) and (7) that the competitive outcome leads to underprovision
of personal data if δ(d∗) < 1 and to overprovision if δ(d∗) > 1. Note for δ(d∗) = 1
expression (12) simplifies to (7), the efficient level of data provision. Using our definition
of δ(d∗) we can then see that d∗ < do if
δ(d∗) < 1 ⇐⇒ τ(d∗)− ν(d∗) > ta + tu (18)
and d∗ > do if
δ(d∗) > 1 ⇐⇒ τ(d∗)− ν(d∗) < ta + tu. (19)
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These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The competitive outcome leads to overprovision of personal data if com-
petition on both market sides is weak and/or if net cross-group externalities are small. If
competition on both market sides is strong and/or net cross-group externalities are large,
the competitive outcome exhibits underprovision of personal data.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
We want to interpret this finding by first holding the functions κ(d), ν(d) and τ(d)
fixed and asking the question which competitive environment leads to which scenario.
From our comparative statics results we know that the amount of data is a monotone
function of the transportation cost parameters, i.e. dd∗dtu > 0 and
dd∗
dta > 0. Proposition 4
then gives us a threshold for how the resulting level of data collection compares to the
efficient benchmark: if competition is too strong, i.e. ta + tu is small, platforms tend to
collect and process an inefficiently small amount of data as users and advertisers shy away
too easily. If in turn competition on both sides is weak, i.e. ta + tu is high, the market
sides become more sticky and platforms are able to extract high amounts of personal
data.
We can also hold the competitive environment ta, tu on both sides fixed and analyze
the effects of relatively strong or weak opposing cross-group externalities. On the one
hand, an additional user imposes a positive externality on advertisers (and platforms),
which is equal to the targeting effect τ(d∗). On the other hand, an additional advertiser
imposes a negative externality on users, which is equal to the nuisance costs −ν(d∗). The
net effect can therefore be interpreted as available gains from trade in this economy. If
the net effect is relatively large, there are significant gains of trade which could be seized
by increasing the amount of data collected. If the net effect is small, the gains from trade
could be increased by lowering the amount of collected data.
Comparing the user-optimal level du to the welfare-optimal level do we immediately
see that users would provide an inefficiently low level of data. This result is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The user-optimal level of data provision is inefficiently low.
The reason for this result is straightforward. As users do not internalize the effect
the data has on the advertiser market, they will provide data up to the point where
the marginal decrease in nuisance equals marginal cost of data provision. Since from a
welfare perspective the value creation aspect on the advertiser market is omitted, the
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resulting level of data provision is inefficiently low. Furthermore, since δ(d∗) > 0 we also
have d∗ > du for all exogenous parameters and functional forms, as shown in Corollary
1. Unlike users, platforms act as intermediaries and are able to internalize parts of the
value creation on both sides of the market.
6.2 Policy Conclusions
In this section we briefly discuss what conclusions can be drawn from our previous anal-
yses when it comes to policy implications and regulation.
In our model, an omnipotent regulator could obviously achieve the first-best outcome
by forcing di = dj = do and increasing competition on both sides of the market such that
tu → 0 and ta → 0. In this case the efficient amount of data is provided while the total
transportation costs approach zero.
In practice, regulation and policy discussions typically focus on data and privacy
regulation or on competition policy measures (or merger regulation) to assure compet-
itiveness on the user side, for example in the recent Facebook case at the BKartA or
the Facebook/Whatsapp merger case in the US and the EU. In this section we want
to present answers our model provides for privacy and competition policy, taking into
account both market sides and at the same time the effect on privacy.
Privacy Regulation
Holding the competitive structure of the market fixed, the regulator could improve upon
the market outcome by enforcing the efficient level of private data provision di = dj = do.
However, a direct regulation of the amount of data in our model requires knowledge of the
cross-group externalities, i.e. functions τ(d) and ν(d), as well as users’ privacy concerns
κ(d).
A regulator could also consider switching to a consumer standard and let consumer
freely choose how much data they would like to provide. Our results show that the user-
optimal amount of data is always inefficiently low as users do not internalize the benefit on
the advertiser side. In particular our results suggest that we can only improve in terms of
welfare by switching to a consumer standard when there is extreme overprovision of data
in the economy, i.e. platforms have significant market power on both sides of the market.
If the market exhibits underprovision, switching to the consumer standard always reduces
welfare.
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Competition Policy
An approach which is less demanding when it comes to information requirements is the
regulation of the competitive environment on both market sides, i.e. tu and ta. Our results
(Proposition 4) suggest that if competition is very weak on both sides (tu + ta high), the
amount of data collected is likely to be inefficiently high. Similarly, if competition is
too strong (tu + ta low), too little data is provided from a welfare point of view. While
regulators still have to know whether there is overprovision or underprovision in the
market in the first place, our results can still provide some guidance.
Our comparative statics results suggest that increasing competition works in the same
direction for both sides of the market. The equilibrium amount of data provision is a
monotone function of the transportation cost parameters ta and tu and by altering either
one of the parameters it is possible to push the competitive equilibrium amount of data d∗
towards the welfare optimum do. Typical examples include reducing switching costs on
the user side (see e.g. GDPR/data portability in the EU) or policing vertical integration
on the advertiser side (see e.g. debate around Google/DoubleClick acquisition). Further,
our results suggest that more competition between platforms is not necessarily welfare
enhancing as it further limits the ability to create economic value through the collection
of personal data in the case of underprovision.
Also, our results suggest that policy measures, although they work in the same di-
rection, are not equally effective across market sides, i.e. dd∗dta 6=
dd∗
dtu . This might be
particularly important in a scenario where the market exhibits underprovision and a reg-
ulator would have to reduce competition as this implies increasing transportation costs
in the economy. Increasing transportation costs would then lead to more data collection
in the subsequent market outcome. Whether we can increase total welfare by increasing
transportation costs, however, depends crucially on whether the benefit of higher and
thus more efficient data provision (non linear) exceeds the increased costs of transporta-
tion (linear).18 This trade-off could call for a second-best regulation, where competition
intensity is regulated in such a way that the amount of data provided in the subsequent
market outcome balances the above mentioned benefits and costs at the margin.
From these results on competition policy we want to draw two main conclusions.
First, regulating competition on either or both market sides can address the privacy /
data collection distortion in the market outcome. Second, whenever regulators consider
18Note that also in a situation of overprovision, the market structure might be such that it is so-
cially beneficial to decrease transportation costs, i.e. increase competition, even beyond the level where
it induces efficient data provision (as established in equation 7), such that the benefits of decreased
transportation costs outweigh the costs from data underprovision.
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competition policy or merger regulation in these data-driven industries, they should take
into account the impact on data collection in the market.
7 Discussion
In this section we sketch and briefly discuss extensions and variations of the baseline
model presented in Section 3.
7.1 User Prices
In this section we consider an alternative setup where platforms can charge prices on
the user side of the market, too. All other model specifications remain as before, i.e.
specifically users now have to pay a monetary price additional to their personal data
‘payment’. In a sense, this setup could be considered as an unrestricted model, where
platforms are not restricted to zero user prices. Let pui denote the price a user has to pay
to join platform i. User utility is then given by
ui(x) = vi + d− κ(di)− ν(di)Ai − pui − tc|li − x|, (20)
while advertisers still face the same decision as in Section 3. Market shares are obtained
as before by pinning down indifferent users and advertisers and solving the resulting




= Aiτ(di)piXi + puiXi ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. (21)
Following the same procedure as in our baseline model we obtain symmetric equilibrium
values pi = pj = p̃, pui = puj = p̃u and di = dj = d̃ where advertiser prices are given by
p̃ = 2[ta + ν(d̃)]/τ(d̃), user prices by
p̃u = ta + tc + ν(d̃)− τ(d̃), (22)
while the equilibrium amount of data is given by
κ′(d̃) = 12
[




We immediately see from equations (7) and (23) that d̃ = do.
Proposition 6. If platforms can charge prices on both market sides, the efficient level
of data is collected.
Since platforms can now extract rents from both sides of the market, they maximize
the aggregate value, whereas in our baseline model platforms only profited on the adver-
tiser side of the market and hence set a data requirement level which is distorted. Taking
a closer look at equilibrium user prices in (22) we immediately see that negative, positive
or zero user prices are possible, depending on parameter values and functional forms.
Proposition 7. If user prices in the two-sided pricing model are positive, the one-sided
pricing constraint would result in data overprovision. Contrary, if user prices are nega-
tive, this constraint would yield underprovision.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The intuition for this result is that now platforms can extract the efficient amount
of data by adequately compensating users. If net benefits of data collection are large
or competition is rather strong, platforms can extract large amounts of data from users
and then compensate them by charging negative user prices, whereas in the one-sided
pricing model platforms do not have the instrument for compensation and therefore are
forced to collect less data than the efficient level. Vice versa, if net benefits are small or
competition rather weak, platforms are not forced to monetize through ads by extracting
an inefficiently high amount of data, but can obtain positive revenue from the user side
instead and leave the amount of data at the efficient level.
We would like to mention at this point that this result may depend on the fact
that even with positive user prices we assume the user market to remain fully covered.
However, remember that under a market solution with overprovision users gain in terms
of utility by decreasing d from d∗ to do. If this difference in utility is enough to cover the
associated positive user price, the user market remains covered. If the consumer price
exceeds the utility gain, the two-sided pricing may lead to users leaving the market and
efficiency may not be feasible any longer. We provide a more detailed discussion of the
full market coverage assumption in the subsequent section. A similar argument can also
be made if we consider heterogeneous users as then our uniform pricing setup may not be
sufficient to ensure efficiency but platforms would need to engage in price discrimination.
Nevertheless, we would like to draw two further conclusions from these results. Firstly,
observing a user price p̃u = 0 empirically is consistent with the equilibrium result above as
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well as with our baseline model. By observing zero prices we can not infer whether a price
of zero is an optimal choice, making the model above the ’correct’ model, or whether
there are constraints which prevent platforms from setting user prices at all, making
our baseline model more suitable. Secondly, since user prices depend on parameters of
competition intensity and externalities, observing zero prices across different markets,
jurisdictions and industry sectors makes it unlikely that p̃u = 0 is a profit maximizing
choice in all cases. This strongly supports the argument made by Waehrer (2015) that




Let us consider a collusive game where platforms agree on prices pi = pj = p and data
requirements di = dj = d such that joint profits are maximized. Since advertisers face
transportation costs, the profit maximizing collusive price is such that the participation





= 0 which yields p = 1 − taτ(d) .
Plugging the collusive price p into the platforms’ profit functions (3) we obtain Πi =
1
4(τ(d) − ta) and immediately see that profits are increasing in d up to the point where
the participation constraint of the indifferent user binds d : ui(12) = 0. Since we assumed
u to be high enough to have interior solutions in the previous sections, we can infer that
the collusive amount of data will be excessively high.
Partial Collusion
In this section we consider an alternative collusive environment where platforms coordi-
nate on setting a symmetric level of data d but still compete in prices on the advertiser
market. The idea is that platforms might influence privacy regulation in a collusive
effort without coordinating their pricing decisions. We therefore introduce a collusive
stage where platforms agree on a symmetric level d prior to the price setting decision. It
is easy to verify that symmetric prices are then given by pi = pj = p(d) ≡ 2 tatu+ν(d)τ(d)τ(d)[tu+ν(d)] ,
similar to the market outcome outlined in Section 4. The key difference, however, is the
collusive choice of d. As prices (and d) are symmetric, market shares can be anticipated
to be given by Ai = Aj = Xi = Xj = 1/2 such that industry wide platform profits are
given by Π(d) := Πi(d) + Πj(d) = τ(d)p(d)2 .
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If we have Π′(d) > 0 for all d, the collusive level will be the same as in full collusion
case, such that the participation constraint of the users will be binding, and if Π′(d) = 0
has a solution, a possible interior solution exists. The comparison to the market outcome
(or to the efficient outcome) is in this case, however, ambiguous and depends on functional
forms and parameter values.
Interestingly, industry profits are not necessarily increasing in d. In fact if Π′(d) =
p(d)τ ′(d)+p′(d)τ(d) < 0 for all d then the collusive level of data will be zero. The reason
for this seemingly counter-intuitive result is that increasing d can effectively propagate
competition on the advertiser market. In particular if we go back to the definition
of advertiser market shares in (5) we can see that increasing a symmetric level d has
the same effect on the advertiser market as a decrease in transportation costs in the
sense that it makes advertisers more reactive towards changes in prices. The intuition is
straightforward: if the click-probability is very high, small differences in prices become
magnified. The trade-off faced by the platforms is then the following. An increase in
click probability (through increasing d) results in tighter competition on the ad market
(depressing p). The optimal d can therefore vary widely depending on which effect
dominates.
To briefly summarize this section we can conclude that full collusion amongst plat-
forms should be avoided whenever possible. When it comes to partial collusion, however,
a more nuanced analysis is necessary as competition on the ad market might be suffi-
ciently strong to prevent inefficient regulatory capture.
7.3 Market Coverage and Multi-homing
In this section we want to briefly discuss the effects of relaxing the assumptions guaran-
teeing full market coverage and single-homing. We consider market-coverage and multi-
homing together because without these assumptions in both cases the market share of a
platform is determined by the user/advertiser who is indifferent between joining a plat-
form and the outside option, whereas in the baseline model it was determined by the
user/advertiser who is indifferent between joining both platforms. Note that this changes
the interpretation of transportation costs in the model substantially. While in the base-
line model transportation costs measured a restriction to switching to the other platform
and hence a degree of platform competition, now they rather exhibit a restraint on a
platform’s demand, independent of the other platform. Essentially, lower transportation
costs can now be interpreted as more elastic demand, whereas in the baseline model they
reflected less elastic (sticky) demand. While our assumptions for the baseline model
68 Chapter II. Privacy and Platform Competition
were chosen to study full competition between platforms, relaxing the assumptions on
one market side significantly changes the setting in the sense that platforms now only
compete indirectly through the other market side. Nevertheless, we want to provide
some intuition for the robustness of our results. For a more detailed analysis consider
the Online Appendix B.
Advertiser Side
On the advertiser side, lifting Assumption 1 of a covered market together with the single-
homing assumption can result in two cases, depending on parameters. First, if trans-
portation costs ta are sufficiently small, some advertisers ’in the middle’ will use both
platform (multi-homing). The comparison of the new equilibrium level of data provision
to the new efficient level or the baseline level of data provision is, however, ambiguous.
This is because less advertiser demand elasticity on the one hand could allow firms to
readjust d, while at the same time the total number of advertisers on a platform could
rise. From an efficiency perspective, though, more data should be collected than was
efficient in the baseline model. Second, if transportation costs ta are sufficiently high,
some advertisers in the middle might choose not to use any platform (no full market
coverage). Then it would also be efficient to exclude some advertisers such that the new
efficient level of data provision is below the efficient baseline level. The comparison to
the equilibrium outcomes remains however ambiguous, as above.
User Side
On the user side, relaxing the full-market Assumption 2 and the single-homing constraint
similarly leads to either some users ’in the middle’ joining both platforms (multi-homing)
or some user joining neither platform (no full market coverage), depending mainly on
transportation costs tu. In both cases user demand is then merely scaled by the demand
elasticity, i.e. the transportation costs tu, and users’ role essentially reduces to being a
resource of data needed to create advertising surplus.19 We find that there would always
be over-provision of user data in equilibrium because the efficient benchmark takes into
account the trade-off between total value creation and user exclusion, whereas the market
outcome only balances targeting benefits and potential user exclusion. However, still less
data is collected than in the baseline model and also the efficient level of data decreases.
Further, we find that now the transportation cost parameters have no effect on the
19Note that on the advertiser side this was not the case because advertisers pay money rather than a
value-creating resource.
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equilibrium level of data provision. This is because tu merely scales demand while the
relevant trade-off for the choice of d involves the actual utility when joining the platform
and is not influenced by the demand scale. Furthermore, equilibrium prices now increase
in tu and decrease in ta. Because of the reversed role transportation costs now play,
this is not contradictory to the baseline model results: the harder it is to keep users,
the higher the price for advertisers. Consequently, platform profits still increase and
advertiser profits still decrease in user-side elasticity.
7.4 Positive Cross-group Externalities
In the baseline model we considered the case where users incur nuisance cost from see-
ing ads on the platform, i.e. a negative cross-group externality incurred by users. As
explained in the beginning we consider this case because we think it illustrates the main
results in a very intuitive way. What we demonstrate in the Online Appendix B is that
the model can in fact be generalized to have positive cross-group effects in both directions
while the major results remain unchanged.
8 Conclusion
We analyze the role of competition intensity in a two-sided market framework where
platforms collect data from users and monetize through ad-sales. Our model predicts
that the equilibrium amount of collected data will be distorted compared to the welfare
efficient benchmark. Depending on the net effect of cross-group externalities and the
competition intensity on both sides of the market, the distortion can lead to underpro-
vision or overprovision of personal data. Since the level of collected data increases the
more market power platforms have on either side of the market, side specific regulations
are substitutable. We also show that a consumer standard would always lead to under-
provision of data as users do not internalize improvements in the targeting capabilities.
Lastly, we showed that two-sided pricing induces platforms to choose the efficient level
of data by adequately compensating users.
While we think our model provides useful insights we would also like to discuss some
limitations. It would be interesting to further explore the role of multi-homing on the
advertiser side as it changes the competitive dynamics substantially. Secondly, one could
alter the setting on the user side and consider heterogeneous users, while platforms engage
in second degree discrimination by offering a menu of data choices. We think those are
interesting avenues for future research.
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Appendix
A Omitted Oroofs
A.1 Second Stage Market Shares
Note that equations (4) - (5) are consistent, non-redundant and linear in Xi, Xj , Ai, Aj
such that the resulting solution in (4.1) is unique. Explicit market shares are then given
by:
Xi =
ta(2κ(dj)− 2κ(di) + ν(dj)− ν(di) + 2tu) + (1− pj)τ(dj)(ν(di) + ν(dj))
4tatu + (ν(di) + ν(dj))((1− pi)τ(di) + (1− pj)τ(dj))
Xj =
ta(2κ(di)− 2κ(dj) + ν(di)− ν(dj) + 2tu) + (1− pi)τ(di)(ν(di) + ν(dj))
4tatu + (ν(di) + ν(dj))((1− pi)τ(di) + (1− pj)τ(dj))
Ai =
(1− pi)τ(di)(κ(dj)− κ(di) + ν(dj) + tu)− (1− pj)τ(dj)(κ(di)− κ(dj)− ν(dj) + tu) + 2tatu
4tatu + (ν(di) + ν(dj))((1− pi)τ(di) + (1− pj)τ(dj))
Aj = 1−
(1− pi)τ(di)(κ(dj)− κ(di) + ν(dj) + tu)− (1− pj)τ(dj)(κ(di)− κ(dj)− ν(dj) + tu) + 2tatu
4tatu + (ν(di) + ν(dj))((1− pi)τ(di) + (1− pj)τ(dj))
A.2 Second-Order Conditions
In the following we derive sufficient conditions such that the equilibrium values p∗, d∗
derived from the maximization problem presented in Section 3 characterize a local max-







u τ(d∗)2(ν(d∗) + tu)
4(tu − ν(d∗))2(ν(d∗)τ(d∗) + tatu)




< 0, a necessary condition for the Hessian to be nega-
tive definite. In the next steps we argue that we can always find functions τ(·), ν(·) such
that det(H)|d∗,p∗ > 0. First, it is helpful to look at the numerator and the denominator




where the numerator Hnum and the denominator Hden are given by
Hnum = τ(d∗)2
[
−4t2u(ta − τ(d∗))(ν(d∗)τ(d∗) + tatu)
(
ν′′(d∗)(ta − τ(d∗)) + τ ′′(d∗)(ν(d∗) + tu)
)
−t2uν′(d∗)2(ta − τ(d∗))3 − τ ′(d∗)2(ν(d∗) + tu)2
(
ν(d∗)(ν(d∗)(ta − τ(d∗)) + 4tcτ(d∗)) + 4tat2u
)
+2tuν(d∗)ν′(d∗)τ ′(d∗)(ta − τ(d∗))2(ν(d∗) + tu)
]
Hden = 64(ta − τ(d∗))(tu − ν(d∗))2(ν(d∗)τ(d∗) + tatu)2
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H1num = −4t2u(ta − τ(d∗))(ν(d∗)τ(d∗) + tatu) > 0
H2num = (ta − τ(d∗)) < 0
H3num = (ν(d∗) + tu) > 0
H4num = −t2uν′(d∗)2(ta − τ(d∗))3 ≥ 0
H5num = −τ ′(d∗)2(ν(d∗) + tu)2
(
ν(d∗)(ν(d∗)(ta − τ(d∗)) + 4tuτ(d∗)) + 4tat2u
)
≶ 0
H6num = 2tuν(d∗)ν′(d∗)τ ′(d∗)(ta − τ(d∗))2(ν(d∗) + tu) ≤ 0
we can see that requiring Hnum < 0 is equivalent to the condition
− 1
H1num
(H4num +H5num +H6num) > H2numν′′(d∗) +H3numτ ′′(d∗)
where LHS ≶ 0 while RHS < 0 due to our functional requirements on τ(·) and ν(·).
The important thing to realize is that, firstly, the condition for negative definiteness
reduces to a condition which is linear in ν ′′(d∗) and τ ′′(d∗), the curvature information of
the targeting and the nuisance functions, and secondly, is given by an upper bound. If
the sign of the upper bound is positive then this condition is always fulfilled as we have
RHS < 0. Only if the sign of the upper bound is negative, the condition may bind. But
then we can assume that τ(·) is sufficiently concave and/or ν(·) is sufficiently convex such
that this condition holds since for our results we only require τ ′′(·) < 0 and ν ′′(·) ≥ 0
which is in line with this condition.
A.3 Market Outcome
In equilibrium p∗ < 1 and π∗i (a) ≥ 0. For this note that given equation (13), p∗ < 1 if
2 tatu + ν(d
∗)τ(d∗)
τ(d∗)tu + ν(d∗)τ(d∗)




By Assumption 1 we have that τ(d) > ta for all d and therefore in particular also
τ(d∗) > ta. Further, we have that 0 < (tu − ν(d∗)) /2tu < 1, hence the last inequality.
Thus, Assumption 1 is sufficient for the expression above to hold and p∗ < 1.









− ta2 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ τ(d




which is guaranteed by Assumption 1 for all d and especially for d∗. For this note that
the term on the left in the last inequality is increasing in d.
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A.4 Proofs of Propositions and Corollaries
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Rearranging terms in the first-order condition of platform profit maximization,
given by equation (12), yields 2κ′(d∗) + ν ′(d∗) = τ ′(d∗)ν(d
∗)+tu
τ(d∗)−ta . By Assumption 1 we
have τ(d∗) > ta. Hence the right hand side is positive, such that 2κ′(d∗)+ν ′(d∗) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The proof relies on the monotonicity of the LHS and RHS in equations (7) and
(12). Suppose, δ(d∗) > 1 but d∗ < do and hence κ′(d∗) < κ′(do). Using the implicit
definition of do in (7) and d∗ in (12) this implies δ(d∗)τ ′(d∗) − ν ′(d∗) < τ ′(do) − ν ′(do).




τ ′(d∗) . But due to the curvature of τ(·), ν(·) we
have τ
′(do)
τ ′(d∗) < 1 and
ν′(d∗)−ν′(do)
τ ′(d∗) ≤ 0 for d
∗ < do, contradicting δ(d∗) > 1. Now suppose




τ ′(d∗) . For d
∗ > do we then have
τ ′(do)
τ ′(d∗) > 1 and
ν′(d∗)−ν′(do)
τ ′(d∗) ≥ 0 and hence δ(d
∗) > 1.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. To see that positive user prices in the two-sided model correspond to data overpro-
vision in the one-sided pricing model, note that user prices are positive in the two-sided
pricing model if τ(do) − ν(do) < ta + tu. From Proposition 4 we know that in the one-
sided pricing model too little data is provided if ta + tu < τ(d∗)− ν(d∗). But this would
mean that d∗ < do, which contradicts τ(do) − ν(do) < ta + tu < τ(d∗) − ν(d∗), as τ(d)
is increasing and ν(d) decreasing in d. Hence it can only be that in the one-sided model
there is overprovision, such that d∗ > do and τ(do)− ν(do) < τ(d∗)− ν(d∗) < ta + tu.
To see that negative user prices in the two-sided model correspond to data underprovision
in the one-sided pricing model, note that user prices are negative in the two-sided pricing
model if τ(do) − ν(do) > ta + tu. From Proposition 4 we know that too much data is
provided if ta + tu > τ(d∗)− ν(d∗). But this would mean that d∗ > do, which contradicts
τ(do) − ν(do) > ta + tu > τ(d∗) − ν(d∗). Hence it must be that in the one-sided model
there is underprovision, such that d∗ < do and τ(do)−ν(do) > τ(d∗)−ν(d∗) > ta+tu.
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A.5 Proofs for Comparative Statics
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< 0, (A.4)
because τ ′(d∗) > 0 , while τ(d∗) > ta by Assumption 1 and p∗ < 1 as established in
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+ (ν(d∗) + tu)
[
τ ′(d∗)2 − (τ(d∗)− ta) τ ′′(d∗)
]
> 0.
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Note for the inequalities that τ ′(d∗) > 0, τ ′′(d∗) < 0 while ν ′(d∗) ≤ 0, ν ′′(d∗) ≥ 0 by
construction, and τ(d∗) > ta by Assumption 1.
B Online Appendix
In this online appendix we will provide derivations and intuition for comparative statics
not covered in the main text. Further, we present extensions to our baseline model where
we consider multi-homing, elastic total demand and positive cross-group externalities.
B.1 Comparative Static Effects on Prices in Equilibrium
For this analysis consider the platform’s first-order condition in equation (11) and note
that the price depends indirectly on the effects of pi on advertiser and user market shares

















4 [tatu + (1− p∗)ν(d∗)τ(d∗)]
< 0, (B.2)
because p∗ < 1 as established in Appendix A.
Competition for Advertisers
Note that in Section 5 we discussed that lower advertiser-side competition intensity
increases the level of data collection in equilibrium, i.e. dd∗/dta > 0. Here we analyze
the effects of competition intensity for advertisers on p∗. Differentiating (B.1) with
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Further note that
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4 [tatu + (1− p∗)ν(d∗)τ(d∗)]2
> 0.
If competition for advertisers softens, i.e. transportation costs ta increase, advertisers
become less sensitive to changes in prices such that ∂2Ai/(∂pi∂ta) > 0. Consequently,
users become more sensitive to prices (which repel advertisers) such that ∂2Xi/(∂pi∂ta) <
0. Overall, the former effect dominates the latter effect in magnitude. Consequently, and
as X∗i = A∗i = 1/2, the right-hand-side of equation (11) increases in ta such that the




Intuitively, higher advertiser transportation costs mean more sticky advertisers and hence
decreased platform competition for advertisers. Therefore, it is straightforward that
advertiser prices rise, which is line with standard intuition.
Competition for Users
In Section 5 we discussed that lower competition intensity for users decreases platforms’
equilibrium level of data collection, i.e. dd∗/dtu > 0. Here we analyze the effects of
















= − (1− p
∗)ν(d∗)τ(d∗)2
4 [tatu + (1− p∗)ν(d∗)τ(d∗)]2
< 0.
If competition for users softens, i.e. transportation costs tu increase, users become
less sensitive to changes in prices such that ∂2Xi/(∂pi∂tu) < 0. Consequently, ad-
vertisers, too, become less sensitive to prices (which now repel less users) such that
∂2Xi/(∂di∂tu) < 0. Therefore the right-hand-side of equation (11) decreases in tu such
that the equilibrium price must fall, i.e.




Again, this is in line with standard platform intuition: advertiser prices fall if the user
side becomes less sensitive (elastic).
Nuisance
First, we consider the effects of nuisance on data collection.20 Totally differentiating the







∗)− ta) τ ′(d∗)
Ψ(d∗) > 0. (B.5)
Second, we evaluate the effects of nuisance on p∗. Solving for dp∗/dν(d) and dropping





=−2tu (ta − τ)
2 [τ (τ ′′ (ν + tu)− (τ − ta) (2κ′′ + ν ′′))− (ν + tu) τ ′2]
(ν + tu) τ2 Ψ(d∗)
> 0,
(B.6)
where Ψ(d∗) is defined in equation (A.6). Intuitively, higher (absolute) nuisance
results in lower user demand. To counterbalance this effect, platforms would increase
ad prices as ads become relatively less attractive. Additionally, more user data would
be collected in order to soften the nuisance increase. Interpreted from the point of view
of users, they are now willing to incur marginally more privacy costs in order to obtain
some nuisance reduction.
Targeting
First, we consider the effects of the targeting technology on data collection.21 Solving
for dd∗/dτ(d) yields
20Note that nuisance is a function in our model. To assess an increase in nuisance we treat it as fixed
and consider an upward shift, without changing any curvature. For this we slightly abuse notation to
stay consistent with the rest of our comparative statics, such that e.g. by dd∗/dν(d)|d=d∗ we intuitively
consider the effect of adding a positive constant c to the function, i.e. ν(d) + c where c > 0, on d∗.
21Note that targeting is a function, which we treat as fixed here, such that comparative statics are
performed as described in footnote 20.
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Second, we evaluate the effects of nuisance on p∗. Solving for dp∗/dτ(d) and dropping
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′′ (ν + tu) ta − (τ − ta) [ν ′τ ′ + ta (2κ′′ + ν ′′)]]
(ν + tu) τ2Ψ(d∗)
≷ 0. (B.8)
platforms to create the same ad value with less personal data, hence in equilibrium
platforms will compete to ‘relax’ the data requirement for users. Two effects are relevant
for the effect on ad prices. On the one hand ads become more valuable, hence platforms
might increase the price, i.e. their share, of this value (intensive margin). On the other
hand, platforms might prefer to attract more of these valuable advertisers by reducing
the ad price (extensive margin). Overall, the effect on ad prices depends on which of the
opposing effects is stronger.
B.2 Comparative Static Effects on Platform Profits, Advertiser Profits
and User Utility
In this section we provide further intuition on equilibrium profits and utility by presenting
comparative statics.
Effects on Platform Profits













We look at the effects of advertiser competition intensity. For z = ta both terms on
the right-hand side are positive and hence dΠ∗i /dta > 0. Intuitively, when competition
for advertisers becomes more intense (ta decreases), then prices for ad-placing decrease.
In turn, less data is collected from users, such that targeting becomes less effective, and
less total revenue is made on the ad market. Both these effects decrease platform profits.
The intensity of user-side competition increases platforms’ surplus, i.e. dΠ∗i /dtu < 0.
This effect is discussed in the main text in Section 5.
Increased nuisance (higher z = ν(d)) increases platforms’ surplus, i.e. dΠ∗i /dν(d) > 0.
More data is collected, which increases targeting and hence the (residual) value of a
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placed ad, thus also higher prices can be sustained. Overall, this unambiguously benefits
platforms.
Increased targeting (higher z = τ(d)) increases platforms’ surplus, i.e. dΠ∗i /dτ(d) > 0.
Although less data is collected, the absolute externality of users, i.e. targeting, increases
the value to be shared between platforms and advertisers. While the effect on prices
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}]
> 0, (B.10)
where dd∗/dtu is from equation (15), while Ψ(d∗) is defined in equation (A.6).
Effects on Advertiser Profits
The effects on advertiser profits π∗i (a) = (1−p∗)τ(d∗)X∗i −ta|li−a| = (1/2) (1− p∗) τ(d∗)−
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dta
dz . (B.11)
Stronger competition for advertisers (lower z = ta) makes advertisers overall better off,
i.e. dπ∗i /dta < 0. However, there are multiple effects at work. Firstly, prices fall, such
that the first term on the right hand side increases. Secondly, less personal data from
users can be collected, which makes targeting less effective, therefore the second term is
negative. Thirdly, also transportation costs decrease, which increases advertiser profits.
Overall, the price and transportation cost reduction effects outweigh decreased targeting
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[
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]}
< 0, (B.12)
where dd∗/dta is from equation (14), while Ψ(d∗) is defined in equation (A.6).
Stronger competition for users (increase z = tu) hurts advertisers, hence dπAi /dtu > 0.
The platforms’ bottleneck position allows them to increase prices (negative first term)
and, further, less user data can be collected, such that targeting becomes less effective
(negative second term).
Increased nuisance (higher z = ν(d)) decreases advertisers’ surplus, i.e. dπAi /dν(d) <
0. Although more data is collected, which increases targeting and hence the value of a
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}}
< 0, (B.13)
Increased targeting (higher z = τ(d)) has an ambiguous effect on advertisers’ surplus.
While the targeting function becomes better, less data needs be collected which again
reduces targeting effectiveness. Further, the effect on prices is ambiguous. Hence, overall
effects on advertiser surplus remain unclear.
Effects on User Utility
The effects on a user’s utility u∗i (x) = u − κ(d∗) − ν(d∗)A∗i − tu|li − x| = u − κ(d∗) −










− dtudz |li − x|. (B.14)
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Note that by Corollary 1 the term in brackets on the right-hand side is positive and that
for z ∈ {ta, tu} we have dd∗/dz > 0 such that dui/dz < 0.
Intuitively, less competition for advertisers (higher z = ta) increases the amount of
data collected in equilibrium, which overall leaves users worse off, as privacy concerns
are increased, although ads are more targeted and hence nuisance smaller.
Less competition for users (higher z = tu) increases the amount of data collected,
such that privacy concerns are increased, although it reduces nuisance costs. Further
strengthened by increased transportation costs for users, quite naturally users’ utility
overall decreases.
Increased nuisance (higher z = ν(d)) decreases users’ utility, i.e. dui/dν(d) < 0
because again more data is collected.
Increased targeting (higher z = τ(d)) increases users’ utility, i.e. dui/dτ(d) < 0.
Although targeting does not directly affect users, less data is collected, which is beneficial
for users.
B.3 Market Coverage and Multi-homing
Advertiser Side
We start this section by lifting Assumption 1 for full market coverage and the single-
homing assumption for advertisers. Analytically, this is achieved by pinning down ad-
vertisers which are indifferent between joining a platform and abstaining such that the











Figure B.1: Relaxed Advertiser Market Assumption
Figure B.1 shows two potential outcomes of this alternative setup. In the first case the
total mass of participating advertisers in the market is smaller than 1 while advertisers
’in the middle’ choose not to participate as their transportation costs are too high. In
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the second case the sets of advertisers joining platform i and j are overlapping such that
advertisers ’in the middle’ join both platforms, i.e. they multi-home. The remaining
analysis follows the steps from the baseline model and is omitted at this point.
The welfare maximizing level of data doa is then given by
κ′(doa) = Aoi (doa)τ ′(doa)−Aoi (doa)ν ′(doa) (B.15)
where Aoi (d) denotes the symmetric mass of advertisers on each platform and is given by
Aoi (d) = [τ(d) − ν(d)]/(2ta). The equilibrium level of data under platform competition









τ ′(d∗a)−A∗i (d∗a)ν ′(d∗a) (B.16)
while A∗i (d∗a) = [(1 − p∗a(d∗a))τ(d∗a)]/(2ta). We can see immediately that whether the
resulting allocation is an equilibrium with multi-homing or with excluded advertisers
depends on functional forms and parameters. We will therefore discuss the two cases
separately in the following.
Assume transport costs ta are sufficiently low to allow a multi-homing allocation of
advertisers under the efficient benchmark, i.e. Aoi (doa) > 1/2. Comparing the condition
for the resulting efficient level of data provision to our baseline condition in (12) we see
that doa > do, under multi-homing the efficient level of data provision is higher than under
single-homing. The idea is that additional advertisers are attracted in order to maximize
total value creation in the economy. The comparison of the new competitive level of
data provision d∗a to the new efficiency benchmark as well as to our baseline model is,
however, ambiguous. As competition for advertisers is now relaxed, platforms might not
be forced to offer high levels of d to attract additional advertisers. At the same the value
creation aspect from a larger total number of advertisers is still valid, such that the net
effect on the level of data provision remains ambiguous.
When transportation costs ta are sufficiently large, some advertisers ’in the middle’
would not join any platform, such that Aoi (doa) < 1/2 and also A∗i (d∗a) < 1/2. Note
that the efficient level is then also lower than in our benchmark doa < do as attracting
advertisers becomes relatively expensive and it becomes more efficient to exclude some
advertisers than to offer very high levels of d. The comparison to the market outcome,
however, remains ambiguous. While the same efficiency argument applies, platforms also
have an additional incentive to increase their intensive margin by increasing d to offset
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the reduction in advertising demand. Again, depending on functional forms either effect
may dominate.
User Side
Similarly on the user side, by relaxing Assumption 2 it is possible that u becomes suf-
ficiently small relative to transportation costs, such that users ’in the middle’ prefer to
abstain from both platforms. If u is sufficiently large relative to transportation costs,
users ’in the middle’ might choose to join both platforms. In both cases user market
shares are determined through the utility of the indifferent user relative to the outside
option.
The symmetric welfare-maximizing level of data dou is then given by
κ′(dou) = Xoi (dou)
tu





where Xoi (dou) denotes the symmetric mass of users on each platform and is given by
Xoi (dou) = [2u − 2κ(dou) − ν(dou)]/(2tu). The equilibrium level of data under platform
competition d∗u is then given by







while X∗i (d∗u) = [2u − 2κ(d∗u) − ν(d∗u)]/(2tu). From this we can immediately see that
d∗u > d
o
u, i.e. there is always over-provision of user data. While the efficient benchmark
takes into account the tradeoff between excluding users and total value creation, the
market outcome only compares the targeting benefit to the exclusion of users. Further
note that if the market is not covered such that Xi(du) < 1/2, the efficient as well as the
equilibrium level of data provision is lower than in the baseline model, i.e. dou < do and
d∗u < d
∗ because tu/τ(d) < δ(d) ∀d.
It is worthwhile to note that under user multi-homing as well as under relaxed user
market coverage we get that dd∗u/dtu = dd∗u/dta = 0, i.e. the transportation cost pa-
rameters on either market side are irrelevant for the equilibrium (and also the efficient)
level of data collection. This is because tu now merely scales demand while the relevant
trade-off for the choice of d involves the actual utility from joining the platform, which
is unaffected by the demand scale.
Under this setup user demand becomes more elastic than in the baseline model which
undermines platforms’ incentive to increase d. At the same time platforms would also
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increase prices dp∗u/dtu > 0 if it becomes increasingly difficult to attract users. Note
that we seemingly found the opposite effect in our baseline model dp∗/dtu < 0, however,
the interpretation of tu changes substantially such that the two results do not contradict
each other: the harder it is to keep users, the higher the prices for advertisers.
In fact platforms are able to overcompensate the reduction in user demand such that
dΠ∗u/dtu > 0 (and for advertisers dπ∗u/dtu < 0). Again, as the interpretation of tu essen-
tially reverses, we had the opposite results in our baseline model where platform profits
decreased in tu (while advertiser profits increased). This is also reflected in the effect on
the advertiser side where equilibrium prices rise in ta under both model specifications,
i.e. dp∗u/dta > 0 as the interpretation remains identical.
B.4 Positive Cross-group Externalities
Consider the following modification of the users’ utility function:
ui(x) = u− κ(di) + ρ(di)Ai − tu|li − x|. (B.19)
The concave and twice-differentiable function ρ(d) represents the relevance from a user’s
point of view of seeing Ai offers, where ρ′(d) ≥ 0 and ρ′′(d) ≤ 0. However, ρ(d) can now be
entirely negative, positive or might even switch signs. The first case is discussed in depth
in the main paper, where we consider the case ρ(d) = −ν(d). The second case, a strictly
positive effect, can be thought of as a traditional ‘dating’ model, where one group strictly
enjoys the presence of the other group. The last case can be thought of as a more nuanced
version of our nuisance cost in the baseline model. While for low values of d, i.e. the
platform has very little information about the consumer, a user dislikes the interaction
with the other market side, the interaction might turn out to be valuable once the
platform has sufficient information, i.e. d is sufficiently large. A typical example would be
the recommendation system on Amazon. While it is debatable, whether Amazon is a two-
sided market in the traditional sense, the product recommendation system might serve
as a useful example. A new customer might see all kind of product recommendations,
some of which are completely useless to the user and are just a waste of attention.
However, once Amazon has acquired sufficient information about the user’s preferences
through analyzing the purchasing and browsing history, the recommendations become
more personalized, and the user finds actual value in looking through them.
From a modelling perspective we only require that the relevance is monotonically
increasing in the amount of data, but with decreasing returns. Since the curvature of the
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maximization problem therefore remains unchanged, the characterization of the second
order conditions given in the Appendix A also remain qualitatively unchanged. The
absolute value of the function ρ(d) is in the end of minor importance regarding the
key mechanics of the model, however, it has to be taken care of through appropriately
adjusting the modelling assumptions. In order to assure full market coverage on the offer
side, we now have the following set of assumptions.
Assumption 3. Competition for advertisers is sufficiently strong, i.e. ta ≤ t̄a.
For this, it is necessary that competition for users is sufficiently weak and that there are
gains of trade for all advertisers, even without data collection, i.e.
(a) tu > |ρ(0)|, ρ(d) < tu
(b) ta < τ(0)
The upper bound on ta is then given by t̄a := tuτ(0)+ρ(0)τ(0)3tu−ρ(0) . Since now net cross-
group externalities might be positive, a problem of platform tipping must be taken into
account. In particular the following assumption ensures that the competitive symmetric
equilibrium leads to positive prices (and therefore positive platform profits), so that a
platform would not be indifferent whether to enter the market if just one platform serves
the entire market.
Assumption 4. To ensure market participation of both platforms it is necessary to have
tatu > ρ(·)τ(·).
Note that for negative ρ(·) as in our main model, this assumption is always fulfilled
as then the RHS is always negative, while the LHS is always positive. Accordingly, if
ρ(·) switches signs, the range in which ρ(·) is negative is unproblematic. Therefore the
only potentially problematic case is if ρ(·) is positive or can turn positive since it further
restricts the parameter space in addition to the previous assumption.22 Given that both
assumptions are satisfied, the analysis is analogous to our main model and all major
results still hold.
22In the following we sketch a set of conditions under which both assumptions would be satisfied. Note
Assumption 4 specifies a lower bound ta > ta with ta ≡ 1tu ρ(·)τ(·). It is therefore necessary to show that
the set of ta satisfying Assumptions 3 and 4 is non-empty. In particular, if it holds that limd→∞ta < t̄a
we can always find intermediate values of ta satisfying both conditions. For this to be the case it is







In many markets we observe volatile price paths throughout the entire selling time,
for example in markets for travel or event bookings. Many of these markets share the
following characteristics. First, there is a fixed deadline after which the goods expire or
perish. An airline ticket for an already departed flight or a hotel booking for yesterday
night is worthless today. Second, firms hold only limited capacities. Hotels have a fixed
number of rooms and airlines have to predetermine aircraft types with fixed numbers of
seats to serve a certain route on a certain day. Third, firms can engage in dynamic pricing
behavior, i.e. they are able to adjust prices throughout the entire selling horizon. And
fourth, consumers might act in a forward-looking manner, allowing them to strategically
delay their purchase in the hope of better prices. Examples for these markets are ample.
Besides classic travel (airline, train, bus), hotel or event (theater, sports, concert) booking
markets, one could also think of seasonal goods markets, such as markets for Christmas
trees or first-day-of-school items. Additionally, many of the above named goods are also
traded on secondary markets with similar characteristics.
As a real-world example path of dynamic prices consider Figure 1. Prices posted by
two competing airlines for flights on the same route at the same time of the day are
depicted for 100 days prior to the departure day.
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Figure 1: Observed Airline Price Path
Based on self-collected price data of Ryanair (firm 1) and Aegean Air (firm 2), competing on the ATH-
SKG morning route of May 30, 2014.
In this paper I construct a simple dynamic competition model of discrete and finite
periods, which provides an explanation for these volatile price paths we experience in
many real markets with the above characteristics. Oligopolists with ex-ante determined
capacities post prices in each time period up to the deadline (sometimes referred to as
closed loop-pricing). In each such period one consumer arrives and decides if and where
to purchase. While firms’ goods provide a basic value, there is additional consumer
heterogeneity. Employing a discrete choice model with idiosyncratic taste shocks (multi-
nomial logit), the resulting demand structure yields choice probabilities for each firm’s
good and also a choice probability for not buying (possibly waiting). In the airline or
hotel application this heterogeneity could be due to differences in brand taste or variation
in loyalty program membership across consumers.
Each period can be characterized by its state, consisting of information on the number
of remaining selling periods as well as firms’ remaining capacity stocks and the number
of consumers possibly waiting in the market. Firms know the state and anticipate that
there will be a state transition into the next period, depending on the specifics of possible
trade.1 Using inter-temporal value functions for firms we get a dynamic programming
framework. There exists a pure-strategy price equilibrium in each period, where firms
consider current payoffs as well as possible implications for future states and payoffs,
giving rise to a Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium for the whole game. Furthermore, I
1While myopic consumers choosing between buying or exiting the market do not need knowledge of
the state, forward-looking consumers can choose to wait in the market and hence need knowledge of the
state and its transition.
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provide a condition for equilibrium uniqueness, although I do not encounter any equilib-
rium multiplicity in numerical simulations.
With the help of numerical simulations solving for the equilibrium price paths I
analyze and disentangle the effects driving the price dynamics. Equilibrium prices can
be dispersed, as they depend on the relation of firms’ capacities and remaining selling
periods, which determine the maximum expected demand. If firms have each enough
capacity to serve the entire expected demand, there is harsh competition and firms post
identically low but positive prices. However, if one firm cannot serve the entire expected
demand by itself, yet the sum of firms’ capacities exceeds expected demand, prices are
dispersed and under duopoly the larger firm typically allows the smaller firm to undercut
because it has a larger reservation value, expecting to sell as a monopolist as soon as
the smaller firm is out of stock. Contrary, if the sum of both firms’ capacities is lower
than expected demand, i.e. if capacities are scarce, the larger firm undercuts. This shows
that price-leadership is not monotone in capacity-leadership. Further, I find that under
competition prices might be neither monotone in a firm’s capacity nor in remaining time,
ceteris paribus. However, if capacities are scarce or if there is a monopoly, prices weakly
decrease in capacity and weakly increase in remaining time.
Many results in this work are compared to Dudey’s (1992) model of dynamic Bertrand
pricing.2 There, all firms can sustain monopoly prices throughout the entire selling time
as long as at least one firm cannot serve all expected demand.3 In my model consumer
heterogeneity on the one hand intensifies competition to attract consumers and therefore
yields lower and more dispersed prices, unless the market is already very competitive.
On the other hand heterogeneity increases firms’ market power as goods become less
homogeneous, such that equilibrium prices can increase in heterogeneity.
I consider three policy discussions. For these, average prices, expected profits, con-
sumer surplus and total sales as a proxy for efficiency are computed for expected equilib-
rium price paths. First, I analyze policies allowing consumers to become more forward-
looking. Facing an inter-temporal problem, consumers trade off buying at current prices
and waiting for possibly better prices, however at the risk of being rationed. Although
there is an overall efficiency loss (less sales), consumers are still better off when forward-
looking because prices (and hence total industry profits) are depressed. Second, many
industries using dynamic pricing techniques are frequently in the center of competition
policy discussions, e.g. airline mergers. Results from this model suggest that competition
policy is especially relevant if overall market capacities are excessive relative to expected
2In this model with unit Bertrand demand per period there is no consumer heterogeneity.
3Only if capacities are symmetric, below-marginal cost pricing is possible.
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demand. Contrary, under capacity scarcity market power does not have a significant
effect on average prices and welfare measures. Third, I analyze the equilibrium behavior
of firms in the ex-ante game of capacity production. In equilibrium, capacity production
can be excessive relative to expected demand and more capacity than under capacity
production collusion and under monopoly is built. Nevertheless, from an efficiency per-
spective this is still too little capacity, resulting in higher dynamic price paths which lead
to inefficiently low sales.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 relates this paper’s
contribution to the literature. Subsequently, Section 3 introduces the basic model of
myopic consumers as well as the equilibrium analyses, while the model with forward-
looking consumers is found in Section 4. With the help of simulations, in Section 5 I
present comparative statics results for many model parameters. In Section 6 I provide
welfare and policy discussions before Section 7 concludes. Appendix A contains all proofs
as well as auxiliary derivations and results in order of appearance in the main text,
whereas the equilibrium simulation programming codes are delegated to Appendix B.
Note for the whole paper that whenever findings are from simulations I refer to them as
Results, while I denote them Lemma or Proposition when proven analytically.
2 Literature
Initiated by Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994), the traditional revenue management litera-
ture typically considers a monopolist’s problem when selling multiple units of the same
product to consumers arriving sequentially and possibly with some uncertainty. Much
work considering differentiated or forward-looking consumers has been done, yet pri-
marily in models of monopoly, whereas I consider competition. For example, Su (2007)
studies the case of consumers being differentiated with respect to their valuation and
their patience. Dilme and Li (2016) study the situation with differentiated consumers,
where a seller can periodically use fire-sales in order to reduce capacity and be able to
commit to higher future prices for high type consumers. Board and Skrzypacz (2016)
characterize deterministic cutoffs, depending on inventory and remaining time, also un-
der monopoly. Hörner and Samuelson (2011) consider the monopoly problem of selling
to forward-looking consumers with independent private values, giving rise to a trade-off
between imperfect price discrimination and setting a “reserve” price. Then, the mo-
nopolist’s price continuously decreases in time and only jumps up after a sale. Meisner
(2017) builds upon this work but extends to competition. He shows that if capacity is
scarce, the competitive price path is identical to the one of the monopolist. I consider
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homogeneous consumer valuations with heterogeneous taste shocks (logit demand) under
competition and allow for other capacity constellations than scarcity. Nevertheless, under
capacity scarcity my model predicts similarity between the monopoly and competitive
price, too. Other work, e.g. Nocke and Peitz (2007) and Möller and Watanabe (2010),
make use of a mechanism design approach, studying a monopolist who discriminates
inter-temporally between low and high type consumers, and thereby comparing uniform
pricing to advance purchase discounts and clearing sales. For an excellent overview of
earlier literature, see Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006). Summing up this paragraph, my
work adds to the literature in the sense that I consider oligopolistic competition with
forward-looking consumers and general capacity constellations.
My work goes back to the Bertrand-Edgeworth (Edgeworth et al., 1925) model, i.e.
Bertrand competition with capacity constrains. With static pricing (open-loop with
constant prices) a pure-strategy equilibrium may not exists if for instance in a duopoly
both firms together can serve the entire market but one firm alone does not have enough
capacity to serve all demand itself. In these situations different mixed-strategy equilibria
with continuous price support exist, depending on the rationing assumptions (Allen and
Hellwig, 1986; Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983; Levitan and Shubik, 1972). In my model
this is not relevant since I consider dynamic pricing.
Dynamic pricing allows firms to adjust prices at each point in time before the deadline
(closed-loop pricing). Dudey (1992) shows that with dynamic instead of static pricing for
Bertrand competition a unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists. Depending on capacities
relative to remaining selling periods either the monopoly or the perfectly competitive
price results, unless both firms have identical capacity stocks, then prices can even be
below marginal costs. Furthermore, in the range in which mixed-strategy equilibria
occur in static models, in the dynamic model the larger firm will allow the firm with
less capacity to sell out at the monopoly price, as it prefers to wait until it remains as
the monopolist itself. Contrary, in my model consumers are heterogeneous and therefore
firms set dispersed prices such that due to consumers’ taste heterogeneity either of the
firms may sell. However, as a limit case when consumer heterogeneity tends to zero, I
obtain Dudey’s (1992) results.
Martínez-de Albéniz and Talluri (2011) adopt Dudey’s (1992) model and include
demand uncertainty. They show that continuation payoffs determine prices and again the
seller with lowest capacity sells her entire stock first, at the price of the reservation value
of the next smallest seller, thereby giving rise to a path of volatile prices. Further models
with demand uncertainty are for instance Deneckere and Peck (2012), who consider
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perfect competition and forward-looking consumers, or Dana Jr (1999), who explores
price dispersion due to demand uncertainty and market structure. In my work firms’
reservation values are crucial, too, but I do not consider any further demand uncertainty,
only consumer heterogeneity.
In my model consumers are heterogeneous in the sense that they obtain an idiosyn-
cratic taste shock with respect to each firm’s product. This gives rise to the (multinomial)
logit demand system (McFadden et al., 1973). With this in hand I can construct states,
state transitions and the inter-temporal optimization problem of firms, building upon
results from the computational industrial organization and operations research litera-
ture. Here, I borrow from Pakes and McGuire (1992) and Doraszelski and Satterthwaite
(2010) in the construction of the algorithm finding subgame-perfect equilibria. Perakis
and Sood (2006) consider a similar approach, however with an open-loop pricing proce-
dure. In a setting similar to mine, however without forward-looking consumers, Lin and
Sibdari (2009) compare complete information to a situation where firms do not know
the real-time inventory levels of competitors. In their model there is further demand
uncertainty, nevertheless the baseline set-up is similar to mine. Sinitsyn (2008) charac-
terizes mixed-strategy equilibria consisting of a finite number of prices, when there is
logit demand but static instead of dynamic pricing.
Of course, there is a large empirical literature considering price dispersion and price
discrimination in markets such as the one I study. Notably, Borenstein and Rose (1994)
and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) investigate the effects of airline competition on price
dispersion. Escobari (2012) studies dynamic pricing of inventories with uncertain demand
and his estimates suggest that prices increase as the inventory level decreases, while they
decrease if the deadline approaches, which is in line with my findings. An overview
of dynamic pricing results and revenue losses from mis-anticipating consumer behavior,
especially forward-looking behavior of consumers, can be found in Gönsch et al. (2013).
Sweeting (2012) uses evidence from the secondary market of major league baseball tickets
to show that prices decline towards the deadline, and that dynamic pricing methods
increase revenues substantially. In a recent paper, Williams (2017) examines dynamic
airline pricing considering how fares respond to time and to remaining capacity levels.
Using a discrete choice model for consumer demand, he finds that the interaction of these
two effects is crucial for pricing, which corresponds with the theoretical predictions of
my model.
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3 Baseline Model




Time is discrete and there are T + 1 total time periods, such that goods can be sold
during the T periods and are assumed to perish at the deadline T + 1. A period is
defined by the number of remaining time periods, i.e. t ∈ {T, T − 1, ..., 1, 0}, where t = 0
represents the deadline when no more sales are possible. Each firm i ∈ {1, ..., n} holds
xi ∈ N≥0 capacities at a certain time, with x = (x1, ..., xn). Let ω = (t,x) define the
state of the world and be common knowledge among the firms. In each period, a firm i
posts a price pi(ω) ∈ R, s.t. p(ω) = (p1(ω), ..., pn(ω)). When selling a unit, this firm’s
capacity is reduced by one. During the game firms can neither build more capacity nor
can they destroy capacity.
The timing in a period is such that first a consumer arrives into the market. Then all
active firms defined by the set J(ω) := {j ∈ {1, ..., n} |xj ≥ 1}, i.e. all firms with strictly
positive remaining capacity, simultaneously post prices.4 Subsequently, the consumer,
who is assumed to be myopic in the baseline model, chooses to buy from one of these firms
j ∈ J(ω) or to exit the market, denoted by the outside option j = 0.5 Consequently,
at most one trade per period/state takes place. Depending on this consumer choice, the
state transits to the next state in period t−1, as defined by the following state transition.
State Transitions
Given the consumer choice j ∈ J(ω)∪{0} in state ω = (t,x), the state transition function
into a next state ω′ = (t′,x′) reads
ω′| (ω, j) =
(t− 1,x) if j = 0,(t− 1,x− ej) if j ∈ J(ω), (1)
4Alternatively one could assume that firms without capacity “set” a price of infinity.
5Myopic consumer do not need knowledge of the state as they only consider the posted prices. Con-
trary, forward-looking consumers (see Section 4) need this knowledge as they can choose to wait.
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where ej is a 1×n vector with all zeros but the jth entry equal to 1. In words, the state
transits to the next period t− 1 with unchanged capacities x if the consumer chose not
to buy, i.e. j = 0, or to the next period t − 1 after she bought from firm j with xj ≥ 1,
such that this firm j’s capacity is then reduced by one. Note that time cannot decrease
further than to its deadline because in t = 0 the game ends. Consumers cannot choose
to buy from a firm with zero capacity, i.e. xj = 0, as that firm would be inactive.
Demand
In each period one consumer arrives in the market with probability one.6 Firms offer
homogeneous products of quality v that expire at the same time t = 0. The consumer
receives utility from the good’s quality v and price pi, depending on where she buys.
Assuming linear utility in product quality and price, buying from firm i ∈ J(ω) gives
the consumer utility7
Ui = v − pi + µ εi, (2)
while the outside option, i.e. exiting the market without buying, grants the normalized
utility of
U0 = 0 + µ ε0. (3)
A consumer receives idiosyncratic preference shocks εj for each choice j ∈ J(ω) ∪ {0},
which are assumed to be drawn independently from the Extreme Value Type-I (or Gum-
bel) distribution and are not observed by the sellers.8 These shocks are weighted with
µ > 0, the measure of consumer heterogeneity, which is common knowledge of the firms.
Following the discrete choice model, a consumer chooses i ∈ J(ω) ∪ {0} if and only if
Ui(v, pi, µ, εi) ≥ Uj(v, pj , µ, εj), ∀j ∈ J(ω) ∪ {0} and j 6= i.
This yields the multinomial logit demand system (see e.g. Train (2009) for the derivation
of the discrete choice probabilities), such that the demand probability that a consumer
chooses product i ∈ J(ω) over all other choices is given by
6In Section 5.5 I consider general arrival rates.
7In the standard discrete choice model v and pi can be weighted with β and α respectively, i.e. taste
parameters over quality and price, however I normalize α = β = 1. Note that this is without loss of
generality because by adjusting v and µ we can essentially change α and β.
8The distribution function is f(εj) = exp(−εj) exp [− exp(−εj)].



















while inactive firms’ demand is zero, i.e. Di(p(ω),ω) = 0 if xi = 0. Further, the consumer














Note that the sum over all demand probabilities including the outside option adds up to
one, i.e.
∑
j Dj(p(ω),ω) = 1, with j ∈ J(ω) ∪ {0}. Further note that logit demand, in
contrast to simple Bertrand unit demand, does not entail demand curve jumps, resulting
in non-trivial intermediate prices rather than only extreme monopoly or marginal cost
pricing. Selling probabilities are also more dispersed, in the sense that any firm might
sell in a given period with a certain probability, giving rise to the volatile price dynamics.
For µ→ 0 consumers become homogeneous and we tend to the (unit) Bertrand world,
where Ui = v−pi. Then demand also tends to its Bertrand equivalent. See Appendix A.1
for these derivations and Section 5 for comparative statics in consumer heterogeneity µ.
Further note that D0(p) increases in µ if pj < v for all j ∈ J(ω), while Di(p) decreases
in µ if pi ≤ pj and pi < v for all j 6= i. Intuitively, here heterogeneity increases the
outside option utility relatively to the utility from a good.
Firms’ Problem
In each period (state), each active firm i ∈ J(ω) chooses a price pi(ω) for its product to
maximize Vi(p(ω),ω), the expected net present value of current and all future payoffs,
depending on all firms’ price choices p(ω) in this state. Note that marginal costs are
normalized to zero. If a firm i’s capacity is zero, it is inactive and its value function is
equal to zero. In the deadline firms’ value function is zero, too, such that Vi(p(ω),ω) = 0
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is the expectation of the value function of firm i for the next period, where all firms will
post equilibrium prices, conditional on the consumer having chosen j ∈ J(ω)∪{0} now.10
Hence a firm’s value function (equation 6) consists of current-period payoffs, i.e. demand
Di(p(ω),ω) multiplied with price pi(ω), as well as the sum over next period’s expected
value functions Wi,j(ω), weighted with the probabilities Dj(p(ω),ω) that these states
are reached. The game will be solved by backward induction. As a boundary condition,
in the last period t = 1 a firm’s value function consists only of current-period payoffs,
i.e. Vi(p(ω),ω) = Di(p(ω),ω)pi(ω) if t = 1.












Differentiating the value function in (6) w.r.t. pi(ω) and considering the demand deriva-





































Di (p,ω) . (11)
9The firms’ discount factor could be normalized to δ = 1 as selling periods in these markets typically
last only a few months.
10The continuation values only depends on the current state ω, i.e. are independent of the firms’
actions (prices) in the current period. Current prices only determine the probabilities with which these
continuations are reached. Future equilibrium prices are anticipated and hence taken as given in a
period. Note that I show equilibrium existence by backward induction (and discuss uniqueness) in the
next subsection.
11Note that in the following I drop some arguments (ω) for simplicity.
3. Baseline Model 95
3.2 Equilibrium Existence
This is a multi-period game, therefore the equilibrium concept will be Sub-game Perfect
Nash. For the existence proof we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. The best-response function pi(p−i(ω),ω) is bounded, i.e. inf pi(p−i(ω),ω) >
−∞ and sup pi(p−i(ω),ω) <∞.
Intuitively, the best-response price pi(p−i(ω),ω) in equation (8) is bounded because
very low and very high prices are never a best response. For this I show that the change in
the expected value function Vi(p(ω),ω) becomes positive for low prices, i.e. a condition
for ∂Vi(p(ω),ω)/∂pi > 0, and that the change in Vi(p(ω),ω) becomes negative for
high prices, i.e. a condition for ∂Vi(p(ω),ω)/∂pi < 0. This lemma is necessary for the
construction of a compact strategy set in the existence proof.
Lemma 2. The expected value function Vi(p(ω),ω) is quasi-concave in pi.
The second lemma is necessary for the existence of a unique best-response of firm i
for each p−i. With these two lemmas we can state the main proposition of equilibrium
existence.
Proposition 1. There exists a pure-strategy Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
In the proof for this proposition I follow Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) to show that in
each sub-game an equilibrium exists. Then, by backward induction there exists a pure-
strategy Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium for the whole game. For this note that in
the final period t = 1 no continuation values need to be considered.
To characterize the equilibrium in a given state ω, from equation (10) the first-order








p∗i (ω) + δWi,i(ω)− δWi,j(ω)
]
, (12)
where j ∈ J(ω)∪{0}. Intuitively, a firm will post a price reflecting the trade-off between
current-period profit p∗i (ω) together with the expected continuation value upon selling
itself, δWi,i(ω), and its reservation value which is the continuation value after the con-
sumer chooses the other j, i.e. δWi,j(ω). A similar point is made by Martínez-de Albéniz
and Talluri (2011) for dynamic Bertrand competition.
The equilibrium valuation function in a given state ω then becomes
Vi(p∗(ω),ω) = p∗i (ω) + δWi,i(ω)− µ. (13)
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3.3 Equilibrium Uniqueness
In this section I will state a sufficient condition for uniqueness of the sub-game per-
fect equilibrium under duopoly. Moreover, I will show analytically that this condition
holds for important parameter constellations, while for general parameter levels I use a
simulation approach.
For the following condition I restrict attention to duopoly situations. A monopo-
list’s price choice is unique, as already established in the last paragraph of the proof of
Proposition 1.
Condition 1. There exists a unique pure-strategy Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium







∈ (−1, 1). (14)
While this condition is rather technical and without further intuition, I can show
that for µ→ 0 Condition 1 holds and the equilibrium is unique, which is in line with the
uniqueness result in Dudey (1992).
Proposition 2. There exists a unique pure-strategy Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium
under duopoly for µ→ 0.
Moreover, for µ > 0 I can show that the Nash equilibrium in the last period t = 1 is
unique. Here, no more continuation values are relevant. Similarly, whenever min
i
xi ≥ t
and i ∈ J(ω), i.e. when the active firms have individual excess capacities (compare
Section 5.1), all continuation values of all firms are equal. Independent of the choice of the
consumer all firms will have sufficient capacity until the deadline, such that uniqueness
can be shown analogously.
Proposition 3. Under duopoly, there exists a unique pure-strategy Sub-game Perfect
Nash Equilibrium if min
i
xi ≥ t and i ∈ J(ω), and all firms post the same price.
To see that for all t where min
i
xi ≥ t all active firms will post identical prices, note








for all active firms i, which is (implicitly) solved by a unique and symmetric price for all
i because the demand function at given prices is identical in all these t and all firms are
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symmetric in the sense that they each hold capacity xi ≥ t.12 Intuitively, firms treat all
periods with individual excess capacities like the final period and post the final-period
price. Under competition, I will refer to this price as the total-competition price, since it
defines the lower-bound for competitive prices.13 Naturally, under monopoly there exists
such a lower-bound final-period price, too, which is posted whenever xi ≥ t.
Finally, for higher levels of µ > 0 in all t where min
i
xi < t I provide the following
result, which is based on simulations, where I do not encounter equilibrium multiplicity
for any considered parameter constellation while looping over a wide range of starting
values for the root-finding algorithm. The program for this is provided in Appendix B.
Result 1. There exists a unique pure-strategy Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium under
duopoly.
4 Forward-looking Consumers
In this section I will consider forward-looking consumers and present the model specifics
as well as equilibrium results. Effects of a policy allowing consumers to be forward-looking
will be discussed in Section 6.2.
Contrary to myopic consumers, forward-looking consumers have knowledge of the
state of the world, which next to the number of remaining time periods and firms’ capacity
levels will now also consist of the number of consumers in the market.14 Furthermore, I
assume that in each time period a consumer can choose between buying from any of the
active firms or waiting in the market for at least one more period, rather than exiting
the market. Nevertheless, waiting in every period until the deadline provides the same
(outside option) utility for forward-looking consumers as exiting for myopic consumers.
4.1 Model
Set-up
As in the baseline model, in each period one new consumer arrives. Since consumers can
now choose to wait, more than one consumer might “accumulate” in the market, such
12Note that if µ is not too (insensibly) high, this price is lower than consumer valuation v. Refer to
the discussion of the comparative statics of µ in Section 5.3 for more details.
13Only under symmetric aggregate capacities even lower prices are possible (see Section 5.1).
14One could also consider a third, “intermediate” case, where consumers are not informed about ca-
pacities, but know the remaining time, allowing them to be still fully forward-looking. This case would
require more complex analysis involving consumers having beliefs about capacities and possibly firms
using prices as capacity signals.
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that at the deadline at most as many consumers as total periods can be in the market.
Let c ∈ N+ be the number of consumers in the market at a certain time. Again, I assume
that in each period only one trade can occur, i.e. at most one of possibly several waiting
consumers can buy from only one firm. The remaining consumers are “rationed” and
have to wait for (at least) one more period.
Then the timing in a period is such that first a new consumer arrives into the market
with probability one, while all consumers who did not buy in the previous period are
in the market as well. Second, firms simultaneously post prices and a lottery draws out
of all consumers in the market one lucky consumer.15 The probability to be the lucky
consumer is equal to 1/c, while the probability to be rationed is equal to (c−1)/c. Third,
the lucky consumer chooses to buy from an active firm or to further wait in the market.
Possible trade between the lucky consumer and a firm takes place and the period ends.
All consumers who did not buy will remain in the market for the next period.
State Transition
The state is now given by the vector ω = (t,x, c), i.e. it additionally features the number
of consumers c in the market, and is common knowledge among all firms and consumers.
Depending on the choice of the lucky consumer, the state transition function from
ω = (t,x, c) into a next state ω′ = (t′,x′, c′) is
ω′| (ω, j) =
(t− 1,x, c+ 1) if j = 0,(t− 1,x− ej , c) if j ∈ J(ω), (16)
where ej is a 1 × n vector with all zeros but the jth entry equal to 1. If the consumer
waits (j = 0), x capacities remain and one additional new consumer arrives, such that
there will be c + 1 consumers in the next period t − 1. If the consumer chooses firm
j ∈ J(ω) with xj ≥ 1, then this firm j’s capacity is reduced by 1, while (possibly)
unserved consumers as well as the one newly arriving consumer, i.e. c − 1 + 1 = c, will
be in the market in the next period. Note that time cannot decrease past its deadline
boundary t = 0.
Consumer Utility and Demand
In the world of forward-looking consumers waiting gives the consumer utility of δcWc(ω),
where Wc(ω) is the consumer’s expected valuation of waiting which is introduced in the
15Note that the order of the consumer lottery and firms’ price setting is irrelevant.
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next paragraph. Let δc ∈ [0, δ] be the discount rate for all consumers, which could
be smaller than the firms’ discount rate δ.16 I will interpret δc as consumers’ degree
of patience, i.e. the degree to which they are forward-looking (see Section 5.4 for a
discussion). Note that for δc = 0 the model becomes identical to the baseline model
of myopic consumers. The lucky consumer chooses from J(ω) ∪ {0}, where choices
j ∈ J(ω) exhibit the products of the active firms, while j = 0 represents the choice of
waiting. Utility of the lucky consumer when choosing an active firm’s product i is again
Ui = v − pi + µ εi. Waiting gives the consumer utility of17
U0 = µ δcWc(ω) + µ ε0. (17)
All choice options are again associated with independent Extreme Value Type-I dis-
tributed taste shocks εj . Then the multinomial logit demand system yields the probabil-

























while inactive firms obtain zero demand, i.e. Dj(p(ω),ω) = 0 if xj = 0.
Consumers’ Problem
In each period the lucky consumer chooses between buying from a firm or waiting for
(at least) one more period in the market. Thereby she considers the following trade-off.
On the one hand, she could purchase at current prices from one of the active firms with
certainty. On the other hand, she could wait, expecting that firms become less confident
about selling their goods and hence will further decrease prices. However, waiting involves
the risk of being rationed in the next period(s), amplified by the arrival of new consumers.
When the consumer chooses where to buy or whether to wait, she anticipates all possible
future prices of all sub-games, which determine her expected valuation of waiting.
16Note that δ can be normalized to one.
17Note that I multiply the observable part of the outside option utility with µ, too, such that the ratio
to the shock ε0 remains constant, as in the baseline model, where the observable part of the outside
option is zero. This is merely a normalization and hence does not affect the results qualitatively.
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Given the current state ω and considering future rationing risks, let the transition
probability matrix of the lucky consumer be Φ(ω), a matrix of three dimensions, T×X×
C, with entries in [0, 1].18 This matrix shall state for each entry, i.e. for each possible
state ω′ = (t′,x′, c′) ∈ {{0, .., T} × {0, ..,X} × {1, .., C}}, the probability that in that
state ω′ the currently lucky consumer will be for the first time again the lucky consumer,
given that she decides to wait in the current state ω.19 In Appendix A.2 I provide
the details of this transition matrix Φ(ω).20 In order to solve for the equilibrium it is
important to note that the consumer transition matrix Φ(ω) only depends on the current
state ω. All future sub-games’ prices, demand decisions and rationing probabilities are
fully anticipated in expectation by consumers as they only depend on the current state.
Next, let Ω(ω) be a matrix of three dimensions, T ×X × C, where the entries are
equal to the lucky consumer’s value function in all possible states, as expected after
choosing to wait in ω. All entries of Ω(ω) at the deadline, i.e. for t′ = 0, shall be equal
to zero as all goods will have perished at the deadline. Each other entry (t′,x′, c′) ∈
{{0, .., T} × {0, ..,X} × {1, .., C}} is equal to the consumer’s value function in that state,
Ω(ω)[t′,x′,c′] = Vc(t′,x′, c′). (20)
The value function of the lucky consumer in a state ω is equal to her consumer surplus
as derived for the logit model e.g. in the textbook by Train (2009) and reads21
Vc(ω) = ln



















18C = c+ t is the maximum number of consumers that can accumulate until the end.
19For example, consider a state (t = 2, x1 = 1, c = 1). If the only (and hence lucky) consumer waits,
her transition probability matrix consists of zeros for all possible states, with one exception: in state
(t = 1, x1 = 1, c = 2) she will be for the first time again the lucky consumer with probability 1/2, which
is the probability that she and not the newly arrived consumer will be drawn to be lucky. If the new
consumer is drawn, which happens with probability 1/2, the older consumer does not get to be the lucky
consumer again and reaches the deadline, obtaining the outside option of no purchase.
20Note that unlucky consumers do not become active until they are drawn by the lottery, hence their
transition function is irrelevant to the solution of the problem until then.
21Note that this term is the log of the denominator of a choice probability and therefore is often called
’the log-sum term’, although this equivalence “has no economic meaning” (Train, 2009).
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i.e. the sum of all elements obtained from element-wise multiplying the transition prob-
ability matrix with the matrix of value functions. Note that in the last selling period
t = 1 there are no continuation values, hence waiting grants the outside option valua-
tion Wc(ω) = 0 whenever t = 1, completing the recursion. Intuitively, Wc(ω) gives the
expected equilibrium-path- and rationing-risk-probability-weighted valuation of waiting.
Firms’ Problem
In each state ω = (t,x, c), all active firms i simultaneously post their prices pi(ω) to
maximize their value function Vi(p(ω),ω). The value function is basically identical to
the one in the baseline model as in equation (6). The only difference is that consumers
here have the choice of waiting rather than exiting the market. Since in each period only
one consumer is selected to choose, the firms’ problem remains equal: firms compete
against each other for one trade per period, thereby considering all possible continuation
values. However, consumers’ demand as in equations (18) and (19) now also depends on
their valuation of waiting (equation 22), which firms’ need to take into account.
4.2 Equilibrium
Equilibrium Existence
The proof of equilibrium existence follows the same line as in the baseline model, hence
is only sketched here.
Proposition 4. There exists a pure-strategy sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, when
consumers are forward-looking.
In each period firms’ price choices are a fix point, as in the case of myopic consumers.
The only difference to the proof of Proposition 1 is that continuation values are given
for consumer choices including waiting instead of exiting the market. Still, a firm’s value
function is quasi-concave in its own price and the best-response functions are bounded. In
each period only one consumer is drawn to choose between buying or waiting, whereas all
other consumers remain inactive for this period. This lucky consumer chooses after firms
have posted their prices, whereby she takes current firm prices as given and anticipates
all prices and continuation values as well as her transition probabilities for all future
sub-games (states). Hence, no consumer choice fix-point argument is necessary but the
unique optimal consumer choice directly follows from utility maximization, resulting in
the above specified demand system, which is anticipated by firms. Therefore, in each
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period a Nash equilibrium exists and since the game is finite, there exists a pure-strategy
Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium for the whole game.
Equilibrium Uniqueness
Similar to the case of myopic consumers, we can show equilibrium uniqueness under
duopoly for µ → 0 analytically and also for all t where min
i
xi ≥ t and i ∈ J(ω). The
proofs are analogous to the ones in the previous section for Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 5. There exists a unique pure-strategy Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium
under duopoly, when consumers are forward-looking and µ → 0. If min
i
xi ≥ t and
i ∈ J(ω), the duopoly equilibrium is unique for µ > 0, too, and all firms post equal prices
in a given t.
The equilibrium price levels are implicitly defined by first-order conditions analogous
to (15). However, note that unlike in the myopic consumer case, here firms’ prices in all
t where min
i
xi ≥ t, i ∈ J(ω), are not equal to the final-period price. While firms here
still post unique and symmetric prices in a given period of individual excess capacities,
this price is not constant in t. This is because demand depends on consumers’ valuation
for waiting which increases in t as consumers’ rationing risk rises the closer we get to the
deadline (compare Section 6.2).
For all other cases with µ > 0 in all t where min
i
xi < t I verify equilibrium uniqueness
in the simulations by looping over a wide range of different starting values for the root-
finding algorithm (compare the program in Appendix B).
Result 2. There exists a unique pure-strategy Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium under
duopoly, when consumers are forward-looking.
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5 Comparative Statics and Discussion
In this section I discuss comparative statics to shed light on equilibrium pricing. I
study the effects of differences in capacity levels relative to remaining selling periods, in
consumer heterogeneity, in consumer patience, in the consumer arrival rate and in the
number of firms. Thereby I will distinguish between mainly four different capacity cases
(see Section 5.1).
To solve for the equilibrium price paths I employ numerical simulations. In Appendix
B I provide the program computing the sub-game perfect equilibrium with forward-
looking consumers: Starting in the final period t = 1 and then using backward induction,
I solve for the equilibrium in each possible state, whereby, given the transition probabil-
ities, all possible sub-games’ continuation values are taken into account. Since in a given
state the equilibrium prices cannot be solved for in closed-form, I rely on root-finding
algorithms. To verify equilibrium uniqueness, I loop over various starting values and do
not encounter any multiplicity. Note that whenever I compute representative price paths,
trade realizations are a random draw considering the equilibrium demand probabilities.
To obtain average price paths I average over 1000 repeated simulations.22 The findings in
this section are based on these equilibrium simulations, whereby I vary parametrization
to explore comparative statics and dynamics of the model.
5.1 Capacity Cases
In the pure-strategy sub-game perfect equilibrium different price paths can arise, de-
pending on the relation between firms’ capacities and remaining time periods. Note that
remaining time periods exhibit an upper bound on expected demand since one consumer
arrives per period. In this subsection I will introduce four such capacity cases and show
their effect on pricing.
As an initial example consider Figure 2, which shows equilibrium prices with myopic
consumers depending on the number of remaining time periods, given fixed capacities of
x1 = 4 and x2 = 2 for the entire time under duopoly as well as xM = 6 under monopoly
22For all simulations I add to the observable part of utility from a firm i’s product µ ln (1/|J(ω)|),
i.e. µ times the logarithm of the inverse number of active firms. Then, e.g. demand for i becomes
[(1/|J(ω)|) exp((v − pi(ω)/µ)] / [1 + (1/|J(ω)|)
∑
J(ω) exp((v − pj(ω)/µ)]. Consequently, for forward-
looking consumers also the consumer value function Vc(ω) changes accordingly. Like this two duopolists
obtain the same aggregate demand as a monopolist if they all post equal prices. Without this modification
some price differences between monopoly and competition could be attributed to the fact that consumers
in the multinomial-logit model inherently prefer to have more choices, which would have favored compe-
tition over monopoly, even at equal prices. Nevertheless, this normalization has no implications for the
equilibrium analysis and qualitative comparative statics results of the model parameters.
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as a benchmark.23 In this example we get that p1 < p2 while x1 + x2 ≤ t, and p1 ≥ p2
while x1 +x2 > t, whereas p1 = p2 while min {x1, x2} ≥ t. The monopoly price decreases
and remains constant as soon as t < xM .
Figure 2: Prices with Fixed Capacities
Parameters: T = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, myopic consumers. Capacities are fixed for the entire time
horizon, s.t. under duopoly x1 = 4, x2 = 2 and under monopoly xM = 6 in all t.
This example already proves that it can be the smaller or the larger firm which posts
the lower price. The following proposition summarizes this observation, while more detail
is discussed in the subsequent case analysis.
Proposition 6. Price-leadership is not monotone in capacity-leadership.
Note that with forward-looking consumers this proposition is robust, as seen in the
(respective) example in Figure A.1 of Appendix A.3. For a discussion of why prices
with forward-looking consumers rise towards the deadline if all firms can each serve all
remaining demand refer to Section 6.2.
Individual Excess Capacities (min
i
{xi} ≥ t, i ∈ J(ω))
If all active firms have each enough capacity to serve the entire current and future de-
mand, i.e. firms have individually excess capacities, under duopoly we are in the region
23Note for this and all subsequent figures that my model is of discrete capacity levels and time periods.
Nevertheless I connect all points in the figures for a better overview.
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of t ≤ 2 = x2 in Figure 2. Here firms compete harshly and post identically low but
positive total-competition prices, equal to the price they would post in the final period.
From Proposition 3 we know that under individual excess capacities all firms post the
same total-competition price, independent of their capacity. Then, all firms obtain equal
demand probabilities such that capacity-leadership can vary throughout the selling hori-
zon. Similarly, a monopolist with excess capacity posts the final-period monopoly price
for all remaining time periods, i.e. for t ≤ 6 = xM in Figure 2. Note that in a model
of (unit demand) Bertrand competition and static pricing or even dynamic pricing such
as in Dudey (1992) firms would price at zero (mark-up) under competition and at the
good’s value v under monopoly. In my model, due to consumer heterogeneity firms ex-
pect dispersed taste realizations. Therefore, larger consumer heterogeneity increases this
total-competition price under duopoly.24
Asymmetric Aggregate Excess Capacities (
∑
i
xi > t ∧min
i
{xi} < t, xi 6= xj)
If the sum of firms’ capacities exceeds the number of remaining selling periods, but at
least one firm cannot serve the entire demand itself, we are in the region x2 = 2 < t < 6 =
x1 + x2 of Figure 2. This is the capacity case where in the (static) Bertrand-Edgeworth
problem mixed-strategy pricing equilibria result. A dynamic model with homogeneous
consumers, allowing firms to sell sequentially, such as Dudey (1992), avoids these mixed-
strategy equilibria, however the price path is one of constant monopoly prices. In my
model with consumer heterogeneity we have a pure-strategy path of dispersed prices, i.e.
the smaller or the larger firm could be posting the lower price and either firm could sell.
This yields more realistic yet non-trivial intermediate price realizations under competi-
tion.25
Result 3. Under asymmetric aggregate excess capacities firms post dispersed prices.
Typically, the firm with less capacity posts the lower price such that it obtains a
higher probability to be chosen by the consumer in this period.26 In spirit, this result
is similar to the one by Dudey (1992), where the lower-capacity firm always undercuts.
However, there the result is extreme in the sense that the low-capacity firm can sell out
at the monopoly price. The high-capacity firm has an incentive to wait until the smaller
firm is out of capacity in order to remain as the monopolist subsequently.
24Consider Section 5.3 for details on the effects of consumer heterogeneity.
25Note that, contrary to Dudey’s (1992) dynamic Bertrand model, the static Bertrand model’s mixed-
strategy prices also yield average prices between the monopoly price and marginal costs.
26See Section 5.3 to note that for high values of µ this effect turns around.
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Similarly, in my model the smaller firm has the lower reservation value and hence
the higher opportunity cost of not selling, which can be best illustrated by the following
short example. Consider a situation with two remaining time periods, in which each
one consumer arrives. Firm 1 has only one more capacity in stock while firm 2 has two.
In the penultimate period firm 1 fears that if no sale occurs or if 2 sells, there will be
harsh competition in the last period, i.e. 1 has a low reservation value and consequently
undercuts to increase its selling probability. If firm 1 sells now, this would allow firm 2 to
sell as a monopolist in the ultimate period instead of engaging in price competition, i.e.
firm 2 has a higher reservation value and sets a higher price allowing it to sell only in the
case of a favorable consumer taste realization. Heterogeneity of consumers pushes both
prices below the monopoly price such that lower taste realizations can be served. This
is also true for the larger firm, since by pushing both prices downward the probability of
a sale increases and hence it gets more likely that the larger firm becomes monopolist.
Figure 3: Asymmetric Aggregate Excess Capacities
(a) Representative Price and Capacity Path (b) Average Price Path
Parameters: T = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, myopic consumers. Initial capacities under duopoly are
x1 = 8, x2 = 6 and under monopoly xM = 14.
As an example, consider Figure 3, which for T = 10 shows representative equilibrium
price and capacity paths as well as average price paths under duopoly and monopoly,
given initial capacities of x1 = 8 and x2 = 6 as well as xM = 14 respectively. The smaller
duopolist undercuts the larger duopolist, while a monopolist with excess capacities posts
the final-period price in all time periods.27
27Note that the average price path (Figure 3 b) of the smaller firm 2 decrease towards the deadline
because these prices reflect the average of rare path realizations where firm 2 will not have sold all its
capacities by then. In the representative path (a) firm 2 sells its last capacity in t = 3.
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Note that if the difference between firms’ capacities is relatively large, then the high-
capacity firm might post a lower price. Having only few capacities to sell off, the smaller
firm then has the higher reservation value allowing it to post higher prices initially,
as it can “bet” on some positive taste realizations. Contrary, the larger firm has more
capacities to sell off and is therefore relatively more eager to sell, making this case similar
to the capacity scarcity case discussed below. The example in Figure A.2 of Appendix
A.3 shows this situation with initial capacities of x1 = 12 and x2 = 2 for T = 10.
Symmetric Aggregate Excess Capacities (
∑
i
xi > t, xi ≈ xj < t)
If the sum of firms’ capacities exceeds the number of remaining time periods and firms’
capacities are (relatively) equal but neither firm can serve the entire expected market
itself, competition can be extreme.28 In the dynamic Bertrand model (Dudey, 1992)
pricing below marginal costs can result. Similarly in my model, firms will compete
harshly to become the smaller firm. Intuitively, firms anticipate that becoming the
smaller firm subsequently allows them to sell their capacities earlier. Thus they fiercely
compete down to a (possibly negative) price at which they become indifferent between
selling now at this non-profitable price but then continue as the more profitable smaller
firm, and the continuation value of remaining as the larger firm. However, this effect is
damped by consumer heterogeneity, as further explained in Section 5.3.29
As an example, consider Figure 4, which for T = 10 shows representative equilibrium
paths as well as average price paths, given initial capacities of x1 = 7 and x2 = 7
under duopoly as well as xM = 14 under monopoly as a reference. Note that in the
representative path (a) negative prices are posted in t = 10 when x1 = x2 = 7 and also
in t = 8 when x1 = x2 = 6.
Result 4. Under symmetric aggregate excess capacities there is harsh competition, even
with negative prices, to become the smaller firm.
28Note that due to consumer heterogeneity such a situation might also occur for other than but close
to equal capacities. In Figure 2 this capacity case does nor occur at all.
29Note that under symmetric aggregate excess capacities many comparative static results will seem
initially counter-intuitive due to this “race” to become the smaller firm.
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Figure 4: Symmetric Aggregate Excess Capacities
(a) Representative Price and Capacity Path (b) Average Price Path
Parameters: T = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, myopic consumers. Initial capacities under duopoly are





If the sum of both firms’ capacities is not larger than the number of expected consumers,
i.e. capacities are scarce (x1 + x2 = 6 ≤ t in Figure 2), in static and dynamic Bertrand
models both firms can sustain monopoly prices and they extract all consumer valuation
throughout the entire selling horizon. In my model, consumer heterogeneity can actually
reduce prices such that lower realizations of consumer taste can be accounted for. Further,
the firm with higher remaining capacity undercuts the other firm in order to increase its
selling probability.30 This incentive arises because given the possibility of lower consumer
taste realizations the larger firm faces a higher opportunity cost if no sale occurs, i.e. fears
more the continuation in the asymmetric aggregate excess capacities case. Contrary, the
smaller firm will not follow in this price reduction and the intuition is that here it has
the higher reservation value because capacities are scarce.
A monopolist with scarce capacity has a higher reservation value and posts higher
prices than with excess capacity. However, if she does not sell and hence the number
of remaining time periods decreases further towards a level closer to her capacity, her
reservation value falls and she lowers prices towards her static excess capacity price.
Consider the example in Figure 5, which for T = 10 shows representative equilib-




xi = t and large t, the smaller firm might slightly undercut, as this situation
approaches the case of aggregate excess capacities.
5. Comparative Statics and Discussion 109
under duopoly, while xM = 6 under monopoly initially. Note that the monopoly price
might even be below a duopolist’s price but if the prices are weighted with their demand
probability, the expected price of a sale under duopoly is typically still smaller.31
Result 5. Under scarce capacities competitive prices are high but dispersed and the larger
firm undercuts the smaller firm.
Figure 5: Scarce Capacities
(a) Representative Price and Capacity Path (b) Average Price Path
Parameters: T = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, myopic consumers. Initial capacities under duopoly are
x1 = 4, x2 = 2 and under monopoly xM = 6.
5.2 Capacity Levels and Remaining Time
Given the four capacity cases introduced in Section 5.1 now I will consider the effect of
variation in firms’ capacity levels on pricing in a fixed period and also how prices change
in remaining time for fixed levels of capacity. This provides interesting results on price
monotonicity and additionally sets the groundwork for an assessment of the ex-ante game
of capacity production (Section 6.4).
First, consider the monopoly situation. Without consumer heterogeneity, as in Dudey
(1992), monopoly prices are always equal to valuation v. In my model pricing differs, as
seen in Figure 6. Here monopoly prices (vertical axis) are plotted for different levels of
fixed monopoly capacities and remaining time periods (horizontal axes). Immediately we
can see that monopoly prices weakly increase in time and weakly decrease in capacity, ce-
teris paribus. Intuitively, given fixed capacities a monopolist’s reservation value increases
if she has more time to sell her goods. Contrary, in a given period her reservation value
31In Section 5.6, which is on market power, this is discussed in more detail.
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is lower, the more capacity she holds. However, if capacity becomes excessive relative
to remaining time (xM > t), monopoly prices are constant and equal to the final-period
price. Hence, the following result.32
Result 6. Under monopoly, prices are weakly decreasing in capacity and weakly increas-
ing in remaining time.
Figure 6: Comparative Statics of Capacity and Time (Monopoly)
Parameters: v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, myopic consumers. Monopoly prices pM for different capacity levels
of xM and different remaining time periods t.
Second, to see how duopoly prices in a given period change in capacity level variation
we have to distinguish between the different capacity cases. For this consider the example
in Figure 7 for t = 10 showing firm 1’s price (vertical axis), given variation in its own and
also in firm 2’s capacity levels (horizontal axes). If there are individual excess capacities,
i.e. each firm can serve the entire expected demand (in the figure xi ≥ 10 = t for i = 1, 2),
pricing is unaffected by the exact capacity levels because the period is essentially treated
like the final one and firms post the static total-competition price (compare Proposition
3). Contrary, if there is at least one active firm that cannot serve all expected demand,
i.e. min
i
{xi} < t and i ∈ J(ω), today’s prices and hence selling probabilities do have
implications for reservation values, i.e. future prices and selling probabilities. Specifically,
if together the firms cannot serve the entire demand, i.e. capacities are scarce (in the
32This result is robust to forward-looking consumers, for this consider Figure A.3 in Appendix A.3.
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figure if x1 +x2 ≤ 10 = t), a firm’s price decreases in its own and also in the competitor’s
capacity. Intuitively, lower own or lower competitor capacity and hence lower aggregate
capacity means higher reservation values because firms are more confident to sell out
eventually and hence can post higher prices.33 However, if we have aggregate excess
capacities and rather symmetric capacities (in the figure x1 ≈ x2 ∈ [6, 9]), pricing can
be extremely aggressive (compare Section 5.1), leading to possible non-monotonicity of
prices in capacity levels, i.e. a steep decrease followed by an increase of prices in any
firm’s capacity.34
Figure 7: Comparative Statics of Capacity Levels (Duopoly)
Parameters: t = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, myopic consumers. Price p1 in t = 10 under duopoly for
different capacity levels of x1 and x2.
These observations prove the following findings, which are robust to forward-looking
consumers, as illustrated in Figure A.4 of Appendix A.3.
Proposition 7. Under duopoly in a fixed period, prices are neither monotone in own
nor in competitor capacity.
Result 7. If capacities are scarce in a fixed period, prices decrease in own and in com-
petitor capacity.
33Note for very low capacities that it might be that pi > v, as the firms are comfortable to “bet” on
high taste realizations as long as the deadline is still relatively far.
34Similarly, if xj > t but xi is just lower than t, e.g. such that x1 = 9 < 10 = t < x2, firms’ reservation
values are relatively low and they are eager to sell because if no sale occurs, in the subsequent periods
there will be individual excess capacities and hence total-competition pricing until the deadline.
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Figure 8: Comparative Statics of Remaining Time (Duopoly)
Parameters: v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, myopic consumers. Price p1 under duopoly for different levels of
capacity x1 and different remaining time periods t, while x2 = 5 is fixed.
Finally, I consider how under duopoly a firm’s price changes in remaining time t, for
fixed levels of capacity. Figure 8 shows firm 1’s price (vertical axis) for various fixed levels
of capacity x1 in remaining time t (horizontal axes), whereby competitor capacity is fixed
at x2 = 5. Similar to the analysis above we see that prices are constant in t and equal to
the final-period total-competition price when capacities are individually excessive (here
for x1 ≥ 5 = x2 ≥ t). Further, prices increase in remaining selling time if capacities are
scarce (here if x1 + 5 ≤ t) because, intuitively, more time to sell their goods increases
firms’ reservation values. Only when capacities are on aggregate excessive, prices might
not be monotone in remaining time. As discussed above, specifically if capacities are
sufficiently symmetric (here for example x1 = x2 = 5 < 6 = t), prices become very
aggressive (even negative) while they increase again to the total-competition price as
soon as capacities become individually excessive relative to remaining time (here for
example x1 = x2 = 5 = t). The intuition is that firms “race" to become the smaller firm
(compare Section 5.1). Finally, note that without consumer heterogeneity (Dudey, 1992)
prices can also be non-monotonic in capacity and remaining time, yet remain constant
and equal to the monopoly price under scarcity. The following findings summarize these
observations.35
35This is robust to forward-looking consumers. See Figure A.5 in Appendix A.3 and refer to the
discussion in Section 6.2 for why under individual excess capacities prices decrease in remaining time.
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Proposition 8. Under duopoly with fixed capacities, a firm’s price is not monotone in
remaining time.
Result 8. If capacities are scarce and fixed, prices increase in remaining time.
The analysis of this section shows that prices will typically increase after a sale
and decrease otherwise. This feature is common with the literature of monopoly and
oligopoly dynamic pricing models, for example in Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006), Hörner
and Samuelson (2011) or Dilme and Li (2016). However, my model dynamics explain
additional price volatility, too. As Propositions 7 and 8 suggest, under competition
prices can go up or down in the next period, regardless of trade actually having taken
place. Technically, this non-monotonicity emerges because any firm could sell (or not)
in a given period due to consumer heterogeneity, such that different capacity cases with
distinct pricing can occur.
5.3 Consumer Heterogeneity
The (baseline) setting in this paper differs from Dudey’s (1992) primarily in the in-
troduction of consumer heterogeneity. For an assessment of the impact of consumer
heterogeneity on equilibrium outcomes, remember that buying from a firm i gives a con-
sumer utility Ui = v − pi + εiµ. For µ → 0 the last term vanishes and we essentially
have Bertrand demand.36 Consequently, also the equilibrium prices must tend to their
dynamic Bertrand equivalents.
To see this for an initial example consider the situation from before, where I showed
equilibrium prices for fixed capacities x1 = 4 and x2 = 2, depending on remaining selling
time. Figure 9 shows firm 2’s price, for various levels of consumer heterogeneity µ. Note
that as long as not every firm can serve all expected consumers, i.e. in the region t > 2,
for µ→ 0 we tend to monopoly prices equal to valuation v, but as soon as even the small
firm’s capacity becomes excessive relative to expected demand, i.e. in the region for
t ≤ 2, prices become competitive and jump down towards marginal costs. In the former
region the price initially decreases and then increases in µ, while in the latter region
prices increase in all µ, as indicated by the dashed arrows. To see that this is robust
with forward-looking consumers, refer to Figure A.6 of Appendix A.3, which presents
the respective example for forward-looking consumers.
36In Appendix A.1 I show that then the demand functions tend to their Bertrand equivalents.
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Figure 9: Comparative Statics of Consumer Heterogeneity
Parameters: T = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, myopic consumers. Capacities are fixed for the entire time
horizon, s.t. x1 = 4, x2 = 2 in all t. The price p2(µ) is for different levels of consumer heterogeneity
µ ∈ {0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 50}, where the “in-line” number refers to µ. The values for µ = 0 are
from Dudey (1992). The dashed arrows show the effect of µ on p2, one for the region x2 = 2 < t and the
other for the region x2 = 2 ≥ t.
Intuitively, two effects of consumer herterogeneity are relevant here. On the one
hand, heterogeneity essentially increases firms’ market power as goods become less ho-
mogeneous, allowing firms to increase prices. On the other hand, heterogeneity increases
the relative value of the outside option and hence firms react by decreasing prices. Which
effects dominates depends on the capacity situation and the level of µ. The following
result summarizes the section’s findings on this, while its details will be discussed in the
subsequent case analysis.
Result 9. If the market is very competitive, i.e. under individual excess capacities or
symmetric aggregate capacities, prices increase in consumer heterogeneity µ. Under all
other capacity distributions as well as under under monopoly prices decrease for small µ
and increase for larger µ.
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Individual Excess Capacities (min
i
{xi} ≥ t, i ∈ J(ω))
or Symmetric Aggregate Excess Capacities (
∑
i
xi > t, xi ≈ xj < t)
If each firm can serve individually all expected consumers or firms have symmetric but
on aggregate excess capacities, prices increase in consumer heterogeneity, ∂p∗i /∂µ > 0
for all µ. Intuitively, in both these cases competition is relatively strong such that the
first effect of increased market-power through heterogeneity is relatively more important
than the second outside-option effect for all µ.
For the individual excess capacity case note that for µ → 0 we get p∗i → 0. To
see that the price for an increased µ must also increase, consider the equilibrium value
function given in equation (13) and rearrange to p∗i (ω) = µ+ Vi(p∗,ω)− δWi,i(ω). Note
then that here p∗i (ω) ≥ µ because Vi(p∗,ω)−δWi,i(ω) ≥ 0, since under individual excess
capacities the continuation value after a successful sale cannot exceed the total value
function. Therefore, the price p∗i (ω) must be at least as large as µ and hence if µ > 0,
also p∗i > 0. This only shows that prices are larger than zero for any µ > 0. Figure 10
illustrates that prices are increasing in µ for all µ with individual excess capacities under
duopoly (labeled pD−ieci ).
Figure 10: Comparative Statics of Consumer Heterogeneity (2)
Parameters: t = 4, v = 100, δ = 1, myopic consumers
- Monopoly (M-sc) scarce capacity: xM−sc = 2
- Monopoly (M) capacity: xM ≥ 4
- Scarce capacities duopoly (D-sc): xD−sci = 2, i ∈ {1, 2}
- Asymmetric aggregate excess capacities duopoly (D-aec:asy): xD−asc.asy1 = 2 and x
D−asc
2 = 4
- Individual excess capacities duopoly (D-iec:asy): xD−ieci = 4, i ∈ {1, 2}
- Symmetric aggregate excess capacities duopoly (D-aec:sym): xD−asc:symi = 3
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For the symmetric aggregate excess capacity case (labeled pD−aec:symi ) note that for
µ → 0 in the duopoly equilibrium we have p∗i → v(t + 1 − 2xi), i.e. non-positive prices
(Dudey, 1992). With µ > 0 firms will also compete harshly to become the smaller firm,
however this is dampened by consumer heterogeneity, which allows for more random
demand later, such that being the smaller firm does not guarantee selling out first.
Asymmetric Aggregate Excess Capacities (
∑
i
xi > t ∧min
i
{xi} < t, xi 6= xj)




If there is a duopoly with asymmetric aggregate excess capacities (labeled pD−aec:asyi
in Figure 10) or scarce capacities (pD−sci ), and also if there is a monopoly with excess
capacity (pM ) or with scarce capacity (pM−sc), then without consumer heterogeneity, i.e.
for µ→ 0, prices tend to the monopoly price v. For µ > 0 simulations suggest that prices
fall from v, such that ∂p∗i /∂µ < 0, but only as long as µ is not too large, while we get
∂p∗i /∂µ > 0 if µ is large.37 Intuitively, in all these capacity cases both the market-power
and the outside-option effect of consumer heterogeneity are relevant. For smaller µ the
latter effect dominates, while for higher µ the market-power effect becomes increasingly
more important.38
5.4 Consumers Patience
In this section I will discuss the impact of consumer patience on equilibrium prices. For
this I make use of the extended model with forward-looking consumers as presented in
Section 4, i.e. consumers can choose to wait in the market instead of exiting the market.
The parameter defining consumers’ patience level is δc, the discount factor of consumers.
Fully patient consumers do not discount the future at all (not more than firms), such
that δc = δ, whereas completely impatient consumers disregard future payoffs, such that
δc = 0.39 Note that with completely impatient consumers we are back in the baseline
model of myopic consumers.
37Note that if capacities are very scarce, prices still fall for small µ but start increasing quickly in µ,
s.t. they can reach values above v already for relatively small µ.
38The multinomial-logit demand becomes essentially random for very high values of consumer hetero-
geneity and therefore increasingly inelastic. For example, if v = 100, for the monopoly price we get
∂p∗M/∂µ > 1 for all µ > 60 and therefore prices increasingly larger than v. Similarly, this is true under
duopoly. Therefore, it seems sensible to restrict µ and focus on values of µ such that at least the total-
competition price p∗i as defined in equation (15) is below consumer valuation v. For v = 100 this is true
for all µ < 60.
39Technically, also δc = 1 < δ is possible, however not sensible.
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Figure 11: Comparative Statics of Consumer Patience
Parameters: T = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, forward-looking consumers. Capacities are fixed for the
entire time horizon, s.t. x1 = 4, x2 = 2 for all t. Price p1 under duopoly for different levels of consumer
discount levels δc ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1), where the “in-line” number refers to δc.
At first consider the example from before in Figure 11, where I depict firm 1’s equilib-
rium price for fixed capacities, given different values of δc. Note that prices are generally
lower, the more patient consumers are, while they remain constant in δc under individual
excess capacities, i.e. as soon as even x2 = 2 ≥ t.
The following lemma provides an analytical outcome for T = 2, while for higher T I
provide simulation results below.
Lemma 3. For T = 2, prices weakly decrease if consumers become more patient, i.e.
more forward-looking.
Although more complex due to δc’s impact on Wc(ω) as well as on Wi,i(ω)−Wi,j(ω),
simulation results suggest that for higher T the effect is similar.
Result 10. Prices weakly decrease if consumers become more patient, i.e. more forward-
looking, unless there are symmetric aggregate excess capacities.
The intuition is straightforward. The more patient consumers are, the higher their
valuation of waiting, such that demand for firms’ goods decreases. Consequently firms
will decrease prices.
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For t = 4 Figure 12 illustrates that prices weakly decrease for all levels of δc in all
distinguished capacity cases. Only in the case of symmetric aggregate excess capacities
(compare Section 5.3), prices (initially) increase in δc. Intuitively, if consumers become
more patient, they choose to wait more often, hence firms anticipate that they might not
remain in the aggregate excess capacity case but could move into the individually excess
capacity case, which would lead to generally lower prices. Therefore, the continuation
value of becoming the smaller firm decreases and firms would not be willing to accept
such a low (or negative) initial price, hence prices slightly increase. If consumers become
even more patient, pressure on demand (and hence prices) becomes higher such that all
prices decrease in equilibrium, even under symmetric aggregate excessive capacities.
Figure 12: Comparative Statics of Consumer Patience (2)
Parameters: t = 4, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10
- Monopoly (M-sc) scarce capacity: xM−sc = 2
- Monopoly (M) capacity: xM ≥ 4
- Scarce capacities duopoly (D-sc): xD−sci = 2, i ∈ {1, 2}
- Asymmetric aggregate excess capacities duopoly (D-aec:asy): xD−aec:asy1 = 2, x
D−aec:asy
2 = 4
- Individual excess capacities duopoly (D-iec:asy): xD−ieci = 4, i ∈ {1, 2}
- Symmetric aggregate excess capacities duopoly (D-aec:sym): xD−asc:symi = 3
5.5 Consumer Arrival
In the baseline model in every time period one additional consumer arrives with probabil-
ity one. Now consider a general arrival rate, such that a new consumer only arrives with
probability λ ≤ 1 each period. Let the arrival rate λ be common knowledge. Remember
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that the timing in a period is such that first consumer arrival realizes, then all firms learn
the number of consumers in the market and simultaneously post prices. Intuitively, if
firms expect lower consumer arrival rates, expectations for future demand decrease, such
that firms’ reservation values decrease as they become less “confident” to sell out their
goods, and hence post lower prices. For T = 2 consider the following lemma, while for
higher T I provide simulation results below.
Lemma 4. For T = 2, prices weakly decrease if the consumer arrival rate falls.
For T > 2 the argumentation is more complex because the sign of δWi,i(ω)−δWi,j(ω)
becomes ambiguous, especially in the case of symmetric aggregate excess capacities,
however note the following simulation result.40
Result 11. Prices weakly decrease if the consumer arrival rate falls, unless there are
symmetric aggregate excess capacities.
Figure 13: Comparative Statics of Consumer Arrival Rate
Parameters: t = 4, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, myopic consumers
- Monopoly (M) scarce capacity: xM−sc = 2
- Monopoly (M) capacity: xM ≥ 4
- Scarce capacities duopoly (D-sc): xD−sci = 2, i ∈ {1, 2}
- Asymmetric aggregate excess capacities duopoly (D-aec:asy): xD−aec:asy1 = 2, x
D−aec:as
2 = 4
- Individual excess capacities duopoly (D-iec:asy): xD−ieci = 4, i ∈ {1, 2}
- Symmetric aggregate excess capacities duopoly (D-aec:sym): xD−asc:symi = 3
40When consumers are forward-looking, the same intuition applies and hence prices should increase in
the arrival rate, too.
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Consider Figure 13 providing an example for t = 4 to see that prices increase in
the arrival rate under all capacity cases. Only if there are symmetric aggregate excess
capacities, i.e. possibly below-marginal-cost pricing, prices might decrease for higher
levels of the arrival rate λ. Similarly to the intuition for lower consumer patience δc, if
the arrival rate of consumers is expected to be high and hence future demand to be more
stable, symmetric firms compete even fiercer to become the smaller firm. However, if
firms do not expect high consumer arrival rates, the continuation value of becoming the
smaller firm decreases.
5.6 Market Power
To assess the effect of market power on prices I compare prices under monopoly and
competition. At the same time I want to show that these comparisons are robust to dif-
ferent levels of consumer heterogeneity µ. For µ→ 0, the monopoly price is always equal
to valuation v, while competitive prices are also equal to v, unless there are individual
excess capacities, which yield prices equal to marginal costs.41
Figure 14: Monopoly vs Competition (t = 2)
Parameters: t = 2, v = 100, δ = 1, myopic consumers
- Monopoly (M) capacity: xM−100 = 1, xM−200 ≥ 2
- Duopoly (D-110): xD−1101 = x
D−110
2 = 1, x
D−110
3 = 0
- Duopoly (D-220): xD−2201 = x
D−220
2 = 2, x
D−220
3 = 0
- Triopoly (T): xT−111i = 1, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
41Only symmetric aggregate excess capacities yield prices below marginal costs.
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Figure 14 provides an example for t = 2, where for µ > 0 monopoly and duopoly
prices differ, however remain “similar” when the aggregate market capacities are equal
and scarce.42 In a market with three firms (triopoly) or aggregate excess capacities, prices
are substantially lower (and equal to marginal costs for µ→ 0). This effect is standard:
more firms and/or more capacity mean more aggressive pricing as the continuation value
after no sale decreases.
Figure 15: Monopoly vs Competition (t = 3)
Parameters: t = 3, v = 100, δ = 1, myopic consumers
- Monopoly (M) capacities are s.t. xM−200 = 2, xM−300 ≥ 3
- Duopoly (D-210) capacities are s.t. xD−2101 = 2, x
D−210
2 = 1, x
D−210
3 = 0
- Duopoly (D-110) capacities are s.t. xD−1101 = x
D−110
2 = 1, x
D−110
3 = 0
- Triopoly (T) capacities are xD−111i = 1, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
However, it is not necessary the case that prices always decrease in the number of
firms, if overall market capacities are equal and relatively scarce (and in some cases of
extremely asymmetric aggregate excess capacities, too). For this consider the example
illustrated in Figure 15 for t = 3. For
∑
i xi = 2, duopoly prices (labeled pD−110) are
higher than in the corresponding monopoly (pM−200). Here for µ > 0 goods become
less homogeneous such that a "Cournot" effect becomes relevant, which dominates the
standard market-power effect: Under competition firms do not internalize the positive
externality a low price imposes on the other firms. While a monopolist posts prices with
the intent of selling both of her units eventually, competitive firms care only about selling
42Further details on this similarity are in Section 6.3.
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their own capacity and do not internalize that no sale yields harsher competition in the
next period for the other firm, too.43
Result 12. Unless capacities are relatively scarce, prices typically decrease in the number
of firms.
Note however that if capacities are not too scarce, e.g.
∑
i xi = t = 3 in Figure 15,
prices still decrease in the number of firms (pD−210 < pM−300). Even if for asymmetric
duopolies the smaller firm’s price might be above the monopoly price, nevertheless if
duopoly prices are weighted with their corresponding demand, the expected duopoly
price at which consumers buy (pD−210 in the figure) is smaller than the monopoly price.
6 Welfare and Policy
In this section I will discuss policy effects on welfare. Fist, I will consider the effect of
having forward-looking rather than myopic consumers. Second, I will further investi-
gate on market power and competition policy, while third I will study ex-ante capacity
production.
6.1 Welfare Definitions
Before analyzing policies we need to define total sales, average prices, firm profits and
consumer surplus.





















where j ∈ J(ω) ∪ {0} and at the deadline S(0, ·) = 0. Total sales are defined as the
equilibrium-path-probability-weighted discounted sum of probabilities that trade will
happen in the given periods. I will interpret total sales as a proxy measure of efficiency.
Every time a capacity unit is sold this creates a value, which through the price is split
between the firm and the consumer.44 I argue that total welfare can be approximated
by the total number of these value creations.45
43To see that these results are similar for forward-looking consumers, refer to Section 6.3 where I discuss
competition policy under both regimes.
44In Section 6.4 I consider capacity production costs.
45Note that summation of profits and consumer surplus is not sensible in the multinomial logit models
as the overall scale of utility is only meaningful as a relative measure.
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while at the deadline no prices are posted. Average prices are the equilibrium-path-
probability-weighted sum of expected prices posted in the given periods. In a period the
expected price is obtained by weighting prices with their respective demand probabilities.









A firm’s (expected) profit in a state is equal to its expected valuation function, i.e. its
equilibrium-path-probability-weighted discounted sum of expected revenues. The sum of
all firms’ profits shall be called industry profits.





















where at the deadline CS(0, ·) = 0. Consumer surplus here is based on the standard
definition for the logit model as e.g. in Train (2009), which is the logarithm of the
sum of utility terms from products of the active firms and the outside option. Since the
problem is of multiple periods, I add over all periods weighted with the equilibrium-path-
probabilities. Note that this notion of consumer surplus is different than the definition of
the consumer value function I used in equation (22). In (22) the valuation of a consumer
sums over all states she might reach for the first time again as the lucky consumer,
providing the foundation for her decision criterion of whether to wait or not. Here, we
need the consumer surplus which is created whenever a good is sold. Therefore, choosing
to leave the market in the myopic model or choosing to wait in the forward-looking model
both give the consumer the normalized outside option utility for that particular period,
such that consumer surplus under both regimes is comparable.46 Further note that the
46If similar to (22) consumer surplus with forward-looking consumers included instead her expected
continuation value after waiting, some sales would essentially be counted twice, as my definition of
consumer surplus already sums over all states of the equilibrium path.
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utility term from a firm i’s product is multiplied by 1/|J(ω)|, i.e. the inverse number of
active firms, such that consumers obtain the same surplus at equal prices independent
of the number of firms. Otherwise the mere number of active firms, i.e. the number of
choices in set J(ω), would increase consumer surplus, ceteris paribus. Since consumer
surplus is only a relative measure, this normalization is without loss of generality.47
Note for all welfare measures defined here that future states are discounted with the
common (firm) factor δ, which I assume to be equal to the planner’s discount factor.48
Also consumer surplus is discounted with δ because it measures the sum of current and
future consumers’ surpluses, which is relevant for the planner and not for the individual
consumer when choosing whether to wait or to buy.
6.2 Forward-looking Consumers
Myopic consumers only consider the current period. Contrary, forward-looking con-
sumers can anticipate all future prices and might prefer to wait whenever they expect
better prices and a relatively low rationing risk. For this they need to compute all possible
continuations, which requires knowledge of the current state.
This could be achieved through a policy informing consumers about the current state,
e.g. by regulation enforcing firms to publicly announce their real-time capacity levels.
In the markets for airfare tickets or other travel markets consumers are typically not
informed about remaining capacity, while in other markets, such as theater or event
ticket markets, this information tends to be publicly available through, e.g., seat maps.
Another, perhaps more subtle, regulation could aim at increasing the degree to which
consumers are forward-looking. E.g., by providing additional information on typical
price paths or rationing risks, but without any capacity level disclosure requirement for
firms, consumers could learn to better deduct information about firms’ capacity levels
from announced prices. This way, they could become more patient, such that they could
compute continuation values more effectively. If forward-looking consumers (or total
welfare) are better off than under myopia, regulators could consider such policies.
Technically, the myopic-consumer and the forward-looking-consumer models can be
compared as the following three conditions hold in both models. First, in each time
period at most one seller can sell a good. Second, if we start from the same initial
state with no previous consumers in the market, then the total number of units that can
maximally be sold until the deadline is identical in both models. This is because the
47Compare footnote 22 from the section on comparative static simulations for a discussion.
48This could be normalized to δ = 1.
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total number of consumers throughout the entire selling time is equal, even if consumers
choose to wait for one or more periods. Third, the definitions of welfare measures as in
Section 6.1 are identical under both regimes.
Figure 16: Forward-looking vs Myopic Consumers: Average Price Path
Parameters : T = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10. Initial capacities at time t = 10 are given by x1 = 6,
x2 = 6 under duopoly and by xM ≥ 10 under monopoly. Duopoly price pD and monopoly price pM , for
myopic (myo: δc = 0) and forward-looking consumers (forw: δc = δ).
From the comparative statics results from Section 5.4, we know that in a given state
prices are lower when consumers are forward-looking. Therefore the average price path
with forward-looking consumers entails lower prices than the respective price path with
myopic consumers.49 Consider the example in Figure 16, where for initially symmet-
ric but aggregate excess capacities I show the average price path under duopoly and
monopoly for myopic and completely forward-looking consumers. For the intuition of why
prices with forward-looking consumers are generally lower, consider the monopoly price
paths (pM−myo and pM−forw). Unlike in the case of myopic consumers, with forward-
looking consumers the monopoly price is not constantly equal to the final-period price.
49Note that in the case of symmetric aggregate excess capacities and small levels of consumer patience
δc prices can increase in consumer patience. However here we consider fully patient consumers where this
is not the case. Nevertheless, even if the price in a state of symmetric aggregate capacity was higher for
forward-looking consumers, this would yield lower trade probabilities and hence subsequently lower prices
such that the average price (path) effect of forward-looking consumers should overall still be negative.
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Although she holds excess capacities throughout the entire selling period, here a mo-
nopolist gradually increases prices. The longer the time until the deadline, the higher
consumers’ valuation for waiting as the rationing risk is still relatively small. Conse-
quently, the posted prices must be lower if the deadline is still further away, while only in
t = 1 the monopoly prices are identical in both cases. Respectively, this intuition carries
over to competition.
Figure 17: Forward-looking vs Myopic Consumers: Welfare
(a) Average Prices (b) Total Sales
(c) Industry Profits (d) Consumer Surplus
Parameters: t = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10. Average prices (a), total sales (b), industry profits (c)
and consumer surplus (d), as expected in t = 10, under monopoly and duopoly for different levels of
initial capacity x1, given fixed levels for x2 ∈ {0, 6}, for myopic (myo: δc = 0) as well as forward-looking
consumers (forw: δc = δ).
For the comparison of the previously introduced welfare measures under myopic and
forward-looking consumers consider the example in Figure 17, where I plot these measures
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for different capacity levels of firm 1, as expected in period t = 10. Average prices (a)
with myopic consumers are higher than with forward-looking consumers, under monopoly
as well as under duopoly. Interestingly, although less goods are sold overall (b), prices
under consumer myopia are sufficiently higher such that firms are still better off (c).
Contrary, consumers (d) remain worse off when myopic. While here I provide the case
where one firm cannot serve all expected demand, in Figure A.7 of Appendix A.3 I show
that this is robust to the case where both firms can have excess capacities. In general, I
find this result to be robust when looping over a wide range of parameter constellations
in the simulations.
Result 13. Average prices, total sales and industry profits are higher with myopic con-
sumers than with forward-looking consumers, while consumer surplus is lower.
For the regulator it is interesting that the efficiency loss of having forward-looking
consumers (less total sales due to the waiting possibility) does not go in hand with a
consumer surplus reduction because the threat of waiting sufficiently depresses prices.50
6.3 Competition Policy
Competition policy and merger regulation in markets with dynamic pricing are om-
nipresent, e.g. in the assessment of airline mergers or booking platform market power.
In this section I will analyze the effects of competition on welfare measures by comparing
monopoly to duopoly situations.
While in chapter 5.6 I discussed how prices change in the number of firms, in Figure
18 I plot average prices, total sales, industry profits and consumer surplus, as expected in
period t = 10, for different levels of total market capacity under monopoly and duopoly,
whereby both duopolists initially hold exactly half the number of capacities as the mo-
nopolist. As long as we are under scarcity, i.e. whenever total market capacity is lower
than the number of remaining selling periods such that
∑
i xi < t, average prices, total
sales, industry profits and consumer surplus are (almost) identical under monopoly and
duopoly.51 This result is similar to Meisner (2017), who shows that under similar con-
ditions but with different consumer heterogeneity the competitive price path resembles
the monopoly price path if market capacities are equal and scarce.
50To further strengthen this result, note that my forward-looking consumer model is rather ’conserva-
tive’ in the sense that only one consumer can buy in a period, imposing a substantial rationing risk.
51Note that if capacity is very scarce, e.g. if xD1 = xD2 = xM/2 = 4 in t = 10, total expected sales might
even be slightly lower under duopoly than under duopoly as pricing under duopoly can be less aggressive
than under monopoly where the positive externality on other capacities is internalized (cf. Section 5.6).
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Figure 18: Competition Policy
(a) Average Prices (b) Total Sales
(c) Industry Profits (d) Consumer Surplus
Parameters: t = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, myopic consumers. Average prices (a), total sales (b),
industry profits (c) and consumer surplus (d), as expected in t = 10, under monopoly and (initially
symmetric) duopoly for different levels of initial market capacity
∑
i
xi, such that xD1 = xD2 = xM/2.
What is more, in Figure 18 I show that if total market capacity becomes excessive
relative to remaining time, i.e.
∑
i xi > t, average prices under duopoly are lower than
under monopoly. Consequently, under duopoly there will be more total sales until the
deadline, while consumer surplus becomes larger and industry profits smaller than under
monopoly. Further, under monopoly for xM =
∑
i xi > t and respectively under duopoly
for xDi =
∑
i xi/2 > t, all four measures become constant in additional market capacity∑
i xi because a situation of individual excess capacity is reached.52 Summing up, we get
52For duopoly asymmetry, refer to Figure A.8 of Appendix A.3, where I show that for extremely as
well as for less extremely asymmetric initial capacities all results are robust.
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the following result.
Result 14. If market capacity is excessive, average prices and industry profits are typi-
cally higher under monopoly than under duopoly, while consumer surplus and total sales
are typically lower. If market capacity is scarce, duopoly and monopoly results are rela-
tively equal.
This result is robust with forward-looking consumers. To see this, consider Figure
A.9 in Appendix A.3 for average prices and total sales with forward-looking consumers.
6.4 Ex-ante Capacity Production
In the previous sections of this paper all analyses were conducted for exogenously given
levels of capacity. In this section I will consider endogenous capacity production before
the actual dynamic pricing game starts. I will compare equilibrium capacity production
with efficient capacity production as well as capacity choices under capacity production
collusion and under monopoly.
Suppose that before they start selling, firms can build capacities x̂i at some (constant)
unit cost k·v, whereby k ≤ 1 shall represent the fraction of the good’s value v. To evaluate
firms’ capacity production for different levels of production costs k, let firm profits in state
ω be as defined in Section 6.1, minus capacity costs per unit of production, i.e. Πi(ω)−
x̂i k v.53 Then joint profits are the sum over all firms’ profits, i.e.
∑
i {Πi(ω)− x̂i k v}.
Moreover, I define collusion in the sense that firms only collude in capacity production, i.e.
produce capacities which jointly maximize industry profits in the (expected) subsequent
dynamic pricing game minus initial capacity production costs, while pricing remains non-
cooperative as before. Further, to define an efficiency benchmark with capacity costs,
consider the number of total sales in a market, as given in Section 6.1. Capacity costs
reduce the value of all produced capacities by the factor of k, hence the efficiency measure
in state ω will be defined by S(ω)−
∑
i x̂i k. Then capacities are efficient if they maximize
total sales in the subsequent dynamic pricing game, where firms are free to post prices,
minus the initial capacity value costs.
When producing capacities, firms consider their expected profits given their own
and their competitiors’ capacity choices. Thus, in the capacity production equilibrium
firms’ capacity choices are mutual best responses. Generally, multiple and mixed-strategy
equilibria are possible. In Figure 19 the capacity production best responses are given for
53On average, even under monopoly, firms will sell at a price below v, hence subtracting a fraction k
of v exhibits a sensible production cost assumption.
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subsequent pricing games of length T = 2 and T = 10, while capacity production costs
are k = 0. For T = 2 equilibria consist of x̂i = 1 and x̂−i = 2.54 Contrary, for T = 10
the equilibrium is uniquely given by the pure strategies x̂i = x̂−i = T/2.
Figure 19: Capacity Production: Best Responses and Equilibrium
(a) T = 2 (b) T = 10
Parameters: v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, k = 0, myopic consumers, duopoly. Best responses in ex-ante
capacity production. In (a) T = 2, in (b) T = 10.
As long as competitor capacity x̂−i is small relative to remaining time, firm i will
(weakly) decrease its capacity x̂i in x̂−i, i.e. capacities are strategic substitutes. For higher
levels of x̂ firm i might even expand x̂i in x̂−i, s.t. capacities are strategic complements,
but only to an extent such that i remains the smaller firm in the new situation of aggregate
excess capacities.55 In equilibrium, firms will choose to produce sufficient capacities to
jointly cover the entire expected demand, but without obtaining (too much) aggregate
excess capacity, which would trigger equilibrium paths of consistently lower prices.56
Note from Dudey (1992) that for µ→ 0 capacity choices in duopoly are always such that
exactly
∑
i x̂i = T .57 Summing up, the introduction of consumer heterogeneity µ > 0
can yield (small) excess capacity production.
54In t = 2 firm −i prefers to build one excess capacity because then both firms’ prices will be more
aggressive such that the probability of a sale by firm i increases and firm −i will remain with a higher
probability as the monopolist in t = 1.
55Note that also in Dudey’s (1992) model of dynamic Bertrand an entrant would like to just undercut
the incumbent’s capacity choice, if there are aggregate excess capacities.
56If T is very high or µ relatively high, the probability that in some periods no trade happens increases,
such that firms might produce less capacities than remaining time periods.
57There, if t is even, x̂1 = x̂2 = t/2 and if t is odd, x̂i = (T + 1)/2 while x̂−i = (T − 1)/2.
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Result 15. In the ex-ante equilibrium of capacity production without costs firms might
build excess capacities in equilibrium.
Figure 20: Comparison of Capacity Choices without Costs
(a) Myopic Consumers (b) Forward-looking Consumers
Parameters: v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, k = 0 duopoly for (a) myopic consumers and (b) forward-looking
consumers with δc = δ = 1. Capacity choices for a firm x̂i under efficiency, in equilibrium, under
collusion and under monopoly for all selling periods T . For multiple equilibria x̂i is the mean of their
pure-strategies. Under monopoly I plot x̂i = x̂M/2 to compare.
Consider Figure 20 to see capacity choices x̂i under duopoly with zero capacity costs
in the four different regimes, i.e. under efficiency, in equilibrium, under collusion and
under monopoly, for all possible subsequent selling horizons T ≤ 10, and for myopic (a)
as well as forward-looking (b) consumers. Note for all multiple equilibria that the sum of
both firms’ capacities is still unique in all cases I considered, such that I take the mean
capacity of a pure-strategy equilibrium.58 Under monopoly and collusion firms restrict
themselves to x̂M ≤ T and x̂i ≤ T/2 respectively, while capacities in equilibrium are
such that x̂i ≥ T/2 because the (negative) externality on the other firm’s profit is not
internalized.59 Contrary, it would be efficient to have individually excess capacities, i.e.
x̂i ≥ T for all i, to ensure lowest prices and hence highest total sales. Interestingly, when
consumers are forward-looking more or less capacity than with myopic consumers could
be built in equilibrium. This is because with forward-looking consumers on the one hand
due to the waiting option less demand is expected but on the other hand more capacity
and hence lower prices reduce the relative value of waiting. Nevertheless, the order of
capacity choices remains robust.
58Thereby I neglect the mixed-strategy equilibrium, which however yields the same aggregate capacities.
59Note footnote 56 to see why x̂i < T/2 is possible for high T or high µ.
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Result 16. In the ex-ante equilibrium of capacity production capacities are smaller than
or equal to the efficient level, yet at least as large as under collusion or even monopoly.
To see that this is also robust to different capacity costs, consider Figure 21, which
shows all four capacity choice regimes for different levels of k and T = 10.60
Figure 21: Comparison of Capacity Choices for Different Costs
(a) Myopic Consumers (b) Forward-looking Consumers
Parameters: T = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, duopoly for (a) myopic consumers and (b) forward-looking
consumers with δc = δ = 1. Capacity choices for a firm x̂i under efficiency, in equilibrium, under collusion
and under monopoly for different capacity production costs k. For multiple equilibria x̂i is the mean of
their pure-strategies. Under monopoly I plot x̂i = x̂M/2 to compare.
Finally, the following observations further strengthen my results on policies allowing
consumers to become forward-looking. For this I consider the ex-ante capacity produc-
tion equilibrium with myopic and forward-looking consumers and then compare welfare
measures of the subsequent dynamic pricing games under both regimes.61 Consider Fig-
ure 22, which shows (a) efficiency (total sales) and (b) average prices for T = 10 under
both regimes for different production costs k.62 Efficiency and average prices are higher
with capacity equilibrium choices and myopic consumers, if capacity costs are not too
large. Compare Figure A.10 from Appendix A.3 to see that consequently also industry
60For extremely large capacity costs it would be efficient not to produce any capacity, however firms
might still expect some positive valuation shock during any of the remaining time periods, such that they
might sell at a price above v and hence find it profitable to build one capacity.
61Note that here for all multiple equilibria the sum of capacities is still unique such that I can use the
results of any of the pure-strategy equilibria as they are symmetric.
62Note that for Figures 22 and A.10 I do not subtract the initial capacity costs for reasons of com-
parability, however the results would remain qualitatively robust. It should be noted though, that the
equilibrium capacity production choices could represent a Prisoners’ Dilemma and lead to an efficiency
loss and also to negative industry profits for high capacity costs k.
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profits are higher while consumer surplus is lower, as long as capacity costs are not too
large.63 From this we can conclude that if we consider the ex-ante game of capacity
production, the results from the comparison of forward-looking and myopic consumers
from Section 6.2 carry over, if capacity costs are not too large.
Result 17. Given ex-ante equilibrium capacity production choices with myopic and
forward-looking consumers, total sales, average prices and industry profits are higher
with myopic consumers, while consumer surplus is lower than with forward-looking con-
sumers, as long as capacity costs are not too large.
Figure 22: Welfare Measures Given the Ex-ante Capacity Equilibrium
(a) Total Sales (b) Average Prices
Parameters: T = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, duopoly for myopic consumers and forward-looking
consumers with δc = δ = 1. Total sales (a) and average price (b) of the dynamic pricing game after
ex-ante equilibrium capacity production, for different k. For multiple equilibria I consider the mean of
their pure-strategies.
63Note footnote 62. Further note that while in T = 10 equal capacities are built in equilibrium with
myopic and with forward-looking consumers for k = 0, this result is also robust for T where capacity
production might differ in both cases. Consider Figure A.11 in Appendix A.3 and note that e.g. in T = 5,
although more capacity might be produced with forward-looking consumers, total sales are still lower.
Similarly, although in T = 8 more capacity might be produced under consumer myopia, consumers are
still better off when forward-looking, as long as k is not too large.
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7 Conclusion
I study dynamic pricing of capacity-constrained firms under oligopolistic competition.
For this I employ a multi-period model with heterogeneous consumer demand such that
firms have an inter-temporal pricing problem, while forward-looking consumers face an
inter-temporal waiting problem. The resulting pure-strategy price path equilibrium can
explain empirically observed price volatility, which does not arise in other models of the
literature. Crucially, the number of remaining capacities of each oligopolist as well as
the total number of market capacities relative to remaining selling time determine firms’
reservation values and hence their prices in a given period. I find that price-leadership
is not monotone in capacity-leadership and competitive prices are also neither monotone
in a firm’s capacity nor in remaining time, unless capacities are scarce.
There are three main policy results for these dynamic pricing markets. First, a policy
allowing consumers to become forward-looking increases consumer surplus but decrease
efficiency (total sales) as well as industry profits because of the increased pressure on
prices. Second, stronger competition policy is especially valuable if market capacities are
excessive relative to expected demand. And third, ex-ante equilibrium capacity produc-
tion can be excessive, though still inefficiently small, while under capacity production
collusion or under monopoly even less capacity is built.
Building upon this study, further work could refine on a consumer equilibrium, e.g.
allow for more than one consumer to strategically compete for sales in a period. Ad-
ditionally, waiting consumers could have persisting taste shocks. Further, it would be
interesting to investigate the intermediate case of forward-looking consumers who do not
have knowledge about firms’ capacity levels. Also, collusion through repeated interaction
in capacity production and dynamic pricing could be studied. Additionally, the analysis
of price commitment and fixed prices in this setting could be worthwhile investigating
for many real-world dynamic pricing applications. Finally, many dynamics are in effect
at the same time and this model presents an approach to disentangle them. It could be
a valuable empirical exercise to test these predictions with, e.g., real-world airfare data.
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A Appendix
A.1 Myopic Consumers - Baseline Model







































First, note that if pi > v, the whole expression tends to zero for µ→ 0 because the first
term in the denominator tends to ∞. Second, let pi < v.64 Then for µ→ 0 the first term
in the denominator tends to zero. If pi > pj for at least one j 6= i, then for µ → 0 at
least one of the summands in the third term of the denominator tends to ∞ and hence
the whole demand expression to 0. If pi < pj for all j 6= i, then for µ→ 0 the third term
(summation) tends to (n − 1)0 and hence the whole expression to 1. If pi = pj for all
j 6= i, then for µ → 0 the third third term (summation) equals (n − 1)1 and the whole





0 if pi > v
0 if pi < v and pi > pj for at least one j 6= i
1 if pi < v and pi < pj for all j 6= i
1/n if pi < v and pi = pj for all j 6= i.
Derivatives of Demand





















)]2 = 1µDi(p,ω)D0(p,ω) > 0.
64If pi = v < pj , for all j 6= i, demand is equal to 1/2 and if pi = pj = v, demand is equal to 1/(n+ 1),
because the outside option utility is normalized to zero, too.
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)]2 ≥ 0 if pj < v for all j 6= i.



















































pi + δWi,i − δWi,j −∑
j 6=i




Dj [Vi − δWi,j ] . (A.1)
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DjDi [Vj(p,ω)− δWj,i(ω)] .
Proof of Lemma 165
Proof. Define wij(ω) ≡Wi,j(ω)−Wi,i(ω), w+i (ω) ≡ maxj wij(ω) and w
−
i (ω) ≡ minj wij(ω),
where i, j ∈ J(ω) ∪ {0} and i 6= j. Note that w+i (ω) and w
−
i (ω) are constant in a given










pi − δw−i (ω)
]}
. (A.2)
Note for the lower bound that the right-hand-side of (A.2) is positive, if pi < µ1−Di(p,ω) +






i (ω), this is in particular satisfied, if
pi < µ+ δw−i (ω). (A.3)










pi − δw+i (ω)
]}
. (A.4)
Note that the right-hand-side of (A.4) is negative, if pi > µ1−Di(p,ω) + δw
+
i (ω). Since








1 + exp( v−piµ )
≥ 1−
exp( vµ)
1 + exp( vµ)
= 11 + exp( vµ)
65For parts of Lemma 1 I adopt the construction of a similar proof in Lin and Sibdari (2009).
66This is true because continuation equilibrium multiplicity is excluded, as seen in the proof of Propo-
sition 1.
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we have that µ
(






i (ω). Therefore the right-hand-
side of (A.4) is in particular negative, if
pi > µ
(




+ δw+i (ω). (A.5)
Hence Vi(p, ω) increases in pi for pi < µ + δw−i (ω) and decreases in pi for pi > µ(1 +
exp( vµ))+δw
+
i (ω), given any prices p−i of the competitors. Thus, no other prices need to
be considered and the best-response price is bounded, i.e. inf pi(p−i,ω) ≥ µ+δw−i (ω) >
−∞ and sup pi(p−i,ω) ≤ µ(1 + exp( vµ)) + δw
+
i (ω) <∞.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Whenever the first-order condition given by setting expression (9) equal to zero





Di (p,ω) < 0, (A.6)
i.e. the second-order condition for a local maximum is fulfilled. Note that the strict
inequality follows from the fact that Di (p,ω) > 0 because prices are bounded from
above, which we showed in Lemma 1. This satisfies the sufficient condition for quasi-
concavity as stated in Crouzeix (1980), which is an extension of Katzner’s criterion
(Katzner et al., 1970).
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), who rely on e.g. Debreu (1952), a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium exists in each period t if the strategy sets are (a) non-empty,
(b) compact and (c) convex, while the payoff to a firm is (d) continuous in all firms’
actions and (e) quasi-concave in its own action.
(a) and (c) are fulfilled since firms choose from the non-empty and convex set pi ∈ R.
From Lemma 1 we know that there is an upper and a lower limit for firms’ best response
pricing functions. Hence we could construct a new but equivalent game where firms are
restricted to prices pi ∈ [µ+ δw−i (ω), µ
(
1 + exp( vµ)
)
+ δw+i (ω)], such that we also have
(b) a compact strategy set. To see that a firm’s payoff function Vi(p,ω) is continuous
in all firms’ actions (d), note that equation (6) is continuous in all pj , j ∈ {1, ..., n},
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since Wi,j(ω) and Wi,0(ω) are constant in p.67 Finally, from Lemma 2 we get (e), payoff
quasi-concavity in pi. Therefore the Nash equilibrium is in pure strategies as the set of
strategies consists only of pure strategies.
If there were multiple such equilibria in a given period, then I assume that firms will
coordinate on the equilibrium granting higher total payoffs.68
Under monopoly only one firm, say i, holds capacity. Then from the first-order
condition ∂Vi(p,ω)/∂pi = 0, it follows that ∂2Vi(p,ω)/∂p2i = − 1µDi (p,ω) < 0, and
hence the monopoly price choice exists and is unique.
Hence, there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in each period and firms can
perfectly anticipate future equilibrium outcomes, while in the final period t = 1 there
are no continuation values. Then, by backward induction there exists a pure-strategy
Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium for the whole game.
Proof of Condition 1
Proof. To show uniqueness I use the index theory approach (Vives, 2001) based on the
Poincaré-Hopf index theorem. For this define the marginal value function as gi(p) ≡
∂Vi(p,ω)/∂pi for all firms i ∈ {1, 2}. Let g(p) = (g1(p), g2(p)). Define the Jacobian
matrix of g(p) as M [g(p)]. The above named theorem implies that if g : P → R, where
P is a compact set in R, satisfies a boundary condition and the determinant of M [−g(p)]
is positive whenever g(p) = 0, then there is a unique solution to g(p) = 0.
From Lemma 1 we know that the best-response prices are bounded in [b−i , b
+
i ] :=
[µ + δw−i (ω), µ
(
1 + exp( vµ)
)
+ δw+i (ω)] for each i, hence we have a compact set. For
the boundary condition note that ∂Vi(b−i , pj ,ω)/∂pi > 0 and ∂Vi(b
+
i , pj ,ω)/∂pi < 0 for
all pj and all i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i, which is shown in the proof of Lemma 1. Then the
Jacobian matrix of −g(p) is given by
M [−g(p)] =
(
−∂2V1(p, ω)/∂p21 −∂2V1(p, ω)/∂p1∂p2
−∂2V2(p, ω)/∂p2∂p1 −∂2V2(p, ω)/∂p22
)
.
The determinant of this matrix, given the above specified second derivatives, is
det M [−g(p)]
67This is true because continuation equilibrium multiplicity is excluded, as seen below.
68Refer to the discussion of equilibrium uniqueness in the Section 3.3 but note that during simulations
for no parameter constellation equilibrium multiplicity was encountered.
























































Whenever g(p) = 0, i.e. ∂Vi(p,ω)/∂pi = 0 ∀i, we get that










Thus, if ∂Vi(p, ω)/∂pj ∈ (−1, 1) while ∂Vi(p, ω)/∂pi = 0, we have M [−g(p)] > 0 and
we can apply the Poincaré-Hopf index theorem, hence a unique solution to the first-order









Dj(p,ω) [pi + δWi,i(ω)− δWi,j(ω)− µ] . (A.7)
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. For uniqueness we need Condition 1 to hold. From equation (A.7) together with








D0(p∗,ω) [p∗i + δWi,i(ω)− δWi,0(ω)] (A.8)

























Consequently, for µ→ 0 the third term in equation (A.8) tends to zero since p∗i , Wi,i(ω)
and Wi,0(ω) are then bounded by v and t ·v respectively, as a firm i only obtains positive
demand if pi ≤ v. Then, since 1−Dj(p,ω) ∈ (0, 1), we get for the whole expression that
∂Vi(p, ω)/∂pj |∂Vi(p,ω)/∂pi=0 ∈ (0, 1), satisfying Condition 1.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. First, note that in t = 1 we have Wi,j = 0 for all j ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}. Second, note
that if min
i
xi ≥ t, i ∈ J(ω), all firms’ continuation values are equal for any consumer
choice, i.e. Wi,j(ω) = Wi,k(ω) for all j, k ∈ J(ω) ∪ {0} and all i ∈ J(ω). To see this
consider the following backward induction argument. In t = 2, each active firm holds
sufficient capacity to sell one good now and one good in t = 1. Consequently, independent
of the consumer choice j in t = 2, in the final period t = 1 all firms will be competing,
such that the value function of all firms i in t = 1, as expected in t = 2, i.e. Wi,j(ω),
will be identical for all j ∈ J(ω) ∪ {0}. Similarly, this holds in any t where each active
firm holds sufficient capacity for all periods until the deadline. Therefore, all demand
realizations yield equal continuation values (of harsh competition).
















) ≥ 1. (A.9)
The inequality holds because
∑
j 6=i












Note that this inequality is because pi/µ ≥ 1 by (A.9). Further, if we insert pi/µ from














) −Dj(p,ω) < 1. (A.11)
This inequality holds because the first term cannot be larger than one. From equations
(A.10) and (A.11) we see that Condition 1 holds and the equilibrium is unique if t = 1
or t > 1 with min
i
xi ≥ t and i ∈ J(ω).
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A.2 Forward-looking Consumers
Definition of consumer transition matrix
Let Φ(ω) be initially a zero-matrix of dimension (T×X×C). Then, each entry (t′,x′, c′) ∈
















































c′ if t− 1 > t














if t− 1 > t′ = 0.
For the completion of the recursion note that for all states with t′ ≥ t or with x′j > xj
for some j ∈ J(ω), we have that Φ(ω)[t′,x′,c′] = 0 because these states cannot be reached
as they either lie in the past, are equal to the current time period or consist of infeasible
capacities. Further note that the matrix contains all probabilities to reach the deadline
without being lucky again, too, hence the sum over all its entries must add up to one.
As an example of how to read Φ(ω)[t′,x′,c′] consider the third case. The state [t′,x′, c′]
will be reached after two possibilities. First, after the sum of probabilities Dj that
in state (t′ + 1, x′j + 1,x′−j , c′), which itself will have been reached with probability
Φ(ω)[t′+1,x′j+1,x′−j ,c′] c
′, some firm j ∈ J(ω) will have sold a good to some other con-
sumer. This means that the currently lucky consumer will not have been lucky then,
s.t. this will have been weighted with probability (c′ − 1)/c′.69 Second, after the
lucky consumer of state (t′ + 1,x′, c′ − 1), which will have been reached with proba-
bility Φ(ω)[t′+1,x′,c−1′] (c′ − 1), will have chosen to wait, i.e. probability D0. Again, this
69No state with c′ = 1 can be reached, i.e. is assigned a probability of zero, because after new consumer
arrival there will be at least one more consumer, next to the currently lucky one.
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means that the currently lucky consumer will not have been lucky then, s.t. this will
have been weighted with probability (c′ − 2)/(c′ − 1).70 Finally, the whole expression is
weighted with 1/c′, i.e. the probability to be lucky in (t′,x′, c′).71
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is identical to the ones for Lemmas 1 and 2 as well as Proposition 1. The only
technical difference is that for the upper bound of the best-response function since











we have that sup pi(p−i,ω) ≤ µ{1 + (exp( vµ)/ exp[δcWc(ω)])}+ δw
+
i (ω) <∞.
Proof of Proposition 5
This proof is identical to the ones for Propositions 2 and 3. Note only that for µ → 0
also utility of waiting U0 → 0. Then demand for waiting D0(p,ω)→ 0, too.
Derivatives of demand w.r.t. δc in t = 2
In t = 2 all expected continuation values Wc(ω) are independent of δc because after
t = 1 there is only the deadline. First, abbreviate the denominator of demand by




















= −Wc(ω)Di(p)D0(p) < 0
∂D0(p)
∂δc
= N exp [δcWc]Wc − exp [δcWc] exp [δcWc]Wc
[N ]2




Dj(p) +D0(p)]/∂δc = ∂ [1−Di(p)] /∂δc > 0
70Φ(ω) gives the probabilities of when the lucky consumer will be for the first time again the lucky
consumer, i.e. no further continuations need to be considered.
71Note for the cases with t′ = 0 that the expression is weighted with 1 as this would be the deadline
reached by all remaining consumers.
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A.3 Comparative Statics and Policy
Comparative Statics: Capacity Cases
Figure A.1: Prices with Fixed Capacities (F-l Consumers)
Parameters: T = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, forward-looking consumers. Capacities are fixed, s.t. under
duopoly x1 = 4, x2 = 2 and under monopoly xM = 6 in all t.
Figure A.2: Asymmetric Aggregate Excess Capacities (2)
(a) Representative Price and Capacity Path (b) Average Price Path
Parameters: T = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, myopic consumers. Initial capacities under duopoly are
x1 = 12, x2 = 2 and under monopoly xM = 14.
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Comparative Statics: Capacity Levels and Remaining Time (F-l Consumers)
Figure A.3: Comp. Statics of Capacity and Time (Monopoly, F-l Cons.)
Parameters: v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, forward-looking consumers. Monopoly price pM for different
capacity levels of xM and different remaining time periods t.
Figure A.4: Comp. Statics of Capacity Levels (Duopoly, F-l Cons.)
Parameters: t = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, forward-looking consumers. Price p1 in t = 10 under
duopoly for different capacity levels of x1 and x2.
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Figure A.5: Comp. Statics of Remaining Time (Duopoly, F-l Cons.)
Parameters: v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, forward-looking consumers. Price p1 under duopoly for different
levels of capacity x1 and different remaining time periods t, while x2 = 5 is fixed.
Comparative Statics: Consumer Heterogeneity
Figure A.6: Comp. Statics of Consumer Heterogeneity (F-l Cons.)
Parameters: T = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, forward-looking consumers. Capacities are fixed, s.t.
x1 = 4, x2 = 2 in all t. The price p2(µ) is for different levels of consumer heterogeneity µ ∈
{0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 50}, where the “in-line” number refers to µ. The dashed arrows show the
effect of µ on p2, one for the region x2 = 2 < t and the other for the region x2 = 2 ≥ t.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. In period t = 1 there is no continuation value for consumers (nor firms) and
hence demand choices and equilibrium prices are identical for all levels of δc. Therefore
in t = 1 also the valuation function Vc(ω) of consumers will be independent of δc. Hence,
all firm continuation valuations Wi,j(ω), for all i, j, are independent of δc if t ≤ 2.
Consequently in t = 2, the only part of the demand function in (18) depending on δc will
be the actual discount factor in the term exp [δcWc(ω)]. For the effect on equilibrium
prices in t = 2 recall the first-order condition in equation (12), which is analogous for
the forward-looking consumer case. Since the sum of all but i’s demands increase in δc
(compare Appendix A.2), equilibrium price p∗i must decrease in δc. Only if capacities are
individually excessive, all continuations are equal for the firms, such that the effect of δc
on demands cancels out. Overall we have ∂p∗i /∂δc ≤ 0 for t ≤ 2.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. In the last period, t = 1, if there is no consumer, the continuation value for
firms is zero. If, however, a consumer arrives, pricing is not affected by λ because there
are no future arrivals. Then, in the pen-ultimate period, t = 2, if a consumer arrives
(otherwise the problem is irrelevant) the maximization problem of the firms is as given
at equation (6), with the only difference that the transition matrix is now weighted with
the probability of consumer arrival in t = 1, i.e.
ω′| (ω, j) =
(t− 1,x, c = 1) if j = 0,(t− 1,x− ej , c = 1) if j ∈ J(ω), with probability λ,
ω′| (ω, j) =
(t− 1,x, c = 0) if j = 0,(t− 1,x− ej , c = 0) if j ∈ J(ω), with probability 1− λ.
Note that the state ω now also describes the number of consumers c, as in the model
with forward looking-consumers, although with myopic consumers we can only have one
or no consumer in the market. The expected continuation value increases in λ because in
the case of no arrival (1− λ) there will be no demand and hence zero revenues, whereas
in the case of consumer arrival (λ) the continuation value is identical to the standard
model with λ = 1. Now consider the resulting equilibrium condition in t = 2, as given
by equation (12) and note for the continuation values that δWi,i(ω)− δWi,j(ω) ≤ 0 (for
all j ∈ J(ω) ∪ {0}, j 6= i) because either firm i will have sold out and hence Wi,i(ω) = 0
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or competitors j will have sold out, hence i remains monopolist and Wi,i(ω) < Wi,j(ω),
where i, j ∈ J(ω), or all firms remain with positive capacity after any sale and then
Wi,i(ω) = Wi,j(ω), while always Wi,i(ω) ≤ Wi,0(ω) because any positive capacity in
t = 1 allows for at most one unit to be sold. As argued above, all continuation values
are “discounted” symmetrically with weight (1−λ).72 Consequently δWi,i(ω)−δWi,j(ω)
weakly increases (becomes less negative) for all j ∈ J(ω) ∪ {0}, j 6= i, in λ and the
equilibrium price must weakly increase in λ.
Welfare Analysis: Forward-looking vs Myopic Consumers
Figure A.7: Forward-looking vs Myopic Consumers: Welfare (2)
(a) Average Prices (b) Total Sales
Parameters: t = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10. Averages prices (a) total sales (b), as expected in t = 10,
under monopoly and duopoly for different levels of initial capacity x1, given fixed levels for x2 = 12, for
myopic (myo: δc = 0) as well as forward-looking consumers (forw: δc = δ).
72If consumers are forward-looking, the problem is only relevant if only one consumer is in the market,
hence the proof is analogous.
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Welfare Analysis: Competition Policy
Figure A.8: Competition Policy (2)
(a) Average Prices (extreme asymmetry) (b) Total Sales (extreme asymmetry)
(c) Average Prices (simple asymmetry) (d) Total Sales (simple asymmetry)
Parameters: t = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, myopic consumers. Average prices and total sales as




(a) and (b): extremely asymmetric duopoly capacities, such that xD1 = 2xD2 = xM/3,




xi = 2, let xD1 = xD2 .
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Figure A.9: Competition Policy (F-l Consumers)
(a) Average Prices (b) Total Sales
Parameters: t = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, forward-looking consumers. Average prices (a) and total




xi, s.t. xD1 = xD2 = xM/2 in t = 10.
Welfare Analysis: Ex-ante Capacity Production
Figure A.10: Welfare Given the Ex-ante Capacity Equilibrium (2)
(a) Consumer Surplus (b) Industry Profits
Parameters: T = 10, v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, duopoly for myopic consumers and forward-looking
consumers with δc = δ = 1. Consumer surplus (a) and industry profits (b) of the dynamic pricing game
after ex-ante equilibrium capacity production, for different k. For multiple equilibria I consider the mean
of their pure-strategies.
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Figure A.11: Welfare Given the Ex-ante Capacity Equilibrium (3)
(a) Total Sales, T = 5 (b) Consumer Surplus, T = 8
Parameters: v = 100, δ = 1, µ = 10, duopoly for myopic consumers and forward-looking consumers with
δc = δ = 1. Total sales in T = 5 (a) and consumer surplus in T = 8 (b) of the dynamic pricing game
after ex-ante equilibrium capacity production, for different k. For multiple equilibria I consider the mean
of their pure-strategies.
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% Dynamic Pricing under Capacity-constrained Competition with a Deadline
% Philipp Dimakopoulos, November 2017
%
% Duopoly Simulation, Forward-Looking Consumers









global beta A B C T H Q mc v mm arr mufix;
% A: max number of firm A capacity, a=1 means no capacity
% B: max number of firm B capacity, b=1 means no capacity
% T-1: total selling periods, t = T is the deadline
% C: max number of consumers in the market, c=1 means no consumer
% H: the number of possible mu - values
% Q: the number of possible betac - values
% mc: marginal costs (=0)
% v: baseline value of a product
% mm: grid for global deviation detection
% arr: arrival rate of consumers
% mufix: fix value for mu
% Run setup program giving inital capacities and remaining time, etc.
run setup_s;














% define price matrices
pA = zeros(T,A,B,C,H,Q);







% define welfare measures
SumDn0W = zeros(T,A,B,C,H,Q);   % sum of total sales, "efficiency"

















Loop for each state, beginning in the end
for t=T:-1:1
    % t=T is the deadline, where no sales take place
    if t==T
        for c=1:C
        for h=1:H
        for a=1:A
        for b=1:B
        for q=1:Q
             % continuation values of firms and consumers = 0
            V0A(t,a,b,c,h,q)=0;
            V0B(t,a,b,c,h,q)=0;
            V0C(t,a,b,c,h,q)=0;
            % infinite prices s.t. no demand
            pA(t,a,b,c,h,q)=realmax;
            pB(t,a,b,c,h,q)=realmax;
        end
        end
        end
        end
        end
    % for all t<T
    else
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        for c=1:(t+1)   % there can never be more than t+1 consumers
        for h=1:H
        for a=1:A
        for b=1:B
        for q=1:Q
done2-Loop over different start values for root-finding
            iter2 = 0;
            done2 = 0;
            while ~done2





% consumer heterogeneity from function mufun
mu = mufun(h);
% consumer patience from function betacfun
betac = betacfun(q);
% transition probabilties for firms:
% input: state of the world
% output: state reached after j in (wait, buyA, buyB)
% use transitionprob function
[PrL_0,PrW_A,PrW_B] = transprobs_st_s(t,a,b,c,h,q);
% transition probabilties for lucky consumer
% input: state of the world
% output: state reached next time as lucky consumer if j=0
% use transitionprob function
[PrC_0] = transprobs_st_s_cons(t,a,b,c,h,q,De0,DeA,DeB);
% check
disp(sprintf('%2d %2d %2d %2d %2d %2d',t,a,b,c,h,q));
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while ~doneGlob  %global price max
    % help price matrices
    pA_0(t,a,b,c,h,q) = pA_0_G(t,a,b,c,h,q);
    pB_0(t,a,b,c,h,q) = pB_0_G(t,a,b,c,h,q);
done-Loop: internal price quilibrium
    done = 0;
    iter = 0;
    while ~done
% parameters for maximization
MaxIter = 400; TolFun = 1e-6; TolX = 1e-6;
options = [1,TolFun,TolX,TolFun,MaxIter,1e-6];
% Equilibrium for different cases
% using FOC functions,
% which uses demand functions
% and Root-Finding-Algorithm (DogLeg)
% no capas or no consumer
if ( a == 1 && b == 1 ) || c==1
    pA(t,a,b,c,h,q) = realmax;
    pB(t,a,b,c,h,q) = realmax;
    info(6)=0;
    infoB(6)=0;
% only B has capa
elseif a == 1 && b~=1
    pA(t,a,b,c,h,q) = realmax;
    [pB(t,a,b,c,h,q),infoB] = ...
        DogLeg('FOC_st_s_B', ...
        [mc,pA_0(t,a,b,c,h,q),W0_B,WA_B,WB_B,WW_C,a,b,h,q], ...
        pB_0(t,a,b,c,h,q),options);
    info(6)=0;
% only A has capa
elseif b == 1 && a~=1
    pB(t,a,b,c,h,q) = realmax;
    [pA(t,a,b,c,h,q),info] = ...
        DogLeg('FOC_st_s_A', ...
        [mc,pB_0(t,a,b,c,h,q),W0_A,WA_A,WB_A,WW_C,a,b,h,q], ...
        pA_0(t,a,b,c,h,q),options);
    infoB(6)=0;
% both have capa: dual maximization
else
    pDog_0 = zeros(2,1);
    pDog_0(1) = pA_0(t,a,b,c,h,q);
    pDog_0(2) = pB_0(t,a,b,c,h,q);
    [pDog,info] = ...
        DogLeg('FOC_st_s_AB', ...
        [mc,mc,W0_A,W0_B,WA_A,WA_B,WB_A,WB_B,WW_C,a,b,h,q], ...
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        pDog_0,options);
    pA(t,a,b,c,h,q) = pDog(1);
    pB(t,a,b,c,h,q) = pDog(2);
end
% report possible error
if info(6)>3 || infoB(6)>3
    warning('There is a problem with DogLeg!');
    pause
end
% internal EQ loop ok (done = 1) if tolerance ok
tolpA = abs(pA(t,a,b,c,h,q)-pA_0(t,a,b,c,h,q))/(1+abs(pA(t,a,b,c,h,q)));
tolpB = abs(pB(t,a,b,c,h,q)-pB_0(t,a,b,c,h,q))/(1+abs(pB(t,a,b,c,h,q)));
if ((tolpA<tol) && (tolpB<tol)) || (iter>=maxiter)
    done = 1;
end
% if tolerance level not reached -> another EQ loop
if ~done
    iter = iter + 1;
end
% display iteration numbers
if (mod(iter,10)==0) || done
    disp(sprintf('iter=%d tolpA=%g tolpB=%g',iter,tolpA,tolpB));
end
% old price as new starting value
pA_0(t,a,b,c,h,q) = pA(t,a,b,c,h,q);
pB_0(t,a,b,c,h,q) = pB(t,a,b,c,h,q);
    end     % end done of internal price equilibrium
    % Update value function.
    % get demand for EQ prices
    [D0,DA,DB] = demand_st_s(pA(t,a,b,c,h,q),pB(t,a,b,c,h,q),WW_C,a,b,h,q);
    De0(t,a,b,c,h,q) = D0;
    DeA(t,a,b,c,h,q) = DA;
    DeB(t,a,b,c,h,q) = DB;
    % firms
    V1A(t,a,b,c,h,q) = DA.*(pA(t,a,b,c,h,q)-mc) ...
                       + beta.*(D0.*W0_A+DA.*WA_A+DB.*WB_A) ;
    V0A(t,a,b,c,h,q) = V1A(t,a,b,c,h,q);
    V1B(t,a,b,c,h,q) = DB.*(pB(t,a,b,c,h,q)-mc) ...
                       + beta.*(D0.*W0_B+DA.*WA_B+DB.*WB_B);
    V0B(t,a,b,c,h,q) = V1B(t,a,b,c,h,q);
    % consumers
    uw = exp( betac.*(WW_C) );
    if ( a==1 && b == 1 ) || c==1
        V1C(t,a,b,c,h,q) = 0 ;
    elseif a==1 && b ~= 1
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        V1C(t,a,b,c,h,q) ...
        = log( 0 + exp( (v-pB(t,a,b,c,h,q))./mu ) + uw );
    elseif b==1 && a ~= 1
        V1C(t,a,b,c,h,q) = ...
        log( exp( (v-pA(t,a,b,c,h,q))./mu ) + 0 + uw );
    else
        V1C(t,a,b,c,h,q) = ...
        log( (1/2)* ( exp( (v-pA(t,a,b,c,h,q))./mu ) ...
        + exp( (v-pB(t,a,b,c,h,q))./mu ) + 2*uw ) );
    end
    V0C(t,a,b,c,h,q) = V1C(t,a,b,c,h,q);
Define welfare measures. To be adjusted for arrival rates, if neccessary!
    if t == T
        SumDn0W(t,a,b,c,h,q) = 0;
        WF(t,a,b,c,h,q) = 0;
        ProfA(t,a,b,c,h,q) = 0;
        ProfB(t,a,b,c,h,q) = 0;
        Profs(t,a,b,c,h,q) = 0;
        CS(t,a,b,c,h,q) = 0;
        Pricing(t,a,b,c,h) = NaN;
    else
        [PrL_0,PrW_A,PrW_B] = transprobs_st_s(t,a,b,c,h,q);
        Sum_0 = sum(sum(sum(sum(sum(sum(PrL_0.*SumDn0W))))));
        Sum_A = sum(sum(sum(sum(sum(sum(PrW_A.*SumDn0W))))));
        Sum_B = sum(sum(sum(sum(sum(sum(PrW_B.*SumDn0W))))));
        CS_0 = sum(sum(sum(sum(sum(sum(PrL_0.*CS))))));
        CS_A = sum(sum(sum(sum(sum(sum(PrW_A.*CS))))));
        CS_B = sum(sum(sum(sum(sum(sum(PrW_B.*CS))))));
        % sum of realized trades = efficiency
        SumDn0W(t,a,b,c,h,q) = DA + DB ...
           + beta.*( D0.*Sum_0 + DA.*Sum_A + DB.*Sum_B );
        % consumer surplus
        uw = exp( betac.*(WW_C) );
        if a==1 && b == 1 && c>0
            CS(t,a,b,c,h,q) = 0;
        elseif c==1
            CS(t,a,b,c,h,q) = ...
                beta.*( D0.*CS_0 + DA.*CS_A + DB.*CS_B);
        elseif a==1 && b ~= 1 && c>1
            CS(t,a,b,c,h,q) = ...
                log( 1 + 0 + exp( (v-pB(t,a,b,c,h,q))./mu ) ) ...
                + beta.*( D0.*CS_0 + DA.*CS_A + DB.*CS_B);
        elseif a~=1 && b == 1 && c>1
            CS(t,a,b,c,h,q) = ...
                log( 1 + exp( (v-pA(t,a,b,c,h,q))./mu ) + 0 ) ...
                              + beta.*( D0.*CS_0 + DA.*CS_A + DB.*CS_B);
        elseif a>1 && b>1 && c>1
            CS(t,a,b,c,h,q) = ...
               log( (1/2)* ( 2 + exp( (v-pA(t,a,b,c,h,q))./mu ) ...
               + exp( (v-pB(t,a,b,c,h,q))./mu ) ) ) ...
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               + beta.*( D0.*CS_0 + DA.*CS_A + DB.*CS_B);
        end
        % firm profits
        ProfA(t,a,b,c,h,q) = V1A(t,a,b,c,h,q)-kc*(a-1);
        ProfB(t,a,b,c,h,q) = V1B(t,a,b,c,h,q)-kc*(b-1);
        Profs(t,a,b,c,h,q) = ProfA(t,a,b,c,h,q) + ProfB(t,a,b,c,h,q);
    end
check if global deviation
    %candidates
    V1A_cand = V1A(t,a,b,c,h,q);
    V1B_cand = V1B(t,a,b,c,h,q);
    pA_cand = pA(t,a,b,c,h,q);
    pB_cand = pB(t,a,b,c,h,q);
    % find global best
    pA_glob_N = v*12*mm*(10/v)*2;
    pB_glob_N = v*12*mm*(10/v)*2;
    V1A_glob = zeros(pA_glob_N);
    V1B_glob = zeros(pB_glob_N);
    % e.g. if mm=5, run through all prices -12*v...+12*v, in steps of 2/v
    for pA_glob_10 = 1:pA_glob_N
            pA_glob = pA_glob_10/(mm*(10/v)) - (pA_glob_N/2)/(mm*(10/v));
            [D0_glob,DA_glob,DB_glob] = ...
                demand_st_s(pA_glob,pB_cand,WW_C,a,b,h,q);
            V1A_glob(pA_glob_10) = DA_glob.*(pA_glob-mc) ...
                + beta.*(D0_glob.*W0_A+DA_glob.*WA_A+DB_glob.*WB_A);
    end
    for pB_glob_10 = 1:pB_glob_N
            pB_glob = pB_glob_10/(mm*(10/v)) - (pB_glob_N/2)/(mm*(10/v));
            [D0_glob,DA_glob,DB_glob] = ...
                demand_st_s(pA_cand,pB_glob,WW_C,a,b,h,q);
            V1B_glob(pB_glob_10) = DB_glob.*(pB_glob-mc) ...
                + beta.*(D0_glob.*W0_B+DA_glob.*WA_B+DB_glob.*WB_B);
    end
    pA_glob_best_10 = 1;
    pB_glob_best_10 = 1;
    for ppA_10 = 1:pA_glob_N
        if V1A_glob(ppA_10) >= V1A_glob(pA_glob_best_10)
            pA_glob_best_10 = ppA_10;
        end
    end
    for ppB_10 = 1:pB_glob_N
        if V1B_glob(ppB_10) >= V1B_glob(pB_glob_best_10)
            pB_glob_best_10 = ppB_10;
        end
    end
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    pA_glob_best = pA_glob_best_10/(mm*(10/v)) - (pA_glob_N/2)/(mm*(10/v));
    pB_glob_best = pB_glob_best_10/(mm*(10/v)) - (pB_glob_N/2)/(mm*(10/v));
    %  Adjust pA and pB
    if a == 1 || c==1
        pA_glob_best=realmax;
    end
    if b == 1 || c==1
        pB_glob_best=realmax;
    end
    % best VA
    [D0_glob,DA_glob,DB_glob] = ...
        demand_st_s(pA_glob_best,pB_cand,WW_C,a,b,h,q);
    V1A_glob_best = DA_glob.*(pA_glob_best-mc) ...
                    + beta.*(D0_glob.*W0_A+DA_glob.*WA_A+DB_glob.*WB_A);
    % best VB
    [D0_glob,DA_glob,DB_glob] = ...
        demand_st_s(pA_cand,pB_glob_best,WW_C,a,b,h,q);
    V1B_glob_best = DB_glob.*(pB_glob_best-mc) ...
                    + beta.*(D0_glob.*W0_B+DA_glob.*WA_B+DB_glob.*WB_B);
    % end condition for doneGlob
    % first, assume all works
    doneGlob = 1;
    pA_0_G(t,a,b,c,h,q) = pA(t,a,b,c,h,q);
    pB_0_G(t,a,b,c,h,q) = pB(t,a,b,c,h,q);
    DifpA = abs(pA_glob_best-pA_cand);
    DifpB = abs(pB_glob_best-pB_cand);
    DifVA = (V1A_glob_best-V1A_cand);
    DifVB = (V1B_glob_best-V1B_cand);
    % done not 1 only if not global max
    pAglobnot = 0;
    pBglobnot = 0;
    if ( (DifpA > ((v/20)/mm)) ...
            && (abs(V1A_glob_best - V1A_cand)>((v/20)/mm)) )
        disp(sprintf('pA NOT GLOBAL MAX'));
        doneGlob = 0;
        iterGlob = iterGlob + 1;
        pA_0_G(t,a,b,c,h,q) = pA_glob_best;
        pAglobnot = 1;
        if iterGlob==maxiter
            iterGlobexp(t,a,b,c,h,q) = 1;
        end
    end
    if ( (DifpB > ((v/20)/mm)) ...
            && (abs(V1B_glob_best - V1B_cand)>((v/20)/mm)) )
        disp(sprintf('pB NOT GLOBAL MAX'));
        doneGlob = 0;
        iterGlob = iterGlob + 1;
        pB_0_G(t,a,b,c,h,q) = pB_glob_best;
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        pBglobnot = 1;
        if iterGlob==maxiter
            iterGlobexp(t,a,b,c,h,q) = 1;
        end
    end
    if (mod(iterGlob,10)==0) || done
        disp(sprintf('iterGlob=%d',iterGlob));
    end
    % if no EQ found, ok. Go to next starting value
    if iterGlob >= maxIterGlob
        doneGlob = 1 ;
        % take prices and value from previous starting value
        V1A(t,a,b,c,h,q) = V00A(t,a,b,c,h,q);
        V1B(t,a,b,c,h,q) = V00B(t,a,b,c,h,q);
        V1C(t,a,b,c,h,q) = V00C(t,a,b,c,h,q);
        pA(t,a,b,c,h,q) = pA00(t,a,b,c,h,q);
        pB(t,a,b,c,h,q) = pB00(t,a,b,c,h,q);
    end
end % end doneGlob
% end conditions for loop done 2
% Convergence in Values and prices and for done2 loop
tolVA = abs((V1A(t,a,b,c,h,q)-V00A(t,a,b,c,h,q))./ ...
    (1+abs(V1A(t,a,b,c,h,q))));
tolVB = abs((V1B(t,a,b,c,h,q)-V00B(t,a,b,c,h,q))./ ...
    (1+abs(V1B(t,a,b,c,h,q))));
tolPrA = abs((pA(t,a,b,c,h,q)-pA00(t,a,b,c,h,q))./ ...
    (1+abs(pA(t,a,b,c,h,q))));
tolPrB = abs((pB(t,a,b,c,h,q)-pB00(t,a,b,c,h,q))./ ...
    (1+abs(pB(t,a,b,c,h,q))));
% unique EQ = same EQ as with prior starting value
if ((tolPrA<tol) && (tolPrB<tol) && (tolVA<tol) && (tolVB<tol) ...
        || (iter2>=maxiter)) || ...
        (startval2==lowerstart && startval2==lowerstart)
    unique = 1;
else
    unique = 0;
    iter2 = iter2+1;
end
% if EQ not unique.. try again with updated starting values
if ((mod(iter2,10)==0) && iter2~=0 ) || done2
    disp(sprintf('No EQ'));










if unique == 1
    startval2 = startval2+1;
    disp(sprintf('iter2=%d startval1=%g startval2=%g', ...
        iter2,startval1,startval2));
end
if unique == 1 && startval2 == upperstart && startval1~=upperstart
    startval1 = startval1+1;
    startval2 = lowerstart;
    disp(sprintf('iter2=%d startval1=%g startval2=%g', ...
        iter2,startval1,startval2));
end
% if for all starting values ok, finish done2 loop
if unique == 1 && startval2 == upperstart && startval1 == upperstart
    startval2 = lowerstart;
    startval1 = lowerstart;
    done2 = 1;
end
            end % end done2 loop
        end %q
        end %b
        end %a
        end %h
        end %c
    end % end for t<T
% end of computation
toc
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% Dynamic Pricing under Capacity-constrained Competition with a Deadline
% Philipp Dimakopoulos, November 2017
%




r = 0.00;                           % discount rate.
beta = 1./(1+r);                    % discount factor.
% Constants: States. Starting Values.
T = 11;      % # time periods until good perishes
A = 16;      % # capacity A  % 1=>0
B = 16;      % # capacity B  % 1=>0
C = T;       % number of consumers waiting maximally in total %1=0 C>=T
H = 10;      % variations in mu
Q = 11;      % for variations of betac 0... 1
% Constants: Product market.
mc = 0;             % marginal costs
v = 100;            % quality of inside goods.
kc = 0;             % linear produciton costs of capacity
lowerstart = -20;   % starting value lower bound for uniqueness loop (*v/10)
upperstart = 20;    % starting value upper bound for uniqueness loop (*v/10)
% Constants: Program control.
tol = 1e-4;                % tolerance.
maxiter = 5000;            % maximum number of iteration.
maxIterGlob = 25;          % max iters until: no EQ for these start values




% Logit Demand. Consumer heterogeneity
mufix = v/10;
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% Dynamic Pricing under Capacity-constrained Competition with a Deadline
% Philipp Dimakopoulos, November 2017
%
% Beta c (patience) Function, Forward-Looking Consumers
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%





    if q == i
       betacfu = ((q-1)/(Q-1));
    end
end
% or fix betac!
%betacfu = 1;
end
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% Dynamic Pricing under Capacity-constrained Competition with a Deadline
% Philipp Dimakopoulos, November 2017
%
% Mu (Heterogeneity) Function, Forward-Looking Consumers
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [mufu] = mufun(h);
% Globals.
global beta v H mufix;
% example
for i=1:5
    if h == i
        mufu = (i)* ( (v/10) / 5 ); %2,4,6,8,10
    end
end
for i=6:7
    if h == i
        mufu = (i-3)* ( (v/10) / 2 ); %15,20
    end
end
for i=8:10
    if h == i
        mufu = (i-5)* ( (v/10) ); %30,40,50
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% Dynamic Pricing under Capacity-constrained Competition with a Deadline
% Philipp Dimakopoulos, November 2017
%
% Demand Function, Forward-Looking Consumers
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%







uw = 2 * (exp( betac.*(WW_C) ) );
if aa == 1
    u1 = 0;
    uw = exp( betac.*(WW_C) );
else
    u1 = exp( ((v-p1)./mu) );
end
if bb == 1
    u2 = 0;
    uw = exp( betac.*(WW_C) );
else
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% Dynamic Pricing under Capacity-constrained Competition with a Deadline
% Philipp Dimakopoulos, November 2017
%
% First Order Condition A, Forward-Looking Consumers
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [Del,Jac] = FOC_st_s_A(p1,parms);
% Globals.
global beta H;


















Del = D1.*(1 - (1/mu).*(p1-mc1) - (1/mu).*beta.*WA_A + (1/mu).*Omega);
% Jacobian.
Jac = (1/mu).* ( Del.*(2.*D1 - 1)-D1 );
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% Dynamic Pricing under Capacity-constrained Competition with a Deadline
% Philipp Dimakopoulos, November 2017
%
% First Order Condition B, Forward-Looking Consumers
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [Del,Jac] = FOC_st_s_B(p2,parms);
% Globals.
global beta H;


















Del = D2.*(1 - (1/mu).*(p2-mc2) - (1/mu).*beta.*WB_B + (1/mu).*Omega);
% Jacobian.
Jac = (1/mu) .* ( Del.*(2.*D2 - 1)-D2 );
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% Dynamic Pricing under Capacity-constrained Competition with a Deadline
% Philipp Dimakopoulos, November 2017
%
% First Order Condition AB, Forward-Looking Consumers
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [Del,Jac] = FOC_st_s_AB(p,parms);
% Globals.
global beta H;
% Parameters: Marginal cost, rival's price, and expected values
mc_A = parms(1); mc_B = parms(2);
W0_A = parms(3); W0_B = parms(4);
WA_A = parms(5); WA_B = parms(6);
WB_A = parms(7); WB_B = parms(8);
WW_C = parms(9);
aa = parms(10); bb = parms(11);















Jac(1,1) = (1/mu).* ( Del(1).*(2.*D1 - 1)-D1 );
Jac(1,2) = (1/mu).* D2.*Del(1) + (1/(mu^2)).*D1.*D2.*(Omega(1)-beta.*WB_A);
Jac(2,1) = (1/mu).* D1.*Del(2) + (1/(mu^2)).*D1.*D2.*(Omega(2)-beta.*WA_B);
Jac(2,2) = (1/mu).* ( Del(2).*(2.*D2 - 1)-D2 );
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% Dynamic Pricing under Capacity-constrained Competition with a Deadline
% Philipp Dimakopoulos, November 2017
%
% DogLeg (Root-Finding), Forward-Looking Consumers
% from Hans Bruun Nielsen,  IMM, DTU.  99.06.10
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function  [X, info, perf] = DogLeg(fun,par, x0, opts)
%DogLeg  Dog Leg method for nonlinear system of equations
%    f_i(x) = 0 , i=1,...,n
%  where  x  is a vector,  x = [x_1, ..., x_n] .
%  In the discussion we also introduce the function
%    F(x) = .5 * sum(f_i(x)^2) .
%  The functions  f_i(x)  and the Jacobian matrix  J(x)  (with
%  elements  J(i,j) = Df_i/Dx_j ) must be given by a MATLAB
%  function with declaration
%            function  [f, J] = fun(x, par)
%  par  may be dummy.
%
%  Call:
%      [X, info {, perf}] = DogLeg(fun,par, x0, opts)
%
%  Input parameters
%  fun  :  String with the name of the function.
%  par  :  Parameters of the function.  May be empty.
%  x0   :  Starting guess for  x .
%  opts :  Vector with five elements:
%          opts(1) = Initial trust region radius.
%          opts(2:5) used in stopping criteria:
%              ||F'||inf <= opts(2)                     or
%              ||dx||2 <= opts(3)*(opts(3) + ||x||2)    or
%              ||f||inf <= opts(4)                      or
%              no. of iteration steps exceeds  opts(5) .
%
%  Output parameters
%  X    :  If  perf  is present, then array, holding the iterates
%          columnwise.  Otherwise, computed solution vector.
%  info :  Performance information, vector with 6 elements:
%          info(1:4) = final values of
%              [||f(x)||inf  ||F'||inf  ||dx||2  Delta]
%          info(5) = no. of iteration steps
%          info(6) = 1 :  Stopped by small  ||f(x)||inf
%                    2 :  Stopped by small  ||F'(x)||inf
%                    3 :  Stopped by small x-step
%                    4 :  Stopped by  kmax
%                    5 :  Problems, indicated by printout.
%  perf :  (optional). If present, then array, holding
%            perf(1,:) = values of  ||f(x)||inf
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%            perf(2,:) = values of  ||F'(x)||inf
%            perf(3,:) = Radius of trust region,  Delta
%            perf(4,:) = values of  beta
%  Hans Bruun Nielsen,  IMM, DTU.  99.06.10
   %  Check and initialize
   [x n f J] = check(fun,par,x0,opts);
   thrc = max(20,n)*eps;    % For checking consistency
   g = J'*f;   ng = norm(g,inf);   ng2 = norm(g);   nf = norm(f,inf);
   delta = opts(1);   kmax = opts(5);
   F = (f'*f)/2;
   Trace = nargout > 2;
   if  Trace
         X = x*ones(1,kmax+1);
         perf = [nf; ng; delta; 0]*ones(1,kmax+1);
       end
   k = 1;   nu = 2;   stop = 0;   nx = opts(3) + norm(x);   beta = 0;
   nh = 0;   % added 04.05.12
   while  ~stop
     %  Check stopping criteria
     if      nf <= opts(4),  stop = 1;
     elseif  ng <= opts(2),  stop = 2;
     elseif  delta <= opts(3)*nx,  stop = 3;
     else    %  Find step
       alpha = (ng2/norm(J*g))^2;   a = -alpha*g;   na = alpha*ng2;
       [Q R] = qr(J);   y = Q'*(-f);
       D = abs(diag(R));
       si = find(D <= thrc*max(D));  nsi = length(si);
       if  nsi    % Singular.  Check consistency
         if  norm(y(si)) > thrc*F
           stop = 5;
           disp('Singular, non-consistent Newton equations.')
         else  % Find minimum norm solution
           p = ones(1,n);   p(si) = zeros(1,nsi);   p = find(p);
           RR = R(p,p);   b0 = [RR\y(p); zeros(nsi,1)];
           N = [RR\R(p,si); -eye(nsi)];
           b = b0 - N*(N\b0);
         end
       else,  b = R\y;  end
       if  ~stop    %  Proceed with Dog Leg
         nb = norm(b);
         if      nb <= delta    % Newton step
           h = b;   beta = 1;   nh = nb;   dL = F;
         elseif  na >= delta    %  Steepest descent
           h = -(delta/ng2)*g;   beta = 0;   nh = delta;
           dL = delta*(ng2 - .5*delta/alpha);
         else    % 'True' dog leg
           c = b - a;   cf = [c'*[c  2*a]  na^2-delta^2];
           beta = max(roots(cf));
           h = a + beta*c;   nh = delta;
           dL = .5*alpha*(1-beta)^2*ng2^2 + beta*(2-beta)*F;
         end
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         if  nh <= opts(3)*nx,  stop = 3; end
       end
     end
     if  ~stop    % Perform step
       xnew = x + h;
       [fn,Jn] = feval(fun, xnew,par);   Fn = (fn'*fn)/2;
       dF = F - Fn;
       if  (dL > 0) & (dF > 0)
         x = xnew;   nx = opts(3) + norm(x);
         F = Fn;  J = Jn;  f = fn;  nf = norm(f,inf);
         g = J'*f;   ng = norm(g,inf);   ng2 = norm(g);
         delta = delta / max(1/3, (1 - (2*dF/dL - 1)^3));   nu = 2;
       else
         delta = delta / nu;  nu = 2*nu;
       end
       k = k + 1;
       if  Trace
             X(:,k) = x;
             perf(:,k) = [nf; ng; delta; 0];  perf(4,k-1) = beta;
           end
       if  k > kmax,  stop = 4; end
     end
   end
   %  Set return values
   if  Trace
     X = X(:,1:k);   perf = perf(:,1:k);
   else,  X = x;  end
   info = [nf  ng  nh  delta  k-1  stop];
% ==========  auxiliary function  =================================
function  [x,n, f,J] = check(fun,par,x0,opts)
%  Check function call
   sx = size(x0);   n = max(sx);
   if  (min(sx) > 1)
       error('x0  should be a vector'), end
   x = x0(:);   [f J] = feval(fun,x,par);
   sf = size(f);   sJ = size(J);
   if  sf(2) ~= 1 | sf(1) ~= n
       tx = 'f  must be a column vector of the same length as  x';
       error(tx), end
   if  sJ(1) ~= sf(1)
       error('row numbers in  f  and  J  do not match'), end
   if  any(sJ ~= n),  error('J  must be an n*n matrix'), end
%  Thresholds
   if  length(opts) < 5
       error('opts  must have 5 elements'), end
   if  length(find(opts(1:5) <= 0))
       error('The elements in  opts  must be strictly positive'), end
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% Dynamic Pricing under Capacity-constrained Competition with a Deadline
% Philipp Dimakopoulos, November 2017
%
% Transitiion Probability Function, Forward-Looking Consumers
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [PrL_0,PrW_A,PrW_B] = transprobs_st_s(t,a,b,c,h,q);
% Globals.





% ASS: choosing to buy at empty firm = waiting
% no consumer waiting in the market: if noone chose (0,A,B)
% relevant valuation matrix entry is prob of arrival
% note that capas unchanged as no consumer around to buy
if c==1
        % if arrival between t and t+1 -> c'=c+1
        PrL_0(min(T,t+1),a,b,min(C,c+1),h,q) = arr;
        PrW_A(min(T,t+1),a,b,min(C,c+1),h,q) = arr;
        PrW_B(min(T,t+1),a,b,min(C,c+1),h,q) = arr;
        % if no arrival between t and t+1 -> c'=c
        PrL_0(min(T,t+1),a,b,c,h,q) = 1-arr;
        PrW_A(min(T,t+1),a,b,c,h,q) = 1-arr;
        PrW_B(min(T,t+1),a,b,c,h,q) = 1-arr;
% at least one consumer, hence
% after arrival (and sale): c'=c-1+1=c
% after arrival (and no sale): c'=c+1=c+1
% after no arrival (and sale): c'=c-1
% after no arrival (and no sale): c'=c
else
    if a>1 && b>1
        PrL_0(min(T,t+1),a,b,min(C,c+1),h,q) = arr;
        PrW_A(min(T,t+1),a-1,b,c,h,q) = arr;
        PrW_B(min(T,t+1),a,b-1,c,h,q) = arr;
        PrL_0(min(T,t+1),a,b,c,h,q) = 1-arr;
        PrW_A(min(T,t+1),a-1,b,c-1,h,q) = 1-arr;
        PrW_B(min(T,t+1),a,b-1,c-1,h,q) = 1-arr;
B. Appendix: Algorithm for Equilibrium (Programming Code) 173
2
    elseif a==1 && b>1
        PrL_0(min(T,t+1),a,b,min(C,c+1),h,q) = arr;
        PrW_A(min(T,t+1),a,b,min(C,c+1),h,q) = arr;
        PrW_B(min(T,t+1),a,b-1,c,h,q) = arr;
        PrL_0(min(T,t+1),a,b,c,h,q) = 1-arr;
        PrW_A(min(T,t+1),a,b,c,h,q) = 1-arr;
        PrW_B(min(T,t+1),a,b-1,c-1,h,q) = 1-arr;
    elseif a>1 && b==1
        PrL_0(min(T,t+1),a,b,min(C,c+1),h,q) = arr;
        PrW_A(min(T,t+1),a-1,b,c,h,q) = arr;
        PrW_B(min(T,t+1),a,b,min(C,c+1),h,q) = arr;
        PrL_0(min(T,t+1),a,b,c,h,q) = 1-arr;
        PrW_A(min(T,t+1),a-1,b,c-1,h,q) = 1-arr;
        PrW_B(min(T,t+1),a,b,c,h,q) = 1-arr;
    elseif a==1 && b==1
        PrL_0(min(T,t+1),a,b,min(C,c+1),h,q) = arr;
        PrW_A(min(T,t+1),a,b,min(C,c+1),h,q) = arr;
        PrW_B(min(T,t+1),a,b,min(C,c+1),h,q) = arr;
        PrL_0(min(T,t+1),a,b,c,h,q) = 1-arr;
        PrW_A(min(T,t+1),a,b,c,h,q) = 1-arr;
        PrW_B(min(T,t+1),a,b,c,h,q) = 1-arr;
    end
end
end
Published with MATLAB® R2014b




% Dynamic Pricing under Capacity-constrained Competition with a Deadline
% Philipp Dimakopoulos, November 2017
%
% Lucky Consumer Transition Probability Func, Forward-Looking Consumers
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [PrC_0] = transprobs_st_s_cons(t,a,b,c,h,q,De0,DeA,DeB);
% Globals.
global A B T C H Q arr;
% Transition probabilities for waiting consumers.
PrC_0 = zeros(T,A,B,C,H,Q);
% prob to reach this state
prob = zeros(T,A,B,C,H,Q);
% end prob to be at this state (Zwischenstop)
eprob = zeros(T,A,B,C,H,Q);
% assumption: choosing to buy at empty firm = waiting
% end prob of current period = 1 (starting point)
eprob(t,a,b,c,h,1)=1;
for tt = t+1:+1:T-1 %nur bis T-1, denn in t=T V=0
    for aa = a:-1:1
    for bb = b:-1:1
    % prob and end prob of a state with no consumer (i.e. cc=1)
        % is not possible out of the perspective of a consumer
    for cc = 2:C
% I am the only one, i.e. in tt it will be my turn,
    % no matter what I choose to do
if cc==2
    % prob to reach this state is sum of
    % 1) after end prob tt-1 & no arrival,
    % not after arr since I am the only one and can not jsut have arrived
    prob(tt,aa,bb,cc,h,1) = 0
        + (1-arr)*( eprob(tt-1,aa,bb,cc,h,1) *( (cc-1)/(cc-1) ) );
    % end prob for this state is the sum of
    % 1) after the lucky consumer waited in tt [not possible cc=2]
    % 2) after endprob tt-1 & other cons did A or (3: B)
        % (i.e. I was unluncky cc-1/cc)
        % arr: in tt-1: aa/bb + 1, cc=cc+1-1,
        % in tt the other cons bought at aa/bb +1, cc=cc+1
        % no arr: in tt-1: aa/bb + 1, cc=cc+1,
        % in tt the other cons bought at aa/bb +1, cc=cc+1
    eprob(tt,aa,bb,cc,h,1) = 0 ...
       + arr *( eprob(tt-1,min(A,aa+1),bb,cc+1-1,h,1) ...
        *  DeA(tt,min(A,aa+1),bb,min(C,cc+1),h,1) * ( (cc-1)/cc ) )...
       + arr*( eprob(tt-1,aa,min(B,bb+1),cc+1-1,h,1) ...
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        *  DeB(tt,aa,min(B,bb+1),min(C,cc+1),h,1) * ( (cc-1)/cc ) )...
       + (1-arr)*( eprob(tt-1,min(A,aa+1),bb,min(C,cc+1),h,1) ...
        *  DeA(tt,min(A,aa+1),bb,min(C,cc+1),h,1) * ( (cc-1)/cc ) )...
       + (1-arr)*( eprob(tt-1,aa,min(B,bb+1),min(C,cc+1),h,1) ...
        *  DeB(tt,aa,min(B,bb+1),min(C,cc+1),h,1) * ( (cc-1)/cc ) );
else %cc>2 (at least two consumers)
    % Exclude possiility that after aa=1 someone could have chosen A
        % end prob for this state is the sum of
        % 1) after end prob in tt-1 & I am unlucky (cc-2/cc-1)
            % & in tt waiting of other cons
                % arr: in tt-1: aa/bb, cc=cc-1,
                    % in tt the lucky cons waited at aa/bb, cc=cc
                % no arr: in tt-1: aa/bb, cc=cc,
                    % in tt the lucky cons waited at aa/bb, cc=cc
        % 2) after endprob tt-1 & other cons did A or (3: B)
             % I was unluncky before they bought,
                    % when we were 1 more cc: cc-1/cc
                % arr: in tt-1: aa/bb + 1, cc=cc+1-1=cc,
                    % in tt the lucky cons bought at aa/bb +1, cc=cc+1
                % no arr: in tt-1: aa/bb + 1, cc=cc+1,
                % in tt the lucky cons bought at aa/bb +1, cc=cc+1
        eprob(tt,aa,bb,cc,h,1) = ...
         arr *( eprob(tt-1,aa,bb,max(1,cc-1),h,1) ...
             * De0(tt,aa,bb,cc,h,1) * ( (cc-2)/(cc-1) ) )...
         + (1-arr)*( eprob(tt-1,aa,bb,cc,h,1) ...
             * De0(tt,aa,bb,cc,h,1) * ( (cc-2)/(cc-1) ) )...
         + arr*( eprob(tt-1,min(A,aa+1),bb,cc,h,1) ...
             * DeA(tt,min(A,aa+1),bb,min(C,cc+1),h,1) * ( (cc-1)/cc ) )...
         + (1-arr)*( eprob(tt-1,min(A,aa+1),bb,min(C,cc+1),h,1) ...
             * DeA(tt,min(A,aa+1),bb,min(C,cc+1),h,1) * ( (cc-1)/cc ) )...
         + arr*( eprob(tt-1,aa,min(B,bb+1),cc,h,1) ...
             *  DeB(tt,aa,min(B,bb+1),min(C,cc+1),h,1) * ( (cc-1)/cc ) )...
         + (1-arr)*( eprob(tt-1,aa,min(B,bb+1),min(C,cc+1),h,1) ...
             * DeB(tt,aa,min(B,bb+1),min(C,cc+1),h,1) * ( (cc-1)/cc ) );
    end
    end
    end
    end
end
% in T use T-1 endprob as PrcW (V=0 anyways).
% So ist Summe PrC_0 immer eins (zur Kontrolle)
PrC_0 = prob;
for aa = a:-1:1
    for bb = b:-1:1
    for cc = 1:C
        PrC_0(T,aa,bb,cc,h,1) = eprob(T-1,aa,bb,cc,h,1);
    end
    end
end
end
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